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GENERAL ABSTRACT 
In this study comprised of three chapters, I bring together the Essays of Michel de Montaigne 
and novice psychotherapists, including myself, in a conversation about our discipline. Our 
discussion bubbles over conventional boundaries of the natural sciences into the fertile yet 
groundless realm of the humanities. Questions about ordinary experience, uncertainty, 
presence, embodiment, friendship, conversation, plain speech, tradition, and Renaissance 
humanism come alive for us in this dialogue. 
The introductory essay is a meditation on friendship in which I lay the groundwork for a 
festive meeting between therapists and the Essays. In the second essay, I take a look at the 
Renaissance as an era of discovery and openness. I explore how this reality came to be 
expressed in two ways: through the essay and the natural sciences. The third essay is made up 
of sidelong glanees at the elusive nature of experience, as so vividly evoked in the Essays. 
Reframing humanistic therapy within the wider humanism of Montaigne allows me to reflect 
on the intersubjective nature of lived experience from unexpected angles. 
This study celebrates Montaigne 's Essays as a vital companion text for psychotherapists. It is 
part of a larger endeavour in psychotherapy to restore the humanities as a complementary 
source of understanding alongside the natural sciences. I try to show fellow students how 
psychotherapy can be understood and enriched through engagement with the Essays, as weil 
as with other conversations that take place in the humanities. 
By adopting the playful yet disciplined essay form, I hope to entice therapy students into a 
hospitable human world, one that bas been obscured by the progressive shadow ofmodemity. 
No longer alone, we can resist the temptations of theoretical expertise and come home to a 
conversation. 
Keywords: psychotherapy, Michel de Montaigne, essay, experience, presence, 
embodiment, friendship, conversation, intersubjectivity, Renaissance humanism 
RÉSUMÉ GÉNÉRAL 
Dans cette étude composée de trois chapitres, je rassemble les Essais de Michel de 
Montaigne et les psychothérapeutes débutants, y compris moi-même, dans une conversation 
au sujet de notre discipline. Nos discussions débordent les limites conventionnelles des 
sciences naturelles pour entrer dans le domaine fertile mais incertain des humanités. Les 
questions concernant l'expérience ordinaire, l'incertitude, la présence, l'incamation, l'amitié, 
la conversation, le discours clair, la tradition, et l' humanisme de la Renaissance prennent vie 
pour nous au cœur de ce dialogue. 
L'essai d ' introduction est une méditation sur l'amitié dans laquelle je pose les bases pour une 
rencontre festive entre les thérapeutes et les Essais. Dans le second essai, je m'intéresse à la 
Renaissance en tant que période de découverte et d 'ouverture. J'explore comment cette 
réalité s'est exprimée de deux manières : à travers l'essai littéraire et les sciences naturelles. 
Le troisième essai est constitué de regards obliques sur la nature insaisissable de l'expérience, 
tel que si lucidement évoquée dans les Essais. Recadrer la thérapie humaniste à l'intérieur de 
l' humanisme plus étendu de Montaigne me permet de réfléchir sur la nature intersubjective 
de l'expérience vécue à partir de points de vue inattendus. 
Cette étude est une célébration des Essais de Montaigne en tant que texte d ' accompagnement 
vital pour les psychothérapeutes. Elle fait partie d ' un effort plus vaste de revalorisation des 
humanités en tant que source de connaissances complémentaire aux sciences naturelles pour 
la psychothérapie. J'essaie de présenter à mes camarades étudiants de quelle façon la 
psychothérapie peut être comprise et enrichie en abordant les Essais, ainsi que les autres 
conversations ayant lieu au sein des humanités. 
En adoptant la forme de l ' essai, ludique mais rigoureux, je souhaite inciter les étudi ants de la 
thérapie à entrer dans un monde humain hospitalier, un monde qui fût obscurci par l' ombre 
progressive de la modernité. N 'étant alors plus seul, il nous est possible de résister aux 
tentations de l'expertise théorique et d'en revenir à une conversation. 
Mots-clés : psychothérapie, Michel de Montaigne, essai, expenence, présence, 
incarnation, amitié, conversation, intersubjectivité, humanisme de la Renaissance 
PRELUDE 
Our !ife is composed, like the ham1ony of the world, of contrary things, also of different ton es, sweet 
and harsh, sharp and flat, soft and loud. If a musician liked only one kind, what wou id he have to say? 
He must know how to use them together and bi end them. [ ... ] Our existence is impossible without this 
mixture, and one element is no Jess necessary for it than the othe:. 
- Michel de Montaigne 
But this talking of oneself, following one 's own vagaries, giving the who le map, weight, colour, and 
circumference of the sou! in its confusion, its variety, its imperfection - this art belonged to one man 
only: to Montaigne. As the centuries go by, there is always a crowd before that picture, gazing into its 
depths, seeing their own faces retlected in it, seeing more the longer they look, never being able to say 
qui te what it is that they see. 
- Virginia Woolf 
Except for y ou, 0 man," sa id that god, "each thing studies itself first, and, according to its needs, has 
limits to its labors and desires. There is not a single thing as empty and needy as you, who embrace the 
uni verse: y ou are the investigator without knowledge, the magistrale without jurisdiction, and ali in ali, 
the fool of the farce. 
- Michel de Montaigne 
TO THE READER 
The structure of this doctoral study is a little unorthodox. As planned, the body is 
composed of two published essays, which are based on my research and writing over the 
course of my degree. However, as I set to writing the introduction to my thesis, it struck me 
that I was writing an introduction to a work that is itself an introduction to the Essays. My 
aim bas always been to introduce fellow novice therapists - in particular those uncomfortably 
confined within the depersonalized realm of medical psychology - to another starting point 
of inquiry into our discipline. I realized that the introduction was an integral part of my 
endeavour, rather than a formality . After its warm reception at the 2012 International Human 
Science Research Conference, 1 continued to essay the introduction until it grew into the first 
chapter of the present study. True to the vision of our companion from Bordeaux, the 
introduction serves as a home for my thought, from which I venture out to discover other 
things, ideas, and people, and to which 1 retum, transformed. 
CHAPTERI 
IN GOOD COMPANY: PSYCHOTHERAPISTS AND THE 
WINE-MAKER FROM BORDEAUX 
Rachel Starr 
ABSTRACT 
The irrepressible 16th century humanist and essayist, Michel de Montaigne, wrote a self-
portrait with su ch unprecedented candour and conversational flair, that he ali but jumps from 
the page and shakes your hand. 1 propose that psychotherapists take Montaigne up on his 
offer of friendship. We could certainly use a friend, and 1 make the case that Montaigne is a 
worthy candidate, perhaps even more so than another contender, Socrates. 
With Montaigne at our side, we gain the confidence to take a closer look at what goes on in 
therapy in all of its remarkable particularity. Consoled and inspired, we step out into the 
wider world, orienting ourselves with respect to our patients and to our discipline. This dual 
movement becomes possible in a lived world made coherent through friendship and 
hospitality. 
In the light of Montaigne's "gay and sociable wisdom", we can see essaying and therapy as 
discrete yet closely intertwined cultural tasks. Each is a candid and honest "work between 
friends" (O'Neill, 1982, p. 19) in which we cultivate painful !osses, tolerate our ordinaty 
foibles, and draw closer to life. The Essays were born in the warm gaze of the library 
bequeathed to Montaigne by his late great friend, Étienne de la Boétie. 1 reflect on what it 
means for therapists to continue this humanist tradition, to receive the gift of the Essays and 
the essay form as part of our cultural heritage. 
Keywords: psychotherapy, Montaigne, essay, Renaissance, humanism, humanities, 
friendship , presence, absence, conversation 
RÉSUMÉ 
L' irrépressible humaniste et essayiste du 16e siècle, Michel de Montaigne, a écrit un 
autoportrait tellement avant-gardiste par sa candeur et son style conversationnel, qu ' il sort 
presque de la page pour nous serrer la main. Je propose que les psychothérapeutes osent 
accepter l'offre d'amitié de Montaigne. Nous avons certainement besoin d'un ami et je 
suggère que Montaigne est un digne candidat, peut-être même davantage qu 'un autre 
prétendant, Socrate. 
En compagnie de Montaigne, nous sommes plus confiants d'examiner ce qui se déroule en 
thérapie dans toute sa singularité. Réconfortés et inspirés, nous élargissons nos horizons et 
adoptons une position respectueuse de nos patients et de notre discipline. Ce double 
mouvement devient possible dans un monde vécu, rendu cohérent grâce à l' amitié et 
l' hospitalité. 
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À la lumière de la« sagesse gaie et sociable » de Montaigne, nous pouvons envisager l'essai 
littéraire et la thérapie comme des tâches culturelles distinctes, mais à la fois étroitement liées. 
Elles sont toutes deux un honnête et candide « travail entre amis » (0 'Neil, 1982, p. 19) dans 
lequel nous explorons des séparations pénibles, tolérons nos failles ordinaires, et nous 
rapprochons de la vie. Les Essais ont pris forme dans l'antre chaleureux de la bibliothèque 
qui fût léguée à Montaigne par son meilleur ami tardif, Étienne de la Boétie. Dans cet article, 
je réfléchis sur ce que cela signifie pour les thérapeutes de perpétuer cette tradition humaniste; 
de recevoir le don des Essais et du style littéraire de l'essai comme parts de notre héritage 
culturel. 
Mots-clés : psychothérapie, Montaigne, essat, Renaissance, humanisme, humanités, 
amitié, présence, conversation 
14 
I' d like to introduce y ou somebody th at I have come to think of as a good friend: Michel 
de Montaigne, the celebrated writer of the Essays of Michel Eyquem de Montaigne. 
Montaigne wrote, "I have not made my book any more than it has made me - a book of one 
substance with its author, proper to me and a Jimb of my life" 1i. He is "the matter of [his] 
book"ii_ Thus, our visit is also a conversation with the Essays.themselves as a body ofwork. 
In fact, Montaigne invented the essay genre: small, disarmingly intimate, and open-minded, 
conversational pieces of prose. He even coined the term essai, a French word which meant 
attempt, try, test, or even taste. Montaigne asked the age-old Socratic question 'What do I 
know?', and his Essays are 107 attempts at an answer. But attempt is the operative word here, 
because early on in the 20-year period during which he wrote, - which, by the way, was from 
1572 until the day he died in 1592 - Montaigne cheerfully gave up searching for any sort of 
grand or fixed truths from authoritative sources. In the 161h century, the fashion was to write 
either systematic philosophical treatises, or commonplace books. The latter were in effect 
scrapbooks of information, a way of compiling and remembering facts and ideas. In stark 
contrast, Montaigne's innovative project was a festive medley of continually renewed 
attempts - essays - to draw closer to more fleeting and fallible truths. That is to say human 
truths , notably th ose of bodil y experience. Here is what he sa ys about his book in the chapter 
entitled "On repentance": 
This is a register of varied and changing occurrences, of ideas which are unresolved and, 
when needs be, contradictory, either because 1 myself have become different or because I 
grasp hold of different attributes or aspects of my subjects. So I may happen to contradict 
myself but, as Demades said, I never contradict tru th. iii If my mind could gain a firm 
footing , I would not make essays, I would make decisions; but it is always in 
apprenticeship and on trial.iv 
1 For ease of reading, I have placed ali of the citations from the Essays in the end notes 
using the following format: (TRANSLATOR INITIAL, BOOK:chapter, page). I mainly refer 
to Donald Frame (Montaigne, 2003), M .A. Screech (Montaigne, 1991), and Charles Cotton's 
(Montaigne, 1877) English translations of the Essays. I also provide the original French text 
as found in the Thibaudet-Rat edition (Montaigne, 1962). 
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Basically, the Essays are tests of Montaigne's judgement. He judges or weighs his own 
and other people 's thoughts about Socrates, opinions about cannibals, and comments on 
history and current events . He throws in remarks on Latin aphorisms, endless persona! 
observations about his body, musings about his cat, snippets of gorgeous classical poetry, 
anecdotes about his unusual childhood, philosophical ideas- whatever cornes into his head as 
they tumble onto the page in front of him. Instead of synthesizing these fragments into a 
sturdy argument or bending them into a theoretical framework, Montaigne juxtaposes; he 
places the unruly pieces, which he describes as "chimeras and fantastic monsters"v, alongside 
each other so that they become voices in a conversation, "lead[ing] to moments of [shared] 
reve lation though not necessarily to any final synthesis." (Hall, 1989, p. 82) 
Montaigne discovered that it is the practice of writing and reading what he writes , that 
brings order to his experience. Essaying, like psychotherapy, is a dual thing: you let your 
thoughts go but you witness them. This witnessing is a kind oftaming, a making sense (lager, 
persona! communication, April, 2011). Moreover, Montaigne found that this order is not 
native to the human mind, it has to be continually achieved. 
T he Wine-Maker from Bordeaux 
But l'rn getting ahead of myself. Let me g1ve you a bit of background about this 
Renaissance man, this wine-maker from Bordeaux. Michel de Montaigne was a Frenchman 
born into recent nobili ty near the end of the Renaissance in 1533. His grandfather, a wealthy 
fish merchant by the name of Raymond Eyquem, bought the Chateau Montaigne and its 
profitable vineyards in 1477. At the time, Bordeaux red wine, also known as claret, enjoyed 
great popularity across the channel and was being imported in vast quantities by the English. 
Along with the bouse, which stands on the top of a mountain (or hill, really) , came the noble 
title, Lord of Montaigne. 
As a child, in order to be fluent with the wisdom of classical texts, .Montaigne was 
spoken to exclusively in Latin. This experimental and "natural" approach meant that he only 
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had his German tutor for company as nobody in his family could actually speak Latin. It 
wasn't un til the age of six that he was permitted to learn French. And yes, this was rather odd, 
even at that time. Latin had not been spoken colloquially in at )east a millennium. Actually, 
no one is quite sure about how true this story is , but what we do know, is that luckily for us, 
Montaigne's early Latin immersion afforded him a rare intimacy with the recently 
rediscovered classical texts . His colloquial rather than scholarly ease allowed him to set the 
table for a uniquely lively and fertile conversation with the great thinkers of antiquity. Given 
that contemporary writers wrote in Latin (as a second language), Montaigne was also 
particularly well-versed in the literature of his day. At six, he was shipped off for a rigorous 
humanist education at the renowned Collège de Guyenne, where beyond impressing the 
masters with his grasp of Latin, he seems to have been a middling student. 
Later on, Montaigne worked as a magistrate in the court system- a somewhat lacklustre 
career by his own account - and served time both in the army and as a gentleman at court. 
While the incredibly bloody Wars of Religion raged on around him, he was often employed 
as an advisor in negotiations between Protestant and Catholic factions. It was at the 
parliament of Bordeaux, in 1558, that he met the great friend of his life: poet and fellow 
humanist, Etienne de la Boétie. Their friendship was eut short after six glorious years when la 
Boétie suddenly fell ill and died. Ten years later, at the ripe old age of 38, (which was 
considered a little long in the tooth), Montaigne retired from public life to the tower on his 
estate to write. Incidentally, I was 38 when I began to read and write about the Essays - a 
detail that bas always made me feel slightly better about starting my PhD at such a geriatrie 
age. 
Books One and Two of his Essays were first published to great success in 1580. They 
went through five editions before Book Three was added in 1588. Three years after his death 
in 1592, a complete edition was published which integrated his abundant marginalia, and 
came to be known as the Bordeaux Copy. The volumes were not seen as free-standing works, 
but as pieces of an ever-growing whole. Interestingly, the Essays were quickly translated into 
English by John Florio in 1603, and had an immediate impact on English writing and 
thinking, even more so than in France. When you consider that the Essays are about a 1000 
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pages, this swift translation speaks to the enthusiasm of the public response. News of what 
Friedrich (1991) called "the most persona! book that had appeared to date in world literature" 
(p. 208) travelled very quickly. To this day, Florio's translation is considered an important 
version. The influence of the Essays on Western thinkers and writers is extensive albeit often 
overlooked. But to give you an idea, consider Montaigne's young contemporary, Shakespeare. 
Obviously, Shakespeare did not write essays, but the themes and rhythms of many of his 
passages, as well as his pioneering use of metaphor2, owe a deep debt to Montaigne. For 
example, "To be or not to be", is considered by many to be Shakespeare's response to the 
Essays. The Renaissance humanists were in the midst of a love affair with ancient philosophy, 
in particular with the scepticism3 . Montaigne, being a man of his time, was a sceptic4 , not in 
the hardnosed way that we view scepticism now, but rather with a sceptic ease, buoyed on the 
rolling waves of doubt. lt could be, maybe so, maybe not, perhaps to be, or perhaps not to be. 
The Essays and Hamlet share this reflexivity- that of a sceptical mind thinking. Atwan (1995) 
points out that Hamlet, like Montaigne, juxtaposes his own judgement processes with more 
authoritative thinking. "Shakespeare, [ ... ] was essaying the essay within his tragedy, and in 
so doing he provided one of the earliest commentaries on Montaigne's literary creation." (p. 8) 
2 Montaigne was the first writer to use visual metaphor so extensively. He explored the 
"poetic gait" (F, III:9, 925) of familiar words to "enrich their own, give more weight and 
depth to their meaning and use; they [good writers] teach the language unaccustomed 
movements, but prudently and shrewdly." (F, III:5 , 807) 
3 Montaigne was particularly interested in the pragmatic schools of thought, which also 
include Stoicism and Epicureanism. 
4 Today, one might view a sceptic as one who doubts things, and requires proof about 
knowledge. In the Hellenistic era (when it was born) and during the Renaissance, scepticism, 
especially Pyrrhonian scepticism, was almost a form oftherapy. Pyrrhonism, which cornes to 
us from the Greek philosopher Pyrrho (ca. 360 BC- ca. 270 BC) and was later elaborated by 
Sextus Empiricus in the second century AD, says that we need take nothing seriously in life, 
including Pyrrhonism itself. Bakewell (2010a) sums up ordinary (Academie) scepticism in 
Socrates' remark "All I know is that I know nothing." (p. 124) The Pyrrhonnian sceptic 
would go one step further and say that they are not even sure that they know nothing! The 
resultant absurdity may have the effect of making you fee! better, even laugh, because you 
are freed from the exasperating search for fixed truths. Y ou still judge and look for answers, 
but you are content with drawing closer to phenomenological truths. 
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Melville was known to have scribbled in the margins of his copy of Ham let: "Here is forcib ly 
shown the great Montaigneism ofHamlet." (p. 7) 
Then, of course, there are the parts that Shakespeare simply copied directly from the 
Essays. But that's another story. 
The Unity of Presence 
The open-endedness of his mind's sceptical rhythms leaves room for ali sorts of 
possibilities to spontaneously emerge in the Essays. At times, like a wild horse, Montaigne 
careens off on unexpected tangents. The beauty is that despite, or rather, by virtue of these 
"disciplined digression[s]" (Kauffmann, 1989, p. 238) there is a sense of unity, a powerful 
sense of the Essays as a who le. In the margins of his manuscript, Montaigne scribbled : "My 
book is always one." (Compagnon et Freccero, 1983, p. 48) This unity is presence: an 
intima te, genuine and surprising revelation. Through all of the wise and the humourous, the 
familiar and the strange, a palpable presence emerges. 
[P]erhaps the greatest feat that he achieved was to reconcile these conflicting strands, 
crossing and rercrossing one another ; to make them into an active force possessing a 
unity - not a unity of expression, but of li fe . (Siche!, 1911 , p. 249) 
Montaigne is a gregarious host who beckons you to his table. Like any good host or 
friend , he doesn 't impose. His words leave room for you to weigh your own judgements, to 
come to new understandings, and to leam anew about your world. His questioning and 
wondering stance, his sidelong glances5, ask for a response, both from the reader and from 
himself. In our modem monolithic view, it's impossible to see how the evocation of presence 
involves leaving room for the revelation of the other, how the question of oneself is 
inseparable from the question of the other. 
5 The Montaignian sidelong glanee is a pertinent metaphor through which to explore 
psychotherapy. For a reflection on what we might leam by framing psychotherapy in this 
crooked view, please see "A Sidelong Glanee at Psychotherapy" (Starr, in press). 
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I've always been struck by the sway of Montaigne's presence; even just hearing or 
reading about him through others is captivating. I first beard about him while jogging and 
listening to a podcast of a radio show featuring a writer who was speaking about him. Even 
through this technological palimpsest of conversations, I was hooked. When I speak about the 
Essays and Montaigne to friends and colleagues, I am continually surprised by the keenness 
of their interest. They want to know more: where can they find the book, which essay should 
they read, which edition, etc. They want to talk about him. "And so the 'Essays' find readers 
who find readers like friends seeking one another. By word of mouth ." (O'Neill , 1982, p. 7) 
The astonishing gift of the Essays is that they are continually rebom in conversation with 
each reader, and it is through these infinite unique relationships, as opposed to, say, a 
biography, that Montaigne's presence emerges so vividly. Through essaying, Montaigne 
cornes to evoke wh at Saul Frampton (20 11 b) calls a sense of "betweenness", "an awareness 
of others as integral to ourselves." (p. 273) 
Ali relationships start by renouncing complete k.nowledge of the self, other and world. In 
light of full presence, we wouldn't need words. But the self and other always escape us- we 
only have moments of presence, and thus conversation and essaying, are infinite endeavours. 
The constant task of the Essays is an attempt to be together. Through essaying, Montaigne 
arrived at the profound intuition that the world becomes coherent through hospitality and 
friendship, rather than systematic k.nowledge. 
"He who lives not at ali unto others, hardly lives unto himself."vi 
As we are beginning to see, the Essays represent an understanding of the world in a 
different register, complementary to and yet ontologically different than our modem view. In 
our modem perspective, which is limited to that of the natural sciences, a single mute reality 
or truth lies before an observer, any observer; it doesn 't matter whom. What he or she can' t 
see may eventually be uncovered through the perfection of methodology or technology or 
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further observations. 6 But Montaigne was seeking a different truth, an understanding that 
arose when he drew closer things and people, including himself, rather than seeking to 
unmask anonymous knowledge, "out there". There are two human responses to our eternal 
thirst for reality: presence or facts. In presence, there is a horizon that draws you out, with the 
promise of seeing more. W e become eager to see and hear things th at we can tell our friend 
the next time we meet. Montaigne's continued curiosity about himself and others is fuelled 
by this promise. Facts do not draw us closer to other people. Y ou may know facts about your 
neighbour, but you don't "know him" until you meet him. 
The Essays embody what we might cali a cosmological perspective. In a cosmos, we 
affirm ourselves by accepting the essential integrity of the other. Montaigne discovered that 
the fundamental unit of reality is a couple: a metaphorical unity rather than the literai unity of 
an individual. He came to see writing and thinking as unifying movements. Rather than an 
assembly of fragments, the Essays are "the site of a social event" (p. 275): a conversation that 
unifies the textual self and the thinking self, and creates the who le of a couple. In this sense, 
humanity, or what makes us human, points to what arises between couples: "god and man, 
man and woman, child and adult, neighbour and neighbour, friend and friend, sou! and body, 
native and foreigner," reader and writer, speaker and listener. (Jager, 1991, p. 64) Our 
humanity can be !ost if not continually cultivated through tentative reaches, or essays, across 
mysterious thresholds that at once demarcate and unite lived worlds. In contrast, modern 
unity finds humanity already there within a self-enclosed individual; one who is subject to the 
same indifferent laws as everything else in the material universe. 
6 Scientists often respond to this description by saying that natural science works by 
consensus and is at heart a deeply collaborative endeavour. This is true, but the point I want 
to make is that in the instant of the observation we are ali alone. (Jager, persona! 
communication, September, 2012). The collaboration occurs after the observation. In contrast, 
in a dialogical perspective, the other is always involved in the moment of observation. There 
is a phenomenological distinction between conversing and collaborating. In a conversation, 
you address each other. Even if we write alone, it' s always to someone. A collaboration 
refers more to a labouring alongside each other; each makes a contribution, but not in any 
intersubj ective sense. 
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This mythical perspective is timeless , but was particularly salient during the Renaissance . 
The humanists' flourishing Christian civilization was founded on the idea that they were 
symbolically united with a stranger, the newly rediscovered Roman culture, which in tum 
was founded on an encounter with the Greeks. Rather than assimilating Roman culture into 
sorne sort of neat synthesis about human nature, or tossing away what they feared as too 
foreign or pagan, the humanists worked extremely hard to maintain a cultural conversation 
through translation, transcription, reading, writing, education, love and friendship. This 
relationship was the source of Montaigne 's culture, of his understanding about himself, the 
world and his position in it. 
lt is really interesting to consider that not only are the Essays engaged in an intimate 
conversation with the world of Antiquity, they are one of the first European writings to 
consider the "cultural and epistemological consequences of the discovery and exploration of 
the New World." (Langer, 2005, p. 4) As a matter of fact, Conley (2005) says, given that the 
New World is no longer new, the Essays are both "[t]he first and last places where we 
encounter the New Worlds." (p. 93) Surprisingly, even though classical and biblical views of 
geography had only recently been thrown into question, the initial response to the New World 
was generally muted. People regarded it as "simply ' there"' (p. 75), as having little impact on 
their lives. Even in the 16111 century, there were only a few travel joumals and a handful of 
political tracts about the American Indians. Montaigne was the first writer to really grapple 
with the meaning of the New World to the Europeans' sense of self, most notably in the 
chapters, "On the cannibals" and "On coaches". Montaigne's "imaginative and reasoned" (p. 
74) reflections on both the otherness and common humanity of the peoples of the New World, 
serve as a mirror to his non-transparent relationship with himself. Radical alterity makes his 
self-portrait come to !ife. On the very first page of the Essays, otherness cornes into play: 
I want to be seen here in my simple, natural, ordinary fashion, without straining or 
artifice; for it is myself that I portray. My defects will be read to the !ife, and also my 
natural form, as far as respect for the public has allowed. Had I been placed among those 
nations which are said to live still in the sweet freedom of nature's first laws, I assure you 
I should very gladly have portrayed myself he re entire and wholly naked. vii 
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Swept up in a spirit of discovery, Montaigne was able see the lay of the land of both 
inner and outer worlds through new eyes, so to speak. He needed the other to know himself. 
With an élan typical of the Renaissance, Montaigne embodied the message that the world is a 
lot bigger than we know.7 
The Presence Within Absence 
So now you know a little bit about Montaigne's !ife and Essays . I've introduced the idea 
that the unity of this "[t]his bundle of so many disparate pieces"viii stems from Montaigne's 
remarkably visceral presence. We have also seen that the Essays ' compelling "unity of !ife" 
is best understood within the Renaissance humanists' relational perspective, as distinguished 
from our modem view. Perhaps, y ou have the feeling th at that essaying and psychotherapy 
share sorne common ground . lt's clearly time ta get ta knaw our friend a little better. Let me 
tell you a story about friendship and Joss, about how Montaigne came to appreciate the dual 
nature of his humanity, ta arrive at statements such as these: 
7 Let me take a moment to distinguish between Renaissance humanism and secular 
humanism. Broadly speaking, Renaissance humanism was an educational and religious 
movement, which centred on the relationship between the human and the divine. The culture 
of the humanists was constantly rebom through renewed dialogue with the past, present and 
future. Secular humanism, which arose during the Enlightenment, partly in response to 
Renaissance humanism, emphasizes the dignity of the individual, and is grounded on the 
rationality of the natural sciences. In this paradigm, human freedom is best achieved through 
progress (think human potential), which means pulling further and further away from the past. 
Humanistic psychotherapy does not necessarily see itself as belonging to secular humanism. 
Y et this modem movement bas influenced many of our conceptions of the self and prioritized 
our quest for theories that unify theary and practice. Furthermore, we are shielded from aider 
views of humanity by the narrowing lens of progress. 
Clearly, this is a very simplified description of Renaissance and secular humanism, 
which have each varied over time and geography. My point is to remind therapists stuck in a 
Cartesian or past-cartesian paradigm, that there may be something to leam from aider ideas 
about humanity, which have been fruitfully explared for thousands ofyears. 
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Myself now and myself a while ago are indeed two; but when better, I simply cannot 
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say. 
But we are, I know not how, double within ourselves, with the result that we do not 
believe what we believe, and we cannot rid ourselves ofwhat we condemn.x 
Montaigne began his project in part as a way of dealing with the loss of his best friend, 
Étienne la Boétie. Theirs was a wonderful meeting of two erudite young hurnanists in their 
20's, each probably a little bored in their jobs, each bursting with ideas and questions about 
books, philosophy and the meaning of a good !ife. They had beard of each other before they 
actually met. Montaigne had already read a circulating manuscript of la Boétie's well-known 
treatise against tyranny, On Voluntary Servitude. 
We sought each other before we met, because of the reports we heard of each other, 
which had more effect on our affection than such repotis would reasonably have; I think 
it was by sorne ordinance from heaven, We embraced each other by our names. And at 
our first meeting, which by chance came at a great feast and gathering in the city, we 
found ourselves so taken with each other, so well acquainted, so bound together, that 
from that time on nothing was so close tous as each other.xi 
And so it be gan. Of the two, la Boétie was more well-regarded, already a writer, married, 
and a little more advanced in his career even though he was only two years older. He gently 
chides Montaigne in a sonnet for wasting his energy socializing and seducing women 
(Bakewell, 2010a, p. 92). Together, they were inspired by the exalted and highly rational 
models of classical friendship, often likening themselves to Socrates and his young friend 
Alcibiades (p. 92). But in time, their friendship escaped the confines of idealism, and 
flourished into something unique and invented anew: "Our friendship has no other model 
than itself, and can be compared only with itself."xii "For the very discourses that antiquity 
has left us on this subject seem to me weak compared with the feeling I have."xiii Just before 
tragically succumbing to a brief illness, probably the plague, with Montaigne at his bedside, 
la Boétie bequeathed his library of about 1000 books to his great friend. In a letter to his 
father, Montaigne recounts the valiant death of his friend : 
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And then, turning his words to me, he said: My brother, whom I love so dearly and 
whom I chose out of so many men in order to renew with you that virtuous and sincere 
friendship, the practice of which has for so long been driven from among us by our vices 
that there remain of it only a few old traces in the memory of antiquity, I entreat you to 
accept as a legacy my library and my books, which I give you as a sign of my affection 
toward you: a very small present, but one which cornes from a willing heart and which is 
appropriate for you because ofyour fonçlness for letters. (Montaigne, 2003, p. 1281) 
Ten years later, Montaigne undertook the writing of the Essays, in particular, the 28111 
chapter, "On friendship", as a monument to his friend, as weil as in an effort to continue their 
dialogue, to restore their connection: "In the friendship I speak of, our souls mingle and blend 
with each other so completely that they efface the seam that joined them, and cannot find it 
again."xiv However, Montaigne's book, which "built itself up with diverse interruptions and 
intervals"xv, was founded on a fundamental gap, a profound absence at its core. The "effaced 
seam" had come undone. Montaigne's self-portrait was not built up around a nucleus of the 
self, but around the painful absence of his friend. It's interesting to recall that in Montaigne's 
time, the French language did not even have a word for the selfl, for that nugget of solidity. 
There was no cogito . 
In keeping with humanist tradition, Montaigne committed to posthumously publishing la 
Boétie's writings . However, instead of simply printing them, he decided that On Voluntary 
Servitude should have the place of honour as the centrepiece of his own book, lovingly 
incorporated into the Essays' embrace. The first book of the Essays was made up of 57 
chapters, and the treatise would constitute the middle, or 291h chapter. But just as Book I was 
going to print, the Huegenots claimed la Boétie's manuscript as their own revolutionary text. 
The outraged Catholic Parliament ordered it burned. So, early on in the writing of the Essays, 
to avoid political difficulties, and also fearing that la Boétie 's ideas would be distorted, 
Montaigne decided to replace On Voluntary Servitude with 29 of his beloved friend's 
unpublished sonnets. He did not edit or reconfigure the text when he made the substitution. 
Montaigne generally avoided any corrections to his Essays because he wanted to paint as real 
8 The term "le moi" only came into common usage in the l71h century. (Brush, 1994, p. 
215) 
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a portrait as possible, one that included "the imperfections that are ordinary and constant in 
me" xvi. In Chapter 29, we still see his introductory remarks about the treatise: "But let us 
li sten a whi le to this boy of sixteen [la Boétie]. "9 xvii 
Michael Butor (1968, as cited in Compagnon et Freccero, 1983, p. 26) provides a 
thought-provoking interpretation of the centrality of Montaigne's great friend to the unity of 
the Essays. Butor sees the 29 sonnets, preceded by 28 chapters, and followed by 28 chapters, 
as forming a triptych typical of a Renaissance painting. In Chapter 28, "On friendship", 
Montaigne wrote: 
As I was considering the way a painter I employ went about his work, I had a mind to 
imitate him. He chooses the best spot, the middle of each wall , to put a picture labored 
over with all his skill, and the empty space all around it he fills with grotesques, which 
are fantastic paintings whose only charm lies in their variety and strangeness. And what 
are these things of mine, in tru th, but grotesques and monstrous bodies, pieced together 
of divers members, without definite shape, having no order, sequence, or proportion 
other than accidental?xviii 
Originally, Montaigne conceived of his project as wild and unruly pieces surrounding the 
still beauty of la Boétie ' s free-standing work. His Essays had no body, only random limbs. 
He hoped that the stillness of the centre would hold both himself and his book together. But 
what is remarkable is that he crossed out even the 29 sonnets in his final manuscript, leaving 
only the dispassionate note, "These verses may be seen elsewhere"xix. Bakewell (201 Oa) 
describes the double deletion in Chapter 29 as "a ragged stub or hole which Montaigne 
deliberately refused to disguise. He even drew attention toits frayed edges." (p. 99) 
Through essaying, Montaigne transformed absence into a threshold at which he could 
maintain a symbolic connection with la Boétie. The absence that is death became an infinite 
source of renewal as the Essays accumulated . It is at the "frayed edges" between presence 
and absence that we, the readers, catch such powerful glimpses of our friend. There is no 
9 This was the age at which La Boétie was thought to have written "On Voluntary 
Servitude". Montaigne had originally written 18, but changed it to 16 in a la ter edition. 
According to scholars, la Boétie was actually 22. 
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stable self at the centre of this book. Instead, Montaigne said, "1 am over the entrance"xx, at 
the threshold between past and present, self and other, reader and writer. 
Lavoisier's terse phrase about a natural universe hating a vacuwn, should thus be 
amplified with the additional observation that a cosmos demands as its absolute center a 
tolerated absence that is symbolized by a threshold. (Jager, 1999, p. 93) 
With the "tolerated absence" at its heart, the Essays were no longer disjointed body parts; 
they became a metaphorically uni fied body, "es sa ys in flesh and bone" xxi. 
If we follow this train of thought and rn ove closer into the symbolic unity at the heart of 
the Essays, we come to the one moment in 1000 pages where our garrulous companion 
cornes to sudden hait, at a complete Joss for words. He doesn ' t even bother to digress. Y ou 
have the sense that Montaigne pulls up short at the edge of the cha sm between himself and la 
Boétie, stunned by grief: 
If you press me to tell why 1 loved him, 1 fee! that this cannot be expressed, except by 
answering: Because it was he, because it was Lxxii 
In this famous passage, Montaigne tries and fails to put their relationship into words. He 
cornes up against the limits of language. Not only can he not translate his lived experience of 
their friendship into the uni versa! language of humanism (Zalloua, 2003, p. p. iii) , he cannot 
find the right words to reach out to la Boétie across the abyss. The sentence is yet another 
trace of the wound. But it is also a point where he accepts the separation and offers the work 
of his imagination up to the public to contemplate. In this moment of transcendence, we fee! 
Montaigne very near. 
If we look at the differences between publications, as weil as at the differences in ink 
used in his copious marginalia, we can find out a little more about Montaigne's grappling 
with absence, his work of creating an ephemeral order out of the chaos of grief. He begins 
"On friendship" in an optimistic mood as he attempts to bring his relationship with la Boétie 
back to !ife as a classical ideal, comparing their friendship with ancient examples. However, 
he wearies of this effort, feeling hopeless and alienated: 
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1 only drag on a weary !ife. And the very pleasures that come my way, instead of 
consoling me, redouble my grief for his Joss. We went baives in everything; [ ... ] 1 was 
already so formed and accustomed to being a second self everywhere that only half of 
me seems to be alive now. xxiii 
Frampton (201lb) charts Montaigne 's search for consolation in the material world. For 
example, at one point later in the Essays, Montaigne tries to look at his separation from la 
Boétie as absolute and literai : "They are dead. So, indeed is my father, as absolutely dead as 
they are, and as distant from me and from life in 18 years as they are in 1600."xxiv Perhaps 
seeking further comfort, he continues his objective investigation with a mathematician named 
Peletier: 
Now these are things that often clash; and 1 have been told that in geometry (which 
thinks it has reached the high point of certainty among the sciences) there are irrefutable 
demonstrations that controvert the truth of experience. For instance, Jacques Peletier was 
telling me at my bouse that he bad found two !ines travelling toward each other so as to 
meet, which nevertheless he proved could never come to touch even at infinity. xxv 
But he's still !ost. The objective view seems to peter out, and the life of the Essays, like 
la Boétie ' s verses, is found elsewhere. Montaigne retums to the abyss in Chapter 28. 
(Remember, Montaigne was constant! y adding to ail of the Essays .) In the first edition of the 
Essays, "On friendship" contained only the phrase: 
If y ou press me to tell wh y 1 loved him, 1 fee! that this cannot be expressed. 
lt is as though he does not have the heart to even try. Severa! years of essaying later, in 
the marginalia that became part of the posthumous Bordeaux copy, he was able to add, 
"except by answering: Because it was 1." Essaying the abyss involves drawing close and 
stepping back, speaking and listening. Montaigne found that there is no "l" without a "he". 
With new technology, it bas recently been discovered that the first part of the sentence was 
added later still, giving us the final phrase, "Because it was he, because it was 1." (Desan, 
2004) In this dance of absence and presence; Montaigne was better able to tolerate the abyss 
and see himself in a new light. Rather than fusing with la Boétie into an idealized union, or 
remaining radically separate, like geometrie !ines in a material universe, the possibility of a 
new conversation arose: 
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Besides this profit that I derive from wnhng about myself, I hope for this other 
advantage, that if my humors happen to please and suit sorne worthy man before I die , he 
will try to meet me. I give him a big advantage in ground covered; for ali that long 
acquaintance and familiarity could have gained for him in severa! years, he can see in 
three da ys in this record, and more surely and exactly. [ ... ] If by su ch good signs I knew 
of a man who was suited to me, truly I would go very far to find him for the sweetness of 
harmonious and agreeable company cannot be bought too dearly, in my opinion. Oh, a 
friend! xxvi 
There is a discontinuity at his core: a Montaigne before the death of la Boétie, and a 
Montaigne after. Clearly we are not in the paradigm of progress. He did not attempt to 
smooth over the gap to make the book more uniform, or nor did he stand paralyzed in defeat 
before it. Instead, Montaigne essayed. The Essays are a work of continuai partings and 
returns, and this is enough. Montaigne becomes human by transforming absence into a source 
of culture, a vital source and resource for human life. 
It is only through Joss that we enter the human world. It is Joss that creates the separation 
of one body from an other, that grants these a surface that can be read and inscribed, that 
forms the border of our existence and that divides a pre-human from a truly human !ife. 
Crossing the gap, traversing the border that separate a pre-human paradise from a human 
world is therefore not a process of development, not a process of natural, biological 
growth th at proceeds by infinite increments, but constitutes a leap across an abyss. W e 
do not "grow" into our humanity but we reach it only after a fateful crossing, that we 
repeat as long as we remain human and that leads us forever over uncharted waters. It is 
this "crossing", this partially failed and parti ally succeeded work of humanization that is 
revisited in therapy. Everything depends on how we perceive this la bor of humanization. 
(Jager, 2002) 
By the way, the etymology of the word "heritage" sheds light on this conception of 
humanity and on the significance of La Boétie's bequest of his personallibrary to Montaigne. 
Jager (persona! communication,_ August, 2012) reminds us that "heritage" stems from the 
Indo-European roots: "ghe" and "do". "Ghe" indicates an absence, a gap left by something 
that has disappeared. The next element, "do", gives rise to the word "donation", or "don" in 
French, which means "gift". Together, these elements create a metaphor that leads us from 
the crisis of losing what was once there, to the appearance of an unbearable absence, which is 
then transformed into a gift. In this sense, our cultural heritage allows what has disappeared 
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to be reborn in a new way, from one generation to another, from one mode of being to 
another, from utter despair to the grace of a new conversation. 
The aim of psychotherapy, like essaying, is to learn to cultivate or live with absences, 
with the opaqueness of the other, to tolerate mystery and ambiguity. We learn to live with 
what escapes us , with the gaps between self and self, between self and the other, not the gap 
between the ory and practice. In this sense, like essaying, therapy is a cultural practice. W e 
learn to be more at home in multiple lived worlds, or, as William Cavanaugh says, "complex 
space" . (Cayley, 2012, May 2, 48:53) Ifwe see psychotherapy as a way ofrediscovering how 
to live a human !ife, how to break free from the constraints of one perspective, then we can 
see the error ofthinking that it is only a form of applied psychology. 
The Essays shed light on the inverse also. Being sick means that you can't meet the other. 
Y ou may be paralyzed by y our yearning for fusion with a loved one, or running as far away 
as you can. In both situations, you close yourself off to dialogue. As J.H. van den Berg (1975) 
says, al! psychological symptoms call out for the healing presence of the other (p. 182). What 
frees us from lonely paralysis or the alienating mechanical repetition of unsatisfying 
behaviour or thinking, is the presence of another, not theory. This blind circle only opens up 
if there is someone to talk to. 
"The Initia tor of Psychology" 10 
Montaigne's enterprise of transforming Joss into a source of creativity led to what he 
called his brain children.xxvii. He saw his love for la Boétie in the tru th of their pro geny, the 
Essays. Put another way, his particular conversations with his !ost friend led to surprising 
moments of connection to the larger world of truth. Al! of the humanities - understood 
broadly to be an approach that seeks the revelations of the arts, myth, religion, history, 
10 (Siche!, 1911 , p. 175) 
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literature, and philosophy- flow out of loving conversational practices, like friendship. These 
relationships are our sources ofunderstanding about the human condition, our psychology. 
The Essays were "born in the [ . .. ] goodness of being loved and understood. " (O'Neill, 
1982, p. 19) Montaigne drew on his friendship with la Boétie to have the courage to come 
forward with, as Spears (1988) puts it, unprecedented "candor and honesty" (p. 312). He was 
the first writer to speak so frankly about the most ordinary details of his life. 
For Montaigne may be said to have been the initia tor of psychology- of a subtle persona! 
note in his study of !ife and men that was unknown before him, a study made at closer 
q uarters with his ki nd than any ventured by his predecessors. (Sichel, 1911 , p. 17 5) 
Our "honnête homme" 11 confides that that he actually knows nothing about the 
fermentation of grapes, even though wine is the primary product of his estate. And he only 
recently found out that bread was made from yeast. We learn that the only fruit he likes are 
melons, and that he often eats so quickly that he bites his fingers. He ' s a middling runner 
unlike his father who was very sprightly and could run and jump weil into old age. He 's 
unfortunately on the short side. He has a round but not fat face. He has terrible singing voice, 
and stiff and clumsy bands: 
My band is so clumsy that 1 cannot even read my own writing, so that 1 prefer to write 
things over again rather than to give myself the trouble of disentangling my scribbles. 
[ . . . ] That apart, 1 am quite a good scholar! I can never fold up a letter neatly, never 
sharpen a pen, never carve passably at table, nor put harness on horse, nor bear a hawk 
properly nor release it, nor address hounds, birds or horses.miii 
This "study made at cl oser quarters" is not presented in the forrn of an autobiography nor 
as a "regimented self-interrogation" (Brush, 1994, p. 174) . Montaigne, the psychologist, is 
11 In 17th century France, the ideal man was an "honnête homme". This term literally 
translates as "honest man", but is more closely associated with the idea of honour than of 
honesty . Such a man was a cultured amateur whose worth was measured by conversational 
ski ll and manners rather than glory, by his broad general culture rather than specifie expertise. 
He embodied social and moral values such as charrn, wit, modesty, and moderation. Freidrich 
considers Montaigne to have been the first "honnête homme" (Desan, 1991 , p. xxiii). 
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"seeking acquaintance, not science." (p. 174) The ordinary details are offered in conversation 
with larger questions, literally juxtaposed with questions about how to live, truth, experience, 
the body, friendship, love, language, death, and education. Intimate details bring him closer 
to the lived world, while knitting him into the wider human fabric. 
Montaigne invented the modem essay, [ . .. ] the form through which the fundamenta l 
questions of the existence of modem man could be posed in relation to the concrete 
reality which is the subject (in every sense) of any particular essay. (Wilden, 1968, p. 
577) 
"lt is a difficult thing to set one's judgement against accepted opinions."xxix 
We are beginning to see that the Essays lead us on another route to knowledge, a more 
live! y and accidentai route to a different kind of knowledge, wh at Frampton (20 11 b) wou ld 
cali "a form of meeting" (p. 205), or what we might call understanding. It is in this 
conversational context that presence and friendship manifest themselves. We therapists are 
fellow travellers with Montaigne on this road. But it's not an easy way to travel. He shares 
our anxiety about the itinerary. He too worried about knowledge and its institutions. Is what 
l'rn writing going to be acceptable? Am I using a valid methodology? We share this the 
same struggle as thinkers. Our first impulse towards knowledge is to know more abstract 
truths and to become an expert. But what we therapists, Montaigne, and importantly, our 
patients, end up doing is going in a different direction, against the grain of mainstream 
thought. Montaigne described his own era as the "Hoc age", which embraced the "just doit", 
task-oriented approach of the Renaissance scholasticism (Hardison, 1998, p. 613). The 
scholastics twisted and tumed great questions about man's relation to the divine, into smaller, 
more logical forms. W e too live in an age of doing rather th an being, of classifications and 
definitions. What Montaigne realized is that in arder to look at the world like a 
mathematician or a scholastic, you have to alienate yourself from yourself. But he was far 
more interested in drawing closer to this world. Great philosophers don't necessarily give us 
more insight or make us wiser about who we are. The scholastics could write eloquently 
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about love, yet Montaigne 's page knew perfectly well how to woo his lover without reading 
treatises on Platonic love: 
Erudite works treat their subjects too discreetly, in too artificial a style far removed from 
the common natural one. My page-boy can court his lady and understands how to do so. 
Read him Leone Ebreo and Ficino: they are talking about him, about what he is thinking 
and doing And they mean nothing to him! I cannot recognize most of my ordinary 
emotions in Aristotle: they have been covered over and clad in a different gown for use 
by the schoolmen.xxx 
We can think of other moments m history, where thinkers turned away from the 
mainstream. Romanticism was a moment when we went into nature to walk, renouncing the 
trappings of materialism. Rebelling against the alienation of Enlightenment rationality, the 
Romantics sought to reclaim human freedom. Broadly speaking, they emphasized a return to 
the lived world through the artistic free play of persona! expression, imagination, intuition 
and emotion. Schneider (200 l ), in "The Handbook of Humanistic Psychology", develops the 
idea that humanistic-existential psychology is the descendent of Romantic thinkers and 
essayists such as Emerson, Thoreau and later William James: "Romanticism nourished 
psychological insight." (p. 66) He is saddened by the fact that we have discarded such an 
important heritage in the frenzy to be scientific, to manualize and professionalize. Schneider 
encourages psychologists to re-engage with romanticism in order to revisit our richer 
conceptions of human life, and to stem the current tide of reductionism which threatens to 
wash away any lin gering traces of the arts and humanities. 
Many of the Romantics were deeply inspired by Montaigne. Rousseau, for example 
enjoyed what he saw as Montaigne's love of solitude, his confessional slant, his 
unpretentious, free and natural style. According to Bakewell (2010a) , it was during the 
romantic heyday of "passionate swooning" (p. 197), at the beginning of the 191h century, that 
people began to visit Montaigne's tower. The Romantics were captivated by Montaigne's 
love for la Boétie. Parts of the tower were refurbished to their original configuration so that 
tourists could see it exactly as their beloved Montaigne once had. But Montaigne wasn't 
much for swooning. He tended to get quite irritated by this kind of frenzy, preferring 
" tempera te and modera te natures."xxxi (Bakewell , 201 Oa, p. 198) 
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lt's true that we have shunted aside great literature in an effort to stick to "accepted" 
paths to knowledge. 1 would like to take Schneider's excellent argument in a different 
direction : rather than calling for a return to an intellectual tradition, let me suggest a 
friendship . 
"Oh, a friend!" 
1 propose Michel de Montaigne as a patron of psychotherapy, a mentor, but most 
importantly, a friend for lonely therapists working away behind closed doors. Just as 
Montaigne was intrigued upon hearing about la Boétie through mutual friends, I want to 
inspire this same feeling : the delightful possibility of a world of friendship waiting to be 
discovered. Rather than introducing a substantive self, a factual or objective Montaigne, I 
hope to invite you into a world that is opened up through Montaigne's essaying. In the lived 
world of the essay, unlike in the material uni-verse, "personhood necessarily implies a 
relationship to other persons." (Jager, in press) Thus, I am encouraging a meeting in the 
intersubjective sense, by conveying sorne of the vivid interpersonal quality that cornes 
through Montaigne 's writing. For it is his way ofbeing with and towards others that grants us 
access to a parti cul ar world. W e can see this world cl earl y not on! y because of our own 
intelligence or Montaigne's unique experience, but because he stands beside us: "essaying 
requires an exchange of lives" (O'Neill, 1982, p. 191). In this realm, seeing is also being seen, 
speaking is also being beard, and writing is also being read. When I refer to Montaigne as a 
person, I approach him, not as an individual consciousness in the modern psychological sense, 
but as a body of work, a metaphorical unity - "a book consubstantial with its author"xxxii - a 
manifestation of his presence that reveals a world. 
lnterestingly, our worlds have quite a bit in common. Like Montaigne, good therapists 
are substantial people; they have heft. Their solid presence conveys maturity, loyalty and 
safety, all vital when exploring unfamiliar territory. Maturity is almost a dirty word in our era 
of online therapies and cutting-edge neuroscience. But do we not want our therapist to be 
someone who has lived, and reflected on that !ife? "1 have lived long enough to give an 
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account of the practice that has guided me so far. For anyone who wants to try it I have tasted 
it like his cupbearer."xxxiii In his journals, Emerson (1926) celebrates the aging Montaigne as 
an "autumnal star" hanging in the "heaven of letters" (p. 136). 
As we have seen, Montaigne and his Essays affectionately remind us of a dialogical 
vision and it's corresponding neighbourly stance or attitude, which we therapists also strive 
to embody. Despite our difficulties in articulating what we do within the constraints of 
scientific language, we too offer an essayistic experience, that of "making sense together" 
(Buirski et Haglund, 2009). Remember, essaying is a judging thing, a weighing of 
possibilities. 
According to Montaigne, good judgment comprises the ability to observe carefully, to 
listen patiently, to speak plainly, and to remember to love !ife through thick and thin.[ ... ] 
lt entails continuously fuelling one's individuality through serious-minded and playful 
engagement with the world. Good judgment also in volves pondering this process, so that 
the teacher [here I would add, and supervisor or therapist] can learn to recognize and 
support its emergence in students [and patients]. (Hansen, 2002, p. 153) 
This brings to mind a process research talk that I attended a couple of years ago. The 
speaker presented therapeutic variables that have been shawn to contribute to positive 
outcomes in therapy. Science tells us that the persan of the therapist makes a significant 
difference in patient outcomes . Effective therapists are those who have developed their 
capacity for "self-reflexivity in interaction". Wh en I asked the speaker, how do you develop 
this, he replied that a student could hopefully do so in supervision but beyond that, he didn't 
know. W e came to a dead end with this question because there is no "I" in the scientific 
realm. To understand and develop "self-reflexivity in interaction", what Montaigne would 
have called judgement, we move from the realm of the natural sciences out into the broader 
awareness of the humanities. 
The spaces in which students can learn to cultivate presence, which underpins judgement, 
are in the humanities. In my opinion, good supervision falls into this realm, but it is a shame 
that many of us have to wait until the end of our doctoral degrees to avail ourselves such 
learning. Psychology, of ali disciplines that should value reflecting on itself, generally 
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favours a detached "view from nowhere" (Nagel, 1986, as cited in Jay, p. 35). Science cannot 
reflect upon itself because it is a unitary reality. Y ou can't step outside it. This has led to a 
pervasive dissatisfaction to which psychologists respond by adopting eclecticism, or 
integrated theories. W e instinctively push boundaries, but often the wrong on es. W e rem ain 
mutely confined within the horizon of our unitary material reality. 
We entangle our thoughts in generalities, and the causes and conduct of the universe, 
which conduct themselves very well without us , and we leave behind our own affairs and 
Michel, who concerns us even more closely than man in general. xxxiv 
Montaigne invites us into wider, inhabited spaces where we can more fully come to 
terms with age-old questions about judgement, intersubjectivity, tolerance of ambiguity, and 
other human themes that come alive for us today in psychotherapy. One of these 
conversational spaces is psychotherapy itself. 
It is highly fitting that our essayistic friend is a man of the Renaissance, since therapy 
helps us to enlarge our culture, in a sense to become Renaissance men and women. Culture 
gives us resources to face the groundlessness of our existence, to create order through 
conversation. As "Montaigne's latent and pervasive smile" (Tete!, 1979, p. 79) suggests, there 
is a positivity that cornes from access to culture. 1 like André Gide's (1964) comment that the 
pleasure we take in reading the Essays is the pleasure that Montaigne took in writing them 
(p. 8). This suggestion of pleasure is remarkable considering the particularly clark and bloody 
times during which Montaigne lived, not to mention his recent and lingering bereavement. ln 
addition to the Joss of la Boétie, he was mourning the deaths his beloved father, five infant 
daughters, and an unlucky brother felled by a tennis bail. 
Ideally, a therapist is a cultured person who has the ability to introduce the patient to the 
wider world. Such a therapist has access to poetry, literature, film , history, religion and art, as 
weil as the sciences. He or she is someone who can dwell comfortably in and pivot between 
multiple worlds, including between utilitarian and cosmological realms. In the therapeutic 
conversation, there is a rhythm between lived experience in the here and now, and reflection 
on this experience. We distinguish and pivot between these views. As Donna Orange (2009, 
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November 10) says, "We engage and notice that we engage with our patients, [we do] not 
just observe them." ( 34: 13) The shared cultural task of the essay and psychotherapy, is to 
listen and draw closer to the familiar in order to understand the new. 
Socrates and Montaigne: From Exemplar to Friend 
Now that I've hopefully piqued your interest by giving you a taste of what we have in 
common with our potential friend, let me draw you in a little further. It may not be proper in 
our scientific world to ally ourselves with the world of a particular person, rather than a 
theory, a persona! work rather than a group or an intellectual tradition. But from the 
Renaissance humanist viewpoint, it is individuals who bring us closer to understanding. 
Intersubjectivity is always about a particular person: 
[ ... ] revelations conceming an inhabited, intersubjective cosmos necessarily bear the 
distinctive mark of a particular person, place and time. They necessarily testify to a 
particular style and substance of intersubjective relations and to a particular manner of 
living our individual and collective !ife. (Jager, 1999, p. 69) 
This is why calls for psychology to retum to the Romantics, or to the Classics, or to tum 
towards Eastern philosophies, may be Jess compelling than an introduction to the oeuvre of a 
particular person. I propose that our discipline of psychotherapy, which is based on particular 
conversations with particular people, may also be fruitfully explored through a relationship 
with one such particular, persona! world. 
In a recent discussion with my psychotherapy colleagues, we wondered about what it 
might mean to align ourselves with a person instead of a theory or approach. The question 
arose of who would be this pers on, our mentor, our patron of psychotherapy. There was a 
somewhat unanimous vote for Socrates, who based his understanding on everyday 
conversations. He leamed just as much from "carters, joiners, cobblers, and masons"xxxv as he 
would from philosophers (Hansen, 2002, p. 130). I still voted for Montaigne, in part because 
with Montaigne, you also get Socrates. Montaigne engaged with Socrates to a greater and 
greater extent as he wrote. Had Montaigne participated in our vote, l'rn pretty sure that he 
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would have voted for Socrates himself. But Montaigne not only engaged with the Socratic-
Platonic tradition, he transformed it. In my opinion, sorne of the ways in which he 
transformed it are key to this debate. 
Montaigne thought a lot about Socrates as a mode! or exemplar. For example, he took to 
heart Socrates' preoccupation with the Delphic inscription, "know thyself': the infinite 
pursuit of understanding "and insight into the things of the world, including himself." 
(Hansen, 2002, p. 129) He also appreciated the Socratic idea that true knowledge is knowing 
th at y ou are ignorant. In his "stupid enterprise"xxxvi, Montaigne wrote: "I, who make no other 
profession, fi nd in me su ch infinite depth and variety, th at wh at I have learned bears no other 
fruit than to make me realize how much I still have to learn."xxxvii 
By turning to Socrates, Montaigne was employing the Renaissance humanist strategy of 
looking to authority to understand the world. He took great pleasure in being Socrates' pupil, 
in bringing his ancestor back to life as his master, his ideal other. A pupil has to overestimate 
his teacher. Montaigne put Socrates on a pedestal, in order to deal with his teacher's ideas 
about a subject matter. This brings to mind positive unconditional regard in therapy. Your 
patient may be in a terrible state, but you make him the authority on his subject matter 
because this initial stance is essential to learning. 
Montaigne didn't rely only on this strategy. In typical fashion, he threw it ali into 
question: Peasants, "who know neither Aristotle nor Cato, neither example nor precept"xxxviii 
are able to perfonn everyday feats of greater endurance and patience than those that we learn 
at school. One of Montaigne ' s misgivings about imitating or following exemplars like 
Socrates or revered kings, was that they are too abstract. Compared to kings and their heroic 
deeds , we fee! alienated, dissatisfied and anxious. According to Montaigne, "the most 
barbarous of our maladies is to despise our being."xxxix He adamantly refused to set himself 
up as any sort of lofty example, like a public statue: 
1 consider myself one of the common sort, except in that 1 consider myself so; guilty of 
the commoner and humbler faults, but not of faults disavowed or excused; and 1 value 
myself only for knowing my value. xl 
l 
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Today, in psychotherapy, our ideals or exemplars are not individuals, but theories about 
the self, statistical means, positions on curves of normality. They lead us to mischaracterize 
and loathe ourselves (de Botton, 2012, July 13, 12:25). By painting such a frank portrait of a 
very ordinary human being rather than an exemplary person, Montaigne "makes our human 
follies less shameful" ( 9:49). His "gentle mockery of human beings" ( 10:50) make us feel 
less alone, and able to laugh at ourselves . It's possible to be serious and ridiculous: we are ail 
steeped in just as much "inanity and nonsense"x1i. Montaigne admired Socrates for his rigour, 
but he eut himself a lot more slack and had more fun (Spears, 1988, p. 315) than his hemlock-
drinking forefather: "1 have not, like Socrates, by the force of reason, corrected my natural 
propensities, and have not in the least interfered with my inclinations by art. I let my self go as 
1 have come. I combat nothing."xlii 
Psychotherapy is also about articulating and leaming to live with our faults, our 
weaknesses, our insecurities, not necessarily about doing anything with them. To a certain 
extent, we leam to give them space and let them be. We meet our problems and let them 
speak rather than solve them. Like Montaigne, we come to the idea that reality is messy, but 
th at a good li fe in volves a "more or less gracious accommodation [ ... ] with reality" (de 
Botton, 2012, July 13 , 15:02), ail white keeping our intellectual confidence in check. "[W]e 
try to be fully human, but not more than human" (Spears, 1988, p. 318). 
Second Best Friend 
In our modern world we don' t really have room for the idea of friendship . We see it as 
biological, or as sorne sort of economies of self-interest, or as repressed homosexuality, or at 
best as something sentimental. Its original primacy, as felt during Antiquity and the 
Renaissance, is completely lost. Montaigne reminds us that !etting our guard down and seeing 
something together leads to discovery. He reminds us of the pleasure of being together in the 
search for understanding. The Essays shows us that friendship is the very condition for 
understanding, for clarity. Whether we are approaching a friend, a patient, or a work of art, 
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we are seeking a mutual revelation of presence, which allows us to see. (Jager, persona! 
communication, December, 2012) 
Montaigne, (whom the French Vatican referred to as the French Socrates), and Socrates 
each valued intimate conversation over speaking to groups, be it in a treatise or in a lecture. 
We have the timeless image of Socrates, strolling and talking with his young students, and we 
can imagine spirited discussions between young Montaigne and la Boétie lasting well into the 
night. Without a teacher or a friend close at band, Montaigne invented essaying as the next 
best thing, bringing "writing as near as it can come to talk among friends." (Hampshire, 2003, 
p. xxv) He transformed the Socratic-Platonic dialogue into a new type of conversation: the 
essay. 
That Montaigne did not originate ideas but rather lent them form and colour, was a fact 
that did not prevent him from transforming them. He put old conceptions in such a fresh 
aspect that he changed their nature, he threw a light upon them which altered proportions 
and made them unrecognisable. He renewed their vitality - they were born again. (Siche!, 
1911, p. 180) 
Montaigne recognized and valued the confidence and vitality that he could draw from a 
sustaining relationship with a friend as opposed to with an anonymous public: 
If 1 had somebody to write to 1 would readily have chosen it as the means of publishing 
my chatter. But 1 would need sorne definite correspondent, as 1 used to have, who would 
draw me out, sus tain me and keep me going. [ ... ] 1 would have been more observant and 
confident if I were addressing one strong and beloved friend th an 1 am now when 1 need 
to have regard for a many-sided public. Unless 1 deceive myself my achievement then 
would have been greater.xiiii 
Few would agree that his achievement would have been greater. For it was precisely 
because he lacked la Boétie as his living correspondent that Montaigne invented essaying. 
Essaying was a new way of practicing friendship, of intimately addressing individual readers 
rather than a "many-sided public". By maintaining the conversational form, he was able to 
speak to the other in the absence of the other. Therapy is like essaying, in the sense that it too 
is often the next best thing to having a great friend, or a great teacher. People without a 
sustaining relationship in their lives can visit a professional who will draw them out, and 
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keep them going. Often, the therapeutic conversation is a space in which to address someone 
or even parts of one's self who are absent. As Montaigne discovered, even a second-best 
relationship can give you the confidence to observe things as they are, to live a particular !ife, 
to dare to love things in their particularity. 
Montaigne enthusiastically offered himself as a friend, intended "for a nook in the library, 
and to amuse a neighbor, a relative, a friend, who may take a pleasure in associating and 
conversing with me again in this image."xliv Moreover, he had a particular type of friend in 
mind when writing his Essays. Common minds with no interest in the Delphic inscription 
would not fit the bill. Nor would stuffy intellectuals: "[T]he former would not understand 
enough about them [the Essays ], the latter too much."xtv Montaigne was extending his 
friendship to a much smaller third group "into whose hands you come, that of minds 
regulated and strong in themselves"xtvi. He envisaged this "middle region"xtvii to .be self-
reflective, "potential essayists" (Brush, 1994, p. 162) like himself: undeniably well-educated, 
yet capable of living with mistakes, that is, of not holding too 'fast to reason. In a fascina ting 
passage in "On experience", he ponders the type of thing that such a pers on would be good 
for. He concludes "[f]or nothing"xtviii ' except for the task of examining another man's sou!. 
His ability is worth "nothing" in a utilitarian or material sense, however, "[t]he long attention 
that 1 devote to studying myself trains me also to judge passably of others"xtix. This task 
"would be a nameless office"' and he sets about imagining just what it might involve. Kings 
come to mind. Given that royals are usually surrounded by untrustworthy flatterers , kings 
have difficulty knowing themselves, and tend to have spoiled, "flighty and erratic 
character[s]". Montaigne would perform a "remarkable act of friendship" for such a king, a 
person for whom "the fidelity of silence" li is paramount: 
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1 would have told my mas ter home truths, and watched over his conduct, if he had been 
willing. Not in general, by schoolmasterly !essons, which 1 do not know - and 1 see no 
true reform spring from them in those who know them - but by observing his conduct 
step by step at every opportunity, judging it with my own eyes, piece by piece, simply 
and naturally, making him see how he stands in public opinion [ . . . ] 1 should have had 
enough fidelity, judgement and independence for th at. [ . . . ] And it is a part th at cannot be 
played indiscriminately by aiL For truth itself does not have the privilege to be 
employed at any time and in any way; it's use, noble as it is, has its circumscription and 
its limits. lt often happens, as the world goes, that people blurt it out into a prince's ear 
not only fruitlessly, but harmfully and even unjustly. And no one can make me believe 
that a righteous remonstrance cannot be applied wrongfully, and that the interest of the 
substance must not often yield to the interest ofform.1;; 
In his search for a kindred spirit, Montaigne conjured up a profession that would best 
suit essayists. lt strikes me that this "nameless office" might very weil be called " therapist" in 
our day. Not only would Montaigne be a good friend for therapists, it appears th at therapists 
may be just the type of company that Montaigne was seeking. 
A Humanist Psychotherapy 
That somewhat off-the cuff conversation with my colleagues who voted for Socrates as 
the patron for psychotherapists has stayed with me. lt prompted me to want to introduce 
Montaigne and his Essays more formally to fellow psychotherapy students, and to think 
about what might be pertinent in such an introduction. lt also got me thinking about why it 
might be important for our discipline to have a friend , in addition to our conventional 
relationships with intellectual traditions. 1 realized that with a friend we are better able to do 
two things: to say who we are and to see where we belong. Having someone at our side gives 
us the courage to reflect on the specificity of things, and to look around and see where we 
stand, just as we do with our patients. 
Montaigne ' s project was to describe his persona! expenence with groundbreaking 
candour and honesty: "1 am all in the open and in full view, born for company and 
friendship ."1;; ; In do ing so, he "provides companionship for us in [our own] process of self-
definition and thereby consoles and encourages us." (Spears, 1988, p. 318) He not only 
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documented his own fluctuating and faliible nature, but also what he learned about human 
nature, knowledge that would not be accessible from a universal viewpoint. Furthermore, in 
his "restless inquiry" (Hampshire, 2003 , p. xx), Montaigne explored how best to live well 
' 
given our overreaching nature. (Bakeweli, 2010b, para. 5). 
Therapy is a remarkably similar endeavour. Like essaying, it flows from a particular 
disciplined relationship, an attempt to be together in a world made coherent by the practices 
of friendship and hospitality. Together, therapist and patient find the heati to engage with 
their subject matter and foliow it closely, which paradoxically allows us to become aware of 
other things, to inscribe our experience within a Jar ger story. Therapy and essaying share this 
central aim: to draw people out into the light of relationships, to live more intensely, in ri cher 
colour and finer detail , 
Essays and therapy are brief visits, tentative attempts to make sense, conversations 
marked by beginnings and ends. Each is a way of dealing with the Joss and separation 
underlying painful discontinuities in our lives. Like ali conversations, they are forms of 
staying together in a relationship that is not static, but must be continualiy recreated. 
Our common attitude is one of humility, for ultimately ali we can do is essay, and that is 
enough. (This is in contrast to the natural sciences, in which you cannot speak until you 
know.) Like Montaigne, we accept that we cannot make pronouncements that will 
reverbera te throughout the ages: "How many things were articles of faith to us yesterday that 
are fables to us today?"1iv Instead of uncovering timeless anonymous facts about human 
nature, we renew the question of how to think our humanity. We continue to essay our 
beginnings and revisit our creative works. Such is the work and imagination required to 
maintain relationships. 
Montaigne' s immediate presence imbues us with the Renaissance spirit of discovery, a 
sense that we are beckoned by something more. The Essays sensitize us to the experience of 
presence and to the question inherent in presence which asks us to step forward and be candid 
ourselves. It is tragic that in our modern time we get to truth by making ourselves absent in 
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an indifferent world. Montaigne shows us that hospitality and friendship are fundamental 
moves th at open a human world to self and other. The Essays began in wonder about his own 
humanity and that of his neighbours. Montaigne wondered about how to be good neighbours, 
how to leave space for the other, how to cultivate difference. The question that arises for 
therapists is how do we create an atmosphere in which people can stop being scared, and start 
talking with confidence in a benevolent world, instead of clamming up? (Jager, persona! 
communication, May, 2011) How do we lay the table for such a vital conversation? This 
cultural exercise is the basis for a humanist psychotherapy. 
There is an essential second act to a humanist psychotherapy. The task of the therapist is 
not only to help beai, but also to transmit the questions and discoveries that arise from our 
privileged encounters. Like Freud, Jung, van den Berg, or William James, we can favour the 
essay form rather than the scientific article to communicate our experiences, keeping their 
nuance, particularity, richness, and !ife. An essay, as conceived by Montaigne, is uniquely apt 
to explore and reflect upon a conversation, to bring forth the "l", to make new discoveries , 
and invite others to respond. 
Psychotherapy Cornes Home 
We've looked at how the Essays and psychotherapy are open-ended responses to the 
question of the position of man in the world. Correspondingly, engagement with the Essays 
helps us to position the discipline of psychotherapy itself. We come to better understand what 
the humanities are, to reflect on their significance for us modems, and to find a home for 
psychotherapy within their dialogical realm. 
The broad sense of the humanities is an acknowledgement of other sources of inquiry. 
Like the Renaissance humanists, we engage with other voices in the conversation about what 
it means to be human, about how we cultivate our humanity. These questions are reflections 
of our communal history of thought, in which this very particular book holds an important 
place. Our deepest understanding arises from such a conversation, rather than from 
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methodical or abstract observation. In the humanities, we leam from all of the different, 
incommensurate branches, adjusting our attitude and approach to the subject and context at 
band. 
When I dance, I dance; when I sleep, I sleep; yes, and when I walk alone in a beautiful 
orchard, if my thoughts have been dwelling on extraneous incidents for sorne part of the 
time, for sorne other part 1 bring them back to the walk, to the orchard, to the sweetness 
of this soli tude, and to me.1v 
The Essays' "patchwork and motley"1vi form and style reflect the coming together of 
disparate voices through conversation. This brings to mind Heaton's conception of therapy: 
"[ ... ] a motley of techniques and practices employed to help people in mental pain and 
distress." (Heaton, 2010, p. 52) Within the horizon of the humanities, the diverse disciplinary 
practices come together not through a unifying theory, but through the felt unity of mutual 
presence: "1 shall know it weil enough when I feel it."1vii 
Bemd Jager sa ys that psychotherapy is like an offshoot in the tree of the humanities. lt is 
a new way of practicing the humanities, of furthering the conversation that bas so many sites 
already. Dance, music, history, religion, and philosophy are ali discrete sites of conversation. 
Psychotherapy is its own site. As in essaying, the practices involved in psychotherapy are not 
totally novel, but they have arisen is a new context, in a new type of conversation. 1 see 
psychotherapy is a much-needed response to the alienation and deculturization of our modem 
!ife. lt is a space in which we seek understanding by making a home for ourselves rather than 
making ourselves absent. In many ways, we visita therapist to help us get back in touch with 
the lived world. A common scenario is one in which the patient knows how to work hard, but 
is unhappy because he can't get out of the instrumental perspective in order to fonn a 
sustaining relationship. Or, the patient may be fleeing part of his lived experience, using 
emotional or behavioural strategies that ultimately isolate and confuse him. 
As a society, we have become much less connected to the humanities in our education 
and in our daily lives. But we still crave culture. Historian Simon Schama says that "we want 
a story that tells us about our humanity that is wider than our brief lives." (Bragg, 1998, 
December 3) Psychotherapy is one modem response to this need. "It is this experience 'of 
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being more than' [ ... ] that is the essential power of psychothenipy" (Todres, 1993, 2000a, as 
cited in Todres, 2003 , p. 202). 
Academie psychologists are homeless in the intellectual world, as evidenced by our ever-
shifting search for identity: from bio1ogists to mathematicians to information engineers to 
philosophers to applied neuroscientists, etc. 12 We are especially nervous around art and 
literature. In this realm, we feel like tourists or consumers of experience because we have no 
place to bring these experiences, to integrate them as therapists . Having a home is essential 
for thinking and observing. A home situates you and makes you embody your ideas so that 
you can go back out into the world. "The greatest thing in the world is to know how to belong 
to oneself. ,lviii 
Montaigne referred to his intellectual home as his "arriere boutique"1ix: "We should set 
aside an arriere boutique, a room, just for ourselves, at the back of the shop, keeping it 
entirely free and founding there our true liberty and our principal place of retreat and 
solitude."1x lt is a protected and inhabited space for reflection, but one that is still connected 
to the hustle and bustle of commerce and production. I can imagine Montaigne comfortably 
seated at small table in a warm, intimate room, writing attentively, but with one eye on the 
happenings in the shop. Frequent noisy interruptions would no doubt occur. Friends might 
drop by for a chat while on break from their work in the storefront. The back of the shop and 
the storefront are each places of meeting in which complementary, interacting, and yet 
fundamentally different types of encounters occur. The metaphor of the arriere boutique 
distinguishes between the sy.stematically ordered world of work, technology, facts and 
measurements, and the festive world of intimate conversation. From his arriere boutique, 
Montaigne could venture out to see things, ideas and people from a more distanced 
perspèctive. Once returned to the room at the back of the shop, he could recollect all that he 
observed, and make sense by bringing his observations into the conversation of the essay. 
12 For a compelling description of one man's discontinuous professional journey through 
the various incarnations of academie psychology, read Yoshida's (2001) essay, "My Life in 
Psychology: Making a Place for Fiction in a W orld of Science". 
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With renewed understanding of what was most familiar, namely, himself, he would set out 
again. The practice of essaying encompasses this movement between the personal space at 
the back of the shop and the utilitarian encounters in the boutique itself. For the discipline of 
psychotherapy, as is often the case for our patients, our arriere boutique is our therapy office. 
There is circular movement in thought: it begins with what we know, moves out into the 
realm of the objective or distanced perspective, and then cornes home to see what we know in 
a new way, to be woven into our particular mental life.13 . We collect our thoughts around the 
nucleus of a particular kind of conversation, for example, an essay or therapy, a dance or a 
poem. The world cornes together in this conversation; ail of life is there. There is no 
teleological quality to thought in the Essays, no progress from opinion to truth. As the title of 
the Essays' very first chapter tells us, "By diverse means we arrive at the same end"1xi, that is 
to say, back to the beginning, to the room at the back of the shop. Essaying is homecoming. 
The circular path of Montaigne 's thought forms a horizon of presence or sense of unity 
around the Essays. It reminds me of how, in therapy, I often find that hard-eamed discoveries 
tum out to have been revealed in the very first moments of our encounter. When I look back 
at what was said in the waiting room on that first aftemoon, or even during the initial phone 
call to set up a session, I see that everything was already there. I understand anew. These 
banal beginnings take on deeper meaning and fresh import. 
Our modem conception of thought or theorizing is one of a unidirectional, progressive, 
and individualized search for truth. But a joumey without homecoming is blind wandering: 
"to be everywhere is to be nowhere"1xii . 
13 The earliest usage of the Greek word theory brings us back to the 6th century B.C. The 
poet,Theognis described the theoretician as the chosen representative of the community who 
sets out to question the Delphian oracle and retums to faithfully transmit the divine response 
(Jager, 1975). 
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The career of our desires ought to be circumscribed and restrained to a short limit of the 
nearest and most contiguous commodities; and their course ought, moreover, to be 
performed not in a right line, that ends elsewhere, but in a circle, of which the two points, 
by a short wheel, meet and terminate in ourselves. Actions that are carried on without 
this reflection - a near and essential reflection, I mean - such as those of ambitious and 
avaricious men, and so many more as run point-blank, and to whose career always 
carries them before themselves, such actions, I say; are erroneous and sickly.1xiii 
The intersubjective world forms " the ultimate ground of a human world" (Jager, persona! 
communication, November, 2012) . It is from here that we move out into the objective world, 
and it is to here that we return. In "a near and essential reflection", how we speak about what 
we have leamed to our friends, to our patients, or to the page of an essay, is very different 
from the language, stance and attitude that we use when we are out in the theoretical world. 
Academie psychology, "this strange modern discourse on the human sou!" (Jager, 1991 , p. 
70), often conflates the intersubjective realities that make up the dual cosmos with the unitary 
reality underlying the natural universe. We conflate the arriere boutique with the boutique 
itself. As such, we have !ost touch with the ability shift between complementary perspectives, 
and we have delegitimized coming home to the intersubjective world . I 've noticed that at 
scientific psychology conferences, the speaker usually begins or ends with a philosophical 
quote, or a poem, or sorne fragment of the humanities . We have a sense that this is where 
thinking about humanity begins and must come home to. But there is no satisfying way of 
speaking about the poem within the language of the traveller. Furthermore, within a scientific 
perspective, it is not valid to change your stance and attitude to accommodate the poem. So 
the fragments remain floating bookends to the main discourse. On the other hand, therapists 
can also render thinking sterile by getting caught up in the isolating routine of therapeutic 
conversations, without ever turning to co\leagues or to the larger public. A home for thought 
can on! y remain a home if there is a journey to renew it. 
Psychotherapy is best understood within the context of the humanities, but this does not 
mean that we adopt an anti-science attitude. In fact, quite the opposite. Humans have always 
been both scientists and myth-makers. The objective and dialogical perspectives are the two 
complementary yet distinct poles of human !ife; each can only be understood in relation to 
the other. Each is a distinct type of relationship to self, other and world. W e pivot between 
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them throughout each day as we work and love, consume and celebrate, manufacture and 
create. The natural universe of the sciences is but one possibility of the dual human cosmos. 
The scientist's perspective is no Jess human than the artist's. The scientist and artist's 
humanity arises from his or her ability to shift between these poles. For this reason, a 
humanist psychotherapy is not pre-modem, or post-cartesian, or postmodem. We understand 
and deepen our engagement with both features of life. From the inhabited standpoint of the 
humanities, psychotherapy is able to bring the natural sciences home, into conversation, to 
engage with and reflect upon them, (just as Montaigne did). The inverse is not tenable. 
Science cannot converse with the humanities, because it is a unitary view. This doesn't mean 
that you can't comment on psychotherapy from a scientific perspective, but it should not 
substitute for the humanities. I am not critiquing science, but scientism. Contrary to what 
Freud initially claimed, the humanities are not fodder for the sciences to be eventually 
mathematicized. Humanist psychotherapists are in a unique position to cultivate the gap 
between these perspectives, to open much-needed possibilities of living together. 
No Longer a "Nameless Office" 
We therapists need to start understanding ourselves as practitioners of a particular type 
of conversation, rather than as theoretical experts. Whatever we hear in our daily lives is 
always brought back to this curious conversation. lt's not an easy stance; it requires that we 
tolerate groundlessness, relinquishing the comforts and power of abstract knowledge. It 
would certainly be easier to just sit back and come up with gratifying explanations, to 
literally be an armchair theorist, a "theorist who chooses not to return." (Jager, 1975, p. 
240) In therapy, patients ask, how should I live and love, what are the rules? They suspect 
that the therapist is on solid ground, that he or she holds the key to sorne secret foundational 
knowledge. But we teach them to live on the basis of a conversation, nothing more solid than 
that. Ali we can do is band together with someone with similar experience, and build 
something together. This is the only security that we have in life. We confess to each other 
that ultimately we do not have a clue, but we can live this cluelessness together. Such a 
conversation, like essaying, is a "thorny undertaking"1xiv because it puts a lot more than facts 
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and knowledge into question. We risk our understanding of ourselves and our world. The 
Essays show us how one person lived this groundless experience without succumbing to 
nostalgia for an absolute unity in which there is no place for man. 
Why is it important to explicitly be long to the humanities? Wh y not just say that we are 
very "qualitative" scientists? Are we just niggling over terminology? I argue no. This essay 
is an attempt to show that by coming home to the humanities, therapists have so many friends! 
Not only Montaigne, but historians, musicians, philosophers, and theologians, past, present 
and future . We deprive ourselves of humanizing dialogue, rich resources and untold 
discoveries by positioning ourselves within natural world of the sciences, or in the overly 
complicated netherland between medicine and philosophy. 
I suggest that by naming our office, "humanist psychotherapists", we shed the false 
pretences of being applied philosophers, applied neuroscientists, experts on how to live, 
health managers, etc. W e can be more authentic if we are up front about the fact th at we are 
based on nothing more (or Jess) than a conversation. Taking the risk of humility opens the 
possibility of real dialogue in which we can assert the "I" of our own discipline. W e can talk 
freely about what it means to see the world from our highly particular standpoint. We can 
talk about philosophy or science, but from our own perspective, asking what does this science, 
or this book, or this person tell us as therapists. 
While we share a dialogical vision with the other sites in the humanities, our relational 
practices of hospitality, love and friendship have their own colour and nuance. Montaigne 
called himself an "accidentai philosopher"1xv because despite his great erudition, he insisted 
that his intellectual home was ~he Essays, rather than the works of Antiquity. The Essays ' 
indirect and conversational nature allowed for chance encounters with philosophical 
questions. In this sense, psychotherapists might sometimes be accidentai philosophers, 
accidentai artists, or accidentai scientists . Philosophical questions come to us in a different 
way than to philosophers. For example, by being astonished at how we resent people we love, 
or struck by how alone we feel in grief. These questions come alive because we are in 
constant contact with them. We talk about them differently. 
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Where a philosopher might never tire of rereading his favorite authors or a writer the 
classics of his trade, the psychotherapist forever retums to his conversations with his 
patients and to the moments of di scovery that have marked his career. (Jager, 2013) 
During my first practicum, I wondered about the tentative and digressive character of the 
therapeutic conversation. Tuming to essaying was a fruitful way of deepening my 
understanding and tolerance of therapy 's ambulatory nature. Another therapist might be 
struck by how his conversations tend to follow the narrative arc of a novel. At other times, we 
might be surprised by the musical rhythm of a particular exchange. Perhaps questions that 
touch on ethics or societal customs come to the fore. It is through the mutual awareness of 
presencè in therapy, as opposed to methodical observation, that we gain access to literature, 
music, theology and sociology. These sensibilities colour our conversation at different 
moments, bringing us into closer contact with our companions in the humanities. We can 
enrich our understanding ofthemes in therapy by bringing other voices into our inquiry. 
Taking the risk of authenticity opens up the possibility of a real vision of the world that 
can do important work. In a rarefied academie world, we are safe with each other but have 
little relevance in the larger world. We are just another producer of knowledge and facts, a 
content-provider for joumals and news headlines. Finding a place in our culture would allow 
us to become more relevant. Our place, like that of Montaigne's middle ranked "nameless 
office", is neither super-academie nor non-academie. 
[A]nd born to a middle rank; because on the one hand he would not fear to touch his 
master 's heart deeply and to the quick, at the risk of losing his preferment thereby; and 
on the other hand, being of middle station, he would have easier communication with ail 
sorts ofpeople.1xvi 
Thinking about therapy in this way opens up new (and old) ways for us to explore and 
write about our experiences. We could contribute in sorne way to understanding our modem 
predicament and the critical human decisions that we face as a society. Therapists have such 
exceptional access to so much human !ife that it is a shame to constrain our experiences 
within the confines of scientific discourse, or apply it to endless diagnostical redefinitions, or 
neuter it in a barrage of tests and measures. We need to go public, like Montaigne! In the 
-------------
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humanist tradition, you cannot divorce psychotherapy from writing, from communicating 
with other therapists and the public in general. 
"That such a human being bas written, truly increases one's desire to live on this 
earth." 14 
In the tree of the humanities, psychotherapy's closest neighbour is the essaying branch. 
Their knotty limbs often intertwine. Essaying is it's own thing, but, as we have seen, it shares 
a lot of common ground with psychotherapy. This proximity is part of what makes 
Montaigne such an ideal friend for therapists. Y ou need a bit of familiarity to discover 
something new. 
At the outset of my doctoral studies, 1 saw the question of positioning our discipline as a 
preliminary step towards a more important thesis. lt is a question that often gets eventually 
erased by "bridging the gap" between theory and practice, or by placing our discipline on a 
continuum between the quantitative and qualitative approaches, or by subsuming the 
humanities into the sciences. But it tums out to be a very old and very important question. To 
position ourselves requires that we cultivate differences, that we describe our experiences 
with more specificity, with candour and honesty. We need a friend to stand by us as we 
articulate our particular creative work, and to help us to see where we stand in conversation 
with our ancestors, other disciplines, our patients, and ourselves. Montaigne is our man. 
The Essays are our heritage. As once la Boétie bequeathed his beloved library to his 
great friend, Montaigne bequeaths the Essays and the essay form to modemity in an act of 
friendship. We receive Montaigne's Essays not as information, but as a symbol of the 
humanist transfer of knowledge, turning his absence into a gift. His gift reminds us of our !ost 
vision of hum an ity, and suggests other possibilities of courageously responding to its absence. 
The discipline of psychotherapy is one su ch response. 
14 (Nietzsche, 1874, as cited in Langer, 2005) 
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The novice therapist today, like myself, has probably received little education in the 
humanities. We may feel daunted at the prospect of tuming towards this field of inquiry, as 
weil as sorne anxiety about going against the grain of scientific thought. For us, the Essays 
are an ideal entry point into to this vast resource. Montaigne's willing ear, the generous scope 
of voices, his erudition and playfulness, his "intellectual gaiety" (Hampshire, 2003, p. xxv), 
and most important! y, the sense th at y ou are not al one, help to ease us back into the 
conversation of humanity, as we try to do with our patients. l'rn not advising against going 
directly to Socrates or any other literary figure, l'rn just suggesting that Montaigne is an ideal 
companion, especially ifyou are feeling a little unsure or intimidated. 
Montaigne encouraged mixing with ali sorts of people, not to learn facts or 
"measurements", but to learn of the ir "characters and ways [ ... ], to rub and polish our brains 
by contact with those of others"1xvii. Now that I've introduced you, fellow therapists, to our 
friend from Bordeaux, I hope that you will open a bottle of wine together, (preferably a 
Montaigne wine, which, by the way, is still in production), enjoy and marvel at each other as 
you "rub and polish" each other's minds. 
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Notes 
i(S, 11:18, 755) 
«Je n'ay pas plus faict mon livre que mon livre m'a faict, livre consubstantiel à son 
autheur, d'une occupation propre, membre de ma vie» (T-R, II:18, 648) 
ii (F, preface, 2) 
« la matiere de [son] livre» (T-R, Au lecteur, 9) 
iii (S, III:2, 908) 
C'est un contrerolle de divers et muables accidens et d'imaginations irresoluës et, 
quand il y eschet, contraires; soit que je sois autre moymesme, soit que je saisisse les 
subjects par autres circonstances et considerations. Tant y a que je me contredits bien 
à l'adventure, mais la vérité, comme di soit Demades, je ne la contredy point. 
(T-R, III:2, 782) 
iv (F, III:2, 740) 
Si mon ame pou voit prendre pied, je ne m'essaierais pas, je me resoudrais ; elle est 
tousjours en apprentissage et en espreuve. (T-R, III:2, 782) 
v (F, 1:9, 25) 
« chimeres et monstres» (T-R, 1:9, 34) 
vi (F, III:lO, 936) 
« Qui ne vit aucunement à autruy, ne vit guere à soy. » (T-R, 1:10, 984) 
vii (F, preface, 2) 
Je veus qu'on m'y voie en ma façon simple, naturelle et ordinaire, sans contantion et 
artifice : car c'est moy que je peins. Mes defauts s'y liront au vif, et ma forme naïfve, 
autant que la reverence publique me l'a pennis. Que si j'eusse esté entre ces nations 
qu'on dict vivre encore sous la douce liberté des premieres loix de nature, je t'asseure 
que je m'y fusse tres-volontiers peint tout entier, et tout nud. (T-R, Au lecteur, 9) 
viii (F, II:37, 696) 
« [c]e fagotage de tant de diverses pieces » (T-R, II:37, 736) 
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ix (F, III:9, 895) 
« Moy à cette heure et moy tantost, sommes bien deux; mais quand meilleur? je n'en 
puis rien dire.» (T-R, III:9, 941) 
x (F, II:l6, 570) 
Mais nous sommes, je ne sçay comment, doubles en nous mesmes, qui faict que ce 
que nous croyons, nous ne le croyons pas, et ne nous pouvons deffaire de ce que nous 
condamnons. (T-R, II:16, 603) 
xi (F, !:28, 169) 
Nous nous cherchions avant que de nous estre vt;<us, et par des rapports que nous 
oyïons l'un de l'autre, qui faisaient en n6stre affection plus d'effort que ne porte la 
raison des rapports, je croy par quelque ordonnance du ciel: nous nous embrassions 
par noz noms. Et à nostre premiere rencontre, qui fut par hazard en une grande feste 
et compagnie de ville, nous nous trouvasmes si prins, si cognus, si obligez entre nous, 
que rien des lors ne nous fut si proche que l'un à l'autre. (T-R, !:28, 187) 
xii (F, ! :28, 169) 
«Cette cy [amitié] n'a point d'autre idée que d'elle mesme, et ne se peut rapporter 
qu'à soy. » (T-R, !:28, 187) 
xiii (F, !:28, 174) 
« Car les discours mesmes que l'antiquité nous a laissé sur ce subject, me semblent 
lâches au prix du sentiment que j'en a y. Et, en ce poinct, les effects surpassent les 
preceptes mesmes de la philosophie » (T -R, !:28, 191-192) 
xiv (F, !:28, 169) 
« En l'amitié dequoy je parle, elles se meslent et confondent l'une en l'autre, d'un 
melange si universel, qu'elles effacent et ne retrouvent plus la couture qui les a 
jointes.» (T-R, !:28, 186) 
xv (F, II:37, 696) 
«s'est basty à diverses poses et intervalles» (T-R, II:37, 736) 
xvi (F, III:5, 809) 
« les imperfections qui sont en moy ordinaires et constantes» (T-R, III:5, 853) 
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xvii (F, 1:28, 175) 
«Mais oyons un peu parler ce garson de seize ans. » (T -R, 1:28, 193) 
xviii (F, 1:28, 164) 
Considérant la conduite de la besongne d'un peintre que j'ay, il m'a pris envie de 
l'ensuivre. Il choisit le plus bel endroit et milieu de chaque paroy, pour y loger un 
tableau élabouré de toute sa suffisance; et, le vuide tout au tour, ille remplit de 
crotesques, qui sont peintures fantasques , n'ayant grace qu'en la varieté et estrangeté . 
Que sont-ce icy aussi, à la verité, que crotesques et corps monstrueux, rappiecez de 
divers membres, sans certaine figure , n'ayants ordre, suite ny proportion que fortuite? 
(T-R, 1:28, 181) 
xix (F, 1:29, 177) 
«Ces vers se voient ailleurs» (T-R, 1:29, 194) 
xx (F, III:3, 762) 
«Je suis sur l'entrée » (T-R, III:3, 807) 
xxi (F, Ill:5, 777) 
« des essays en cher et en os » (T-R, III:5, 821) 
xx ii (S, 1:28, 169) 
« Si on me presse de dire pourquoy je l'aymois, je sens que cela ne se peut exprimer, 
qu'en respondant: «Par ce que c'estoit luy; par ce que c'estoit moy. » » 
(T-R, 1:28, 186-187) 
xxi ii (F, 1:28 , 174) 
«je ne fay que trainer languissant; et les plaisirs mesmes qui s'offrent à moy, au lieu 
de me consoler, me redoublent le regret de sa perte. Nous estions à moitié de tout; [ ... ] 
J'estois desjà si fait et accoustumé à estre deuxiesme par tout, qu'il me semble n'estre 
plus qu'à demy.» (T-R, 1:28 , 192) 
xxiv (passage from III:9 as translated by and cited in Frampton, 20llb, p. 39) 
« Ils sont trespassez. Si est bien mon pere, aussi entierement qu'eux, et s'est esloigné 
de moy et de la vie autant en dixhuict ans que ceux-là ont faict en seize cens; » 
(T-R, III:9, 975) 
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xxv (F, II: 12, 522) 
Or ce sont choses qui se choquent souvent; et m'a l'on dit qu'en la Geometrie (qui 
pense avoir gaigné le haut point de certitude parmy les sciences) il se trouve des 
demonstrations inevitables, subvertissans la verité de l'experience : comme Jacques 
Peletier me disoit chez moy qu'il avoit trouvé deux lignes s'acheminans l'une vers 
l'autre pour se joindre, qu'il verifioit toutefois ne pouvoir jamais, jusques à l'infinité, 
arriver à se toucher; (T-R, II:12, 555) 
xxvi (F, III:9, 911-912) 
Outre ce profit que je tire d'escrire de moy, j'en espere cet autre que, s'il advient que 
mes humeurs plaisent et accordent à quelque honneste homme avant que je meure, il 
recerchera de nous joindre; je luy donne beaucoup de pays gaigné, car tout ce qu'une 
longue connaissance et familiarité luy pourroit avoir acquis en plusieurs années, il le 
voit en trois jours en ce registre, et plus seurement et exactement. [ ... ] Si à si bonnes 
enseignes je sçavois quelqu'un qui me fut propre, certes je l'irois trouver bien loing; 
car la douceur d'une sortable et aggreable compaignie ne se peut assez acheter à mon 
gré. 0 un amy! (T-R, III:9, 959) 
xxvii (S, II:8, 451) 
« A cettuy-cy [brain children, Essais], tel qu'il est, ce que je donne, je le donne 
purement et irrevocablement, comme on donne aux enfans corporels » (T-R, II:8, 383) 
xxviii (S, II : 17, 730) 
Les mains, je les a y si gourdes que je ne sçay pas escrire seulement pour moy: de 
façon que, ce que j'ay barbouillé, j'ayme mieux le refaire que de me donner la peine 
de le démesler; [ ... ] Autrement, bon clerc. Je ne sçay pas clorre à droit une lettre, ny 
ne sçeuzjamais tailler plume, ny trancher à table, qui vaille, ny equipper un cheval de 
son hamois, ny porter à poinct un oiseau et le lascher, ny parler aux chiens, aux 
oiseaux, aux chevaux. (T-R, II:17, 625) 
xxix (F, III:ll , 957) 
«C'est chose difficile de resoudre son jugement contre les opinions communes.» 
(T-R, III:ll , 1005) 
xxx (S, III:S, 988) 
Les sciences traictent les choses trop finement, d'une mode trop artificielle et 
differente à la commune et naturelle. Mon page faict l'amour et l'entend. Lisez luy 
Leon Hébreu et Ficin: on parle de luy, de ses pensées et de ses actions, et si il n'y 
entend rien . Je ne recognois pas chez Aristote la plus part de mes mouvemens 
ordinaires: on les a couverts et revestus d'une autre robbe pour l'usage de l'eschole. 
(T-R, III:S, 852) 
xxx i (F, 1:30, 177) 
« les natures temperées et moyennes. » (T -R, 1:30, 195) 
xxxi i (F, 11:18, 612) 
« livre consubstantiel à son autheur » (T-R, 11:18, 648) 
xxxiii (F, III:13, 1008) 
«J'ay assez vescu, pour mettre en compte l'usage qui m'a conduict si loing. Pour qui 
en voudra gouster,j'en ay faict l'essay, son eschançon. » (T-R, III:13, 1057) 
xxxiv (F:III:9, 882-883) 
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Nous empeschons noz pensées du general et des causes et conduittes universelles, qui 
se conduisent tres bien sans nous, et laissons en arrière nostre faict et Michel, qui 
nous touche encore de plus près que l'homme. (T-R, III:9, 929) 
xxxv (F, III: 12, 965) 
« [ ... ]cochers, menuisiers, savetiers et maçons » (T-R, III:12, 1014) 
xxxvi (F, II:8, 337) 
«sotte entreprise» (T-R, II:8, 364) 
xxxvii (F, III:13, 1003) 
«Moy qui ne faicts autre profession, y trouve une profondeur et varieté si infinie, que 
mon apprentissage n'a autre fruict que de me faire sentir combien il me reste à 
apprendre.» (T-R, III:13, 1052) 
xxxviii (F' III: 12, 968) 
« qui ne sçavent ny Aristote ny Caton, ny exemple, ny precepte » (T -R, III: 12, 10 17) 
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xxxix (F, III:l3 , 1039) 
« de nos maladies la plus sauvage, c'est mespriser nostre estre. » (T-R, III:13, 1091) 
xl (F, II:17, 584) 
Je me tiens de la commune sorte, sauf en ce que je m'en tiens : coulpable des 
defectuositez plus basses et populaires, mais non desadvouées, non excusées; et ne 
me prise seulement que de ce que je sçay mon prix. (T -R, II: 17, 618) 
xli (F, III:9, 931) 
« pleins d'inanité et de fadaise» (T-R, III:9, 979) 
xlii (F, III: 12, 988) 
«Je n'ay pas corrigé, comme Socrates, par force de la raison mes comp lexions 
naturelles, et n'ay aucunement troublé par art mon inclination. Je me laisse aller, 
comme je suis venu, je ne combats rien,» (T-R, III:12, 1037) 
xliii (S , 1:40, 283) 
Et eusse prins plus volontiers ceste forme à publier mes verves, si j'eusse eu à qui 
parler. Il me fallait, comme je l'ay eu autrefois, un certain commerce qui m'attirast, 
qui me soustinst et souslevast. [ .. . ]J'eusse esté plus attentif et plus seur, ayant une 
addresse forte et amie, que je ne suis, regardant les divers visages d'un peuple. Et suis 
deçeu, s'il ne m'eust mieux succédé. (T-R, 1:40, 246) 
xliv (F, II:18, 611) 
« C'est pour le coin d'une librairie, et pour en amuser un voisin, un parent, un amy, 
qui aura plaisir à me racointer et repratiquer en ce tt' image. » (T-R, II: 18, 64 7) 
xlv (F, 1:54, 276) 
«ceux-là n'y entendraient pas assez, ceux-cy y entendraient trop;» (T-R, 1:54, 300) 
xlvi (F, Il: 17, 605) 
« à qui vous tombez en partage, des ames reglées et fortes d'elles-mesmes » 
(T-R, II:17, 640) 
xlvii (F, 1:54, 276) 
« la moyenne region » (T-R, 1;54, 300) 
xlviii (F, III13, 1005) 
«A rien, fis-je .. » (T-R, III:l3, 1055) 
xlix (F, III:l3, 1004) 
« Cette longue attention que j'employe à me considerer me dresse à juger aussi 
passablement des autres,» (T-R, 111:13, 1053) 
1 (F, III: 13, 1 006) 
«Ce seroit un office sans nom» (T-R, III:13, 1055) 
li (F, III:13, 1006) 
«la fidelité du silence» (T-R, III:13, 1056) 
Iii (F, 111:13, 1005-1006) 
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Mais j'eusse dict ses veritez à mon maistre, et eusse contrerrolé ses meurs, s'il eust 
voulu. Non en gros, par leçons scholastiques, que je ne sçay point (et n'en vois naistre 
aucune vraye reformation en ceux qui les sçavent), mais les observant pas à pas, à 
toute oportunité, et en jugeant à l'œil piece à piece, simplement et naturellement, lu y 
faisant voyr quel il est en l'opinion commune, [ ... ] J'eusse eu assez de fidelité, de 
jugement et de liberté pour cela. [ ... ]Et est un rolle qui ne peut indifferemment 
appartenir à tous. Car la verité mesme n'a pas ce privilege d'estre employée à toute 
heure et en toute sorte: son usage, tout noble qu'il est, a ses circonscriptions et limites. 
Il advient sauvant, comme le monde est, qu'on la lache à l'oreille du prince, non 
seulement sans fruict mais dommageablement, et encore injustement. Et ne me fera 
l'on pas accroire qu'une sainte remontrance ne puisse estre appliquée vitieusement, et 
que l'interest de la substance ne doive souvent ceder à l'interest de la forme. 
(T-R, 111:13, 1055) 
liii (F, III:3 , 758) 
« [J]e suis tout au dehors et en evidence, nay à la societé et à l'amitié. » 
(T-R, III:3 , 801) 
liv (F, I:27 , 164) 
«combien de choses nous servoyent hier d'articles de foy, qui nous sont fables 
aujourd'huy? » (T-R, 1:27, 181) 
lv (F, III:13, 1036) 
Quand je dance, je dance; quand je dors, je dors; voyre et quand je me promeine 
solitairement en un beau vergier, si mes pensées se sont entretenues des occurences 
estrangieres quelque partie du temps, quelque autre partie je les rameine à la 
promenade, au vergier, à la douceur de cette solitude et à moy. 
(T-R, III:l3, 1087-1088) 
lvi (F, 11:20, 621) 
« rapiessement et bigarrure » (T-R, 11:20, 656) 
lvii (F, III:l3, 1001) 
« Je la sçauray assez quand je la sentiray. » (T-R, III:l3, 1050) 
lviii (F, 1:39, 216) 
«La plus grande chose du monde, c'est de sçavoir estre à soy. » (T-R, 1:39, 236) 
lix (T-R, 1:39, 235) 
lx (passage from 1:39 as translated by and cited in Screech, 2000, p. 68) 
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« Il se faut reserver une arriere boutique toute nostre, toute franche, en laquelle nous 
establissons nostre vraye liberté et principale retraicte et solitude.» (T-R, 1:39, 235) 
lxi (F, 1:1, 3) 
« Par divers moyens on arrive à pareille fin. » (T-R, 1:1 , 11) 
lxii (F, 1:8, 24) 
«c'est n'estre en aucun lieu, que d'estre par tout. » (T-R, 1:8, 34) 
lxiii (C, III:l O) 
La carriere de nos desirs doit estre circonscripte et restraincte à un court limite des 
commoditez les plus proches et contigües; et doit en outre leur course se manier, non 
en ligne droite qui face bout ailleurs, mais en rond, duquel les deux pointes se 
tiennent et terminent en nous par un brief contour. Les actions qui se conduisent sans 
cette reflexion, s'entend voisine reflexion et essentielle, comme sont celles des 
avaritieux, des ambitieux et tant d'autres qui courent de pointe, desquels la course les 
emporte tousjours devant eux, ce sont actions erronées et maladives. 
(T -R, 111:10, 988-989) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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lxiv (F, II:6, 331) 
« une espineuse entreprinse » (T-R, II:6, 358) 
lxv (F, II:12, 497) 
« Nouvelle figure : un philosophe impremedité et fortuite! » (T -R, II: 12, 528) 
lxvi (F, III: 13 , 1 006) 
[E]t nay de moyenne fortune; d'autant que, d'une part, il n'aurait point de craincte de 
toucher vifvement et profondement le coeur du maistre pour ne perdre par là le cours 
de son advancement, et d'autre part, pour estre d'une condition moyenne, il aurait 
plus aysée communication à toute sorte de gens. (T-R: III:13 , 1055) 
lxvii (F, 1:26, 136) 
« les humeurs [ ... ] et leurs façons , et pour frotter et limer nostre cervelle contre celle 
d'autruy. » (T-R, 1:26, 152) 
CHAPTERII 
SHOULD WE BE WRITING ESSA YS INSTEAD OF 
ARTICLES? A PSYCHOTHERAPIST' S REFLECTION ON 
MONTAIGNE'S MARVELOUS INVENTION 
Rachel Starr 
(Published in the Journal ofHumanistic Psycho/ogy) 
ABSTRACT 
Contemporary psychology may be overlooking an important mode of inquiry by insisting that 
our primary mode of communication should take the form of scientific articles rather than 
that of literary essays. The essay was first practiced and then refined by Michel de Montaigne 
in the late Renaissance and constitutes a unique literary form that incorporates both 
Renaissance humanism and the then-emerging spirit of scientific discovery. The aim of the 
present essay is to explore the uses psychotherapists might make ofMontaigne's Essays, both 
as a fruitful mode! for writing about and for reflecting on the human condition. The essay was 
born at a time of great intellectual and spiritual upheaval and renewal. It is freewheeling, 
unorthodox, forever inventive, and at the same time leamed, disciplined, and profoundly 
respectful of the past. The author looks to the humanist essay as developed by Montaigne as a 
usefulliterary and disciplinary deviee that can help in understanding the gap between purely 
theoretical or academie psychology and the actual practice of therapeutic psychology. 
Keywords: Montaigne, essay, theory, Renaissance, humanism, bridging the gap, 
psychotherapy, ordinary experience, modemity, conversation 
RÉSUMÉ 
En insistant pour que notre principal mode de communication prenne la forme d'articles 
scientifiques, la psychologie contemporaine néglige probablement un mode de recherche 
important, l'essai littéraire. Vers la fin de la Renaissance, Michel de Montaigne fut le premier 
à pratiquer et affiner l' essai littéraire qui constitue un genre unique, en intégrant l 'humanisme 
de la Renaissarrce et l'esprit, alors émergeant, de la découverte scientifique. L'objectif du 
présent essai est d'explorer les diverses utilisations que les psychothérapeutes pourraient faire 
des Essais de Montaigne, autant comme modèle fructueux pour écrire que pour réfléchir sur 
la condition humaine. L'essai est né à une époque de grands bouleversements et 
renouvellements, intellectuels et spirituels. Il est désinvolte, non orthodoxe, toujours innovant, 
et à la fois cultivé, discipliné, et profondément respectueux du passé. L'auteure se penche sur 
l'essai humaniste tel que développé par Montaigne en tant qu'outil littéraire et didactique 
utile pouvant aider à comprendre l'écart entre la psychologie purement théorique ou 
académique et la pratique concrète de la psychologie thérapeutique. 
Mots-clés : Montaigne, essai, théorie, Renaissance, humanisme, combler l'écart, 
psychothérapie, expérience ordinaire, modernité, conversation 
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The scientific article or paper is by far the most privileged form of communication 
within the psychotherapeutic community. Y et our humanist vision might be more at home in 
other fotms of literary expression, such as the essay in the way it was first proposed by 
Michel de Montaigne. Adopting the essay form might enable us to stay in closer and richer 
contact with the psychotherapeutic experience as we discuss the many challenges and 
possibilities of our profession. 
Michel de Montaigne, inventor of what he called the "unscientific" essay genre, 
challenges us to consider the "terrifying [ ... ] instability" (Taylor, 1989 178) of ordinary 
experience without recourse to the comforting authority of established theory and systematic 
methods. As Montaigne himself professed: "Y et there is no use our mounting on stilts, for on 
stilts we must still walk on our own legs. And on the loftiest throne in the world we are stiJl 
sitting only on our own rump." 1i 
The New ldea ofDiscovery and the Invention of the Essay 
The Renaissance was an era of crucial astronomical and geographical discoveries, 
including the discovery of the idea of discovery itself. Until this time, the paradigm of the 
ancient stable world bad remained unchallenged. It was a world where the planets and sun 
revolved around the Earth, and where the understanding of man's place in the cosmos fit 
nicely with religious beliefs. While looking for new trade routes in 1492, Columbus 
"discovered" America, but because he was not looking for a New World, he did not see it in 
this way. It took other voyages to America before the idea that a new land bad been 
discovered began to take shape. Now it appeared that there was more to the universe than was 
already known, and thus the possibility of discovery, the possibility of new possibilities that 
1 For ease of reading, I have placed ali of the references to the Essays in the end notes 
using the following format: (TRANSLATOR INITIAL, BOOK:chapter, page). I refer to 
Donald Frame (Montaigne, 2003) and Charles Cotton's (Montaigne, 1877) English 
translations of the Essays. I also provide the original French text as found in the Thibaudet-
Rat edition (Montaigne, 1962). 
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were not already told by the Bible, or by received scholars, dawned on Europe. Gradually, the 
cosmological, religious and social implications of such an idea be gan to be felt and seen. 
The spirit of discovery and the collapse of established views were bolstered by other 
inventions and discoveries during this tim~ . Besides the Copemican revolution and the 
discovery of the New World and its peoples, the Renaissance saw the invention of the 
mariner's compass, the printer, and the telescope. This period also witnessed the restoration 
of Latin and Greek languages and the recovery of the wisdom of antiquity through the 
translation and prin ting of long-lost classical works. It was as if the stable world horizon had 
broken open, allowing both the ancient world and the New World to flood in. If standard 
assumptions about the place of the Earth in the uni verse, or about the place of Europe in the 
Bible, could be overtumed, th en ali beliefs bec ame suspect. This new uncertainty, this 
concurrent re-examination of the past and questioning ofthe New World order, necessitated a 
new mode of conversation. Michael L. Hall's (1989) wonderful essay, The Emergence of the 
Essay and the !dea of Discovery, pairs the voyages of the new age of discovery in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with a new genre of discourse: the essay. At a time when 
accepted notions about the outside world were under question, the expanding world horizons 
allowed for the inward search for truth as weil. In 1580, Michel de Montaigne launched his 
inward textual voyage of discovery, in a vesse! christened Essays. Following closely in his 
boisterous wake in 1597, was Francis Bacon, an early disciple of the essay form, and father 
of the scientific method, who strove for a more orderly path through the uncharted waters of 
early modemity. The essay was a "new mode of inquiry and a new style of prose" (p. 78). lt 
opened a textual space in which to contemplate movement between tradition, man, and the 
world, while emphasizing the interplay between recovery and discovery. 
Truth could no longer be arrived at by simply assimilating accepted wisdom. Instead, 
truth evolved into something that must be discovered, experienced by oneself, just as one 
would explore new lands, both inwardly and outwardly. Thus, for the first time, ordinary 
experience becarrie a context for truth. Montaigne vividly develops and articulates this novel 
insight in his Essays, particularly in what sorne consider to be his greatest chapter, "On 
experience": 
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I study myself more than any other subject. That is my metaphysics, that is my physics 
[ ... ] In the experience 1 have of myselfl find enough to make me wise, ifl were a good 
scholar.;; 
Although the essay as "inquiry into the value, meaning, and true nature of experience" 
(Sanders, 1989, p. 36), has evolved into severa! forms over the past four centuries, its basic 
"essayness" remains, and we owe this to one man, Michel de Montaigne. 
The Education of Michel de Montaigne 
Michel Eyquem de Montaigne was born into new nobility in Bordeaux in 1533. His 
mother, Antoinette L6pez de Villanueva, was a descendent of Spanish Jews. His father, 
Pierre Eyquem, who served briefly as the mayor of Bordeaux, was an avid proponent of 
Renaissance humanist educational methods, which valued a perfect command of Latin 
(Bakewell , 2010a). Latin unlocked the door to the home of human wisdom, embedded in the 
classical world, as weil as to the professional cultures of law and civil service. The 
enthusiastic educational reform of the day encouraged natural independence of thought 
through freedom, pleasure, and games, rather than structured work. During Pierre's 
generation, the nobility were more superficially educated and generally wore their knowledge 
of the classics as omament. To ensure a deeper engagement with the classics, Montaigne's 
father decided that the boy would be raised with Latin as his native tongue. This was difficult 
to do, considering that few French people spoke Latin, and fewer still , with any fluency. 
Pierre hired a Latin-speaking tutor and forbade anyone on the estate to speak to the child 
except in Latin. Montaigne's parents leamed rudimentary Latin phrases, but the boy was 
largely linguistically isolated from his family until the age of six, when he learned French2. 
Later, he received a top boarding school education, steeped in the Greeks and Romans, 
2 As a newborn, until he was weaned, Montaigne was sent to live with peasants on his 
estate, where he was likely exposed to the local Péridgord dialect. Pierre wanted his son to 
feel comfortable among commoners, engendering a very earl y appreciation of ordinary lives. 
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rhetoric and oratory, but never developed perfect French. Montaigne "follow[ ed] common 
usage in language"iii' writing the Essays in an idiosyncratic vernacular. 
After probably studying law, Montaigne worked in the court system in Bordeaux, 
eventually serving two terms as mayor. It was in the courts that Montaigne met the great 
friend of his life, Étienne de la Boétie, a well-known poet. Montaigne credits this deep love 
and intellectual bond as ground for the development of his ideas. The death of la Boétie in 
1563 was a profound Ioss that in part motivated Montaigne's turn to writing as an effort to 
continue his dialogue with an ideal friend (Henry, 1987). 
In 1572, at the age of 38, Montaigne Ieft public !ife and retreated to his tower on the 
family estate to write. He wrote the Essays over the next eight years, first publi shing in 1580. 
The Gutenberg press had recently been invented in 1452, and our cheerful socialiser took 
advantage of this new opportunity for conversation with a potentially vast number of readers, 
with great success. Montaigne edited the Essays constantly, publishing five editions before 
his death in 1588. 
The Essays were an entirely new form ofwriting. No one bad ever written about himself 
in this way, testing his judgement by studying himself (Bloom, 2002). Whereas people had 
previously written about themselves as a way to glorify their exploits, or to serve God, or to 
interpret the classics, Montaigne invented the introspective self- reflexive writing style with 
which we are familiar today as the essay genre. He claimed: 
1 set forth a humble and inglorious li fe [ . .. ] Authors communicate with the people by 
sorne especial extrinsic mark! 1 am the first to do so by my entire being as Michel de 
Montaigne, not as a grammarian or a poet or a jurist. iv 
Montaigne wrote 107 chapters in a rambling, unstructured manner, spanning three books. 
Like many of his Renaissance contemporaries, he was fascinated by the question "how to 
live", as opposed to "how one ought to live." The Essays are his response. American essayist 
and poet Ralph Waldo Emerson (1926) enjoyed Montaigne's wide-ranging interests: "[the 
Essays are] fu ll of fun, poetry, business, divinity, philosophy, anecdotes, smut" (p. 136). 
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Essay titles include "On friendship" , "On smells", "On the custom of wearing clothing", and 
"How our mind hinders itself' . The content of the Essays often bas little to do with the title, 
which serves only as a starting point for his chain of thought. Montaigne takes great pleasure 
in contradicting himself, gleefully examining his subjects (including himself and his own 
writing process) first from one perspective, then from another. He explicitly criticizes 
Renaissance scholasticism' s3 logical specialization of knowledge as obscuring the complexity 
and coherence of real !ife. His rhetorical style generates a new discourse about knowledge, 
advocating "a persona! worldliness or persona! outwardness" (Spellmeyer, 1989, p. 254), 
terms that would have affronted the purists of the scholastic movement. In contrast to the 
categorizing conventions of scholasticism, Montaigne viewed convention as a '"coming 
together' of dissonant perspectives in order to restore the lived world, at the risk of 
imprecision and incongruity" (p. 254). He sought to find a style that was unrestrained by 
contrived formality and more able to represent the passing moments of the self, "the actual 
process of the mind seeking truth" (Croll, 1966; Williamson, 1966, as cited in Hall , 1989, p. 
79) . 
A New Literary Genre 
The word essay cornes from the Latin exagium, the act of weighing, discussing, or 
counselling. It was Montaigne who coined this term with reference to a literary style. At the 
time, the French verb essayer bad severa! meanings: to try to do something, to experience a 
thing, to suffer something disagreeable, or to test something, putting it through trial runs. 
With the title Essays, Montaigne implies that he is a novice, attempting trial runs of his 
3 Scholasticism was the standard method of teaching knowledge during the Renaissance. 
It arose as a way of logically reconciling classical philosophy with Christianity. For example, 
one of its aims was to build rational arguments for God' s existence. Montaigne launches 
sceptical arguments against the possibility of revelation as certain knowledge. As a Catholic, 
he does not question that God exists, but he argues that we cannot be certain of our human 
interpretations of revelation. According to Montaigne, religious revelation is human 
arrogance because it creates God in a human image. 
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judgement and presenting them to his readers for assessment (Brush, 1994). Importantly, 
rather than The Essays, Montaigne used the single word Essays in the plural, in reference to 
both the text in its dynamic entirety and to the process of producing the book. He wrote and 
edited his Essays over a period of 16 years, constantly revisiting them and rarely making any 
deJetions or corrections, only additions. As he gained experiences, he added to his work, 
integrating new elements and new chapters, transforming the body of work as a whole. Later 
publishers added the article The (Les) to the title, and, as per the modem sense, we now use 
the word essay to denote one chapter of the book. 
In German, there are two words for essay: Abhandlung which means a dealing with 
something, and Aufsatz, which refers to a setting forth (Hardison, 1989). Basically, the 
former term indicates a systematic discourse on a subject, while Aufsatz refers to a lighter, 
more persona! tone, such as the essay conceived by Montaigne. Heidegger called it 
andenkendes Denken, thought thinking about itself. His work, Das Ding, is an Aufsatz. 
From Stardom to the Dentist's Office 
The essay is the most difficult to pin down of all the literary genres. In its resistance to 
classification, it is the most human, that is, the most representative of diversity of thought and 
experience. The essay resists resolution into one form, or even into itself. If anything, it goes 
in the opposite direction: towards greater openness. The Montaignian essay is rambling, 
open-ended, doubtful, contradictory, fragmented, critical, tentative, and vemacular. It is a 
space of continuai beginnings, but with an explicit acknowledgement of finitude. The essayist 
is engaged with the world and the self, occupying the tension between public and private, as 
well as between experience and reason, refusing to hold fast to concepts or theories. Unlike 
autobiography, which "dwells complacently on the self' (Sanders, 1989, p. 37), the persona! 
essay is conversational; it looks out onto the world. Essayists use "language to put themselves 
on display and gesture at the world" (p. 39). Like any good conversationalist, Montaigne 
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doesn't pontificate, but rather digresses and shares stories: "I do not teach, I [relate]"v 4. The 
essay is distinguished from prose, poetry and academie writing by what Spellmeyer (1989) 
calls its "situatedness": the prominence of the writer's actual situation (p. 255). 
With the publication of Bacon's aphoristic Essayes, Britain embraced the essay, unlike 
France, where, after a brief spell of stardom, the Catholic Church placed Montaigne's Essays 
on the Index of Prohibited Books in 1676. Eminent purveyors of the vibrant tradition of 
English essayists include Charles Lamb, William Hazlitt, P.K. Chesterton, and T.S. Eliot. 
Bacon may be seen as the initiator of the more objective and Jess persona! essay that 
gradually evolved into the staid university paper or article permeating today's academie 
world. 
As the great E.B. White lamented in 1932, essayists had become second-class citizens 
(Butrym, 1989). In recent times, the essay has continued its fall into disrepute. A great essay 
these days is often only chanced on, leafing through a Harper's magazine at the dentist's 
office. The essay itself is partly to biarne for this. Montaigne nonchalantly illustrates how the 
essay can accommodate ali sorts of topics. In the same breath, the essayist may explore the 
most quotidian concrete detail and the most abstract philosophical concepts. Thus, the essay 
has come to be associated with other genres, which have chipped away at its distinct 
significance. The rise of the journalistic feature, or op-ed, created a Jess literary, albeit 
popular, genre, which has been conflated in our minds with the essay. In academia, the essay 
began to be relegated to a pedagogical tool, a way of demonstrating clear, logical thinking on 
the written page. Today 's essay has hardly has anything in common with the Montaignian 
essay. But we still often call it an essay, "preserving the illusion that we are deeply devoted to 
the progressive spirit of the humanities" (Ellis, 2008, p. 16). 
The next step was for more advanced students to rename their writing "articles." A 
scientific article must be written in objective universallanguage, using short sentences and no 
4 The original phrase is "Je n 'enseigne poinct; je raconte." Frame's translation is "I do 
not teach, I tell" , which misses the conversational nuance of "raconte". 
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adjectives. Here the "l" is explicitly banned, thus closing the door to reflection. Novelist 
William H. Gass (1985) distinguishes between the scholarly article and the essay: 
The essay is obviously the opposite of that awful object, "the article", which [ ... ] 
represents itself as the la test clevemess, a novel consequence of thought, skill, labor, and 
free enterprise; but never as an activity the process, the working, the wondering. [ ... ] 
[T]he article pretends that everything is clear, [ ... ] that there are no soggy patches, no 
illicit inferences, no illegitimate connections [ ... ] it is the careful product of a 
professional. [ .. . ] and its appearance is proof of the presence, nearby, of the Professor, 
the way one rnight, perceiving a certain sort of speckled egg, infer that its mother was a 
certain sort of speckled bird. (p. 25) 
The "Crooked Path"5 of Ordinary Experience 
Many Renaissance writers turned to the great scholars, both classical and conternporary, 
or to divine revelation in order to speak about the hurnan condition. Just as today, we often 
turn to scientific articles or experts for tru th or to tell us what to "do" in psychotherapy. 
Montaigne was the first thinker to turn inward and to value his own experience as his most 
dependable source of knowledge: "The world always looks straight ahead; as for me, I turn 
my gaze inward, I [amuse it]. Every man looks in front of hirn; as for me, I look inside of 
me"vi 6. Montaigne launches classical sceptical arguments to renounce the pretension of 
"regirnenting, arranging, and fixing truth"vii. He is sceptical of the senses, reason, and 
revelation as reliable sources of truth, and cornes up with the profound idea that ordinary 
experience is "what we know best and to which we can have access" (Levine, 1999, p. 59). 
5 (Kauffrnann, 1989,p.224) 
6 I have altered Donald Frarne's translation, replacing "fix it there" with "amuse it' '. The 
original French is "je l' amuse là". This nuance better captures the fleeting and playful nature 
ofMontaigne's approach to experience. 
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[ ... ] that no man ever treated a subject he knew and understood better than I do the 
subject I have undertaken; and that in this I am the most leamed man alive. Secondly that 
no man ever penetrated more deeply into his material, or plucked its limbs and 
conseql1ences cleaner, or reached more accurately and fully the goal he had set for his 
Wûfk.VI II 
In Sources of the Self (1989), Charles Taylor charts the development of threads of our 
modem identity. One of the most foundational strands of the modern self begins with 
Augustine's tum inwards in the search for God. Michel de Montaigne inaugurates the modem 
idea of turning in ward to know oneself, as opposed to turning in ward to seek the divine. René 
Descartes, 50 years after Montaigne, takes this form of radical reflexivity in a new direction; 
he uses inwardness as a source of disengaged reason rather than as a route to a perfect God. 
Both the Cartesian and Montaignian approaches tum inward, but Montaigne does not try to 
disengage from himself in order to examine himself. The self and the world remain infinite 
sources of conversation rather than observable abjects. For this reason, part of our self is 
always unknowable; the self remains a tluctuating experience, a question to be pursued. We 
explore this open question of the self in therapy, one of the few spaces in our modern world 
to do so. 
Rather than objectifying our own nature and bence classing it as irrelevant to our identity, 
[Montaigne's stance] consists in exploring what we are in order to establish this identity, 
because the assumption behind modern self-exploration is that we don't already know 
who we are. (Taylor, 1989, p. 178) 
Jacques Quintin (2008) sa ys th at the task of philosophy and psychotherapy is to keep our 
relation to our self open, to not contain it in a system of causes and answers, to keep the 
question alive. Faced with this openness, we are surprised at our own oscillating existence 
and our own liberty. The Essays share this task and offer us one of the best illustrations of 
what it means to continually revive the question that we are: 
I have seen no more evident monstrosity and miracle in the world but myself. We 
become habituated to anything strange by use and time; but the more I frequent myself 
and know myself, the more my deformity astonishes me, and the less I understand 
myself.ix 
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Taylor suspects that, like others of his time, Montaigne initially would have believed he 
bad a stable core; a true nature (a universal hum an nature) that served as a foundation for the 
fluctuating passions of the soul. But when he embarked on his voyage of self-discovery, he 
"experienced a terrifying inner instability" (Taylor, 1989, p. 178). Instead of finding an 
immutable core, Montaigne discovered ·flux and human limits and thus set about describing 
the particular (himself), rather than the universal. He "recognized the decentred quality of 
selfhood" (Kauffmann, 1989, p. 224). One cannot grasp the self and world in flux, only visit: 
I do nothing but come and go. My judgement does not always go forward; it floats, it 
strays, [ .. . ] Nearly every man would say as much of himself, if he considered himself as 
I do.x 
Thus, Montaigne launched a new kind of intensely individual reflection to find truth . 
There is nothing "scientific" in his in quiry, it is conducted entirely in the first-person. Taylor 
sees Montaigne's self-discovery as 
the point of origin of another kind of modern individualism [ . . . ] which differs from the 
Cartesian both in aim and method. Its aim is to identify the individual in his or her 
unrepeatable difference, where Cartesianism gives us a science of the subject in its 
general essence; and it proceeds by a critique of first-person self-interpretations, rather 
than by the proofs ofimpersonal reasoning. (Taylor, 1989, p. 182) 
The Essays' authority lies in Montaigne's experience, .not in his knowledge. The essay 
follows "the crooked path ofactual experience." (Kauffmann, 1989, p. 224): 
Instead of imposing a discursive order on experience, the essay lets its discourse take the 
shape of experience. [ ... ] The tru th of the essay is a limited tru th , limited by the concrete 
experience, itself limited, which gave ri se to it. [ . .. ] The essay is a provisional reflection 
of an ephemeral experience of an event or object. (Good, 1988, p. 7) 
Both Montaigne and Descartes began their search for truth with an Augustinian turn 
inward toward experience, in an attempt to bring order to the sou! (Taylor, 1989, p. 182). 
However, whereas Descartes applied a scientific or "intellectual order by which things in 
genera l can be surveyed" (p. 182) to his experience, Montaigne relinquished this · goal and 
happily set about following the rollicking path of the particular: "The Cartesian calls for a 
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radical disengagement from ordinary experience; Montaigne requires a deeper engagement 
with our particularity" (p. 182f. 
At the Crossroads of Modernity: The Essay and the Natural Sciences 
At the historical moment of the essay's birth during the late Renaissance, modemity may 
be seen as having two paths: the classical scepticism of Renaissance humanism or the New 
Philosophy's abstract rigour. In Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (1992), 
Stephen Toulmin shows how different modernity might have been if Montaigne's humble 
scepticism was seen as the starting point instead of the "decontextualized rationalism of 
Descartes' Discourse and Meditations" (p. 42). The humanists viewed abstract theoretical 
claims as beyond the scope of hum an experience to either den y or assert, choosing instead to 
tolerate a diversity of ideas, ambiguity, and uncertainty. It is important to not confuse 
classical scepticism with the modern scepticism of the New Philosophy. The latter is a 
method of systematic doubt, a deniai of any proposition that is not arrived at by "rationally 
validated methods" (p. 29). Humanist scepticism is a movement toward a totality of tru th that 
encompasses contradiction, whereas scientific scepticism is a refusai to accept that which is 
not proven by scientific method. This is a negative dogmatism in which it is implicit that 
finite truth, or an ultimate "reality", is out there to be found, if only we continue to refine our 
methodology. The shift from humanist to rationalist thought demanded a radical change in 
legitimate interests: 
[After Descartes,] the focus of philosophical inquiries bas ignored the particular, 
concrete, timely, and local details of everyday human affairs [ ... ] it has shifted to a 
higher, stratospheric plane, on which nature and ethics conform to abstract, timeless , 
general and universal theories. (p . 35) 
7 Kierkegaard (1964) expressed this idea poetically: "I can circumnavigate myself, but 1 
cannat erect my self above myself. I cannat find this Archimedean point" (p. 90). 
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Toulmin (1922-2009) was a British physicist and philosopher who studied under 
Wittgenstein at Cambridge. His work focused on developing practical arguments to analyse 
moral reasoning, in order to overcome the limited practical value of both absolutism and 
relativism. Like most scholars of his generation and before, he took for granted the 
commonly held view of modernity. The standard modern view of its own beginnings tells us 
that it began in 1 i 11 Century Europe with a new rationality that was able to emerge because of 
the relaxed ecclesiastical constraints and a burgeoning economie growth. In the standard 
narrative, Descartes and other thinkers were able to remove themselves from the influences 
of medieval superstition and the Church. W iping the slate clean of traditional authority, al one 
in a chalet, Descartes was able to uncover "clear" and "certain" ideas, which could be 
demonstrated with geometrical proofs, thus kick-starting the modem sciences. 
Toulmin looked to the past to make sense of the current crisis in philosophl, which can 
be broadly described as the crumb ling of its Cartesian foundations, the disillusionrnent with 
modemity's goals of geometrie exactitude and abstract rigour, the questioning of the tyranny 
of method and scientism, and the philosophical quest for alternative ways of thinking. Deeply 
struck by just how relevant the Essays were to the present crisis in modem philosophy, 
Toulmin was galvanized to build a richer and more comprehensive picture of the birth of 
modemity, looking for elues asto why we moved from the partly practical philosophy of the 
16th century to the purely theoretical philosophy of the 17th century . "The seduction of High 
Modemity lay in its abstract neatness and theoretical simplicity: both of these features 
blinded the successors of Descartes to the unavoidable complexities of concrete human 
experience" (p. 201). If the historical era that we call modemity is ending, what intellectuaJ 
stance should we take as we look to the future? Such elues might shed light on this question. 
8 Since the 1960s and 1970s, many Western thinkers have found themselves knee-deep 
in an intellectual crisis. For example, Hans-Georg Gadamer sees the Cartesian quest as an 
intellectual dead end and profoundly questions the tyranny of method: The "modem 
obsession with Method has distorted and concealed the ontological character of 
understanding." (Bernstein, 1983, p. xi) Questions of being (such as those that are important 
in psychotherapy) may be better served by other modes of inquiry. 
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Toulmin's research findings subvert our accepted history of the origins of modernity: 
The opening gambit of modern philosophy was not Descartes, but Montaigne's "restatement 
of classical scepticism [ ... ] unless sorne one thing is found of which we are complete/y 
certain, we can be certain about nothing" (p. 42). There is no general truth about which we 
can be cetiain. Descartes' move was the Black reply to Montaigne's White. He responded 
directly to Montaigne's sceptical move with his own search for the cogito, finding the one 
thing of which he could be certain. 9 
These two starting points of modernity underlie the modern humanities and the modern 
sciences. Why are they not still seen as complementary rather than mutually exclusive? Why 
do we have to !ose the practical wisdom of Shakespeare, Montaigne, and Erasmus, in order to 
reap the benefits of Galileo, Descartes, and Newton? And why did this change happen so 
rapidly, and so drastically in only 50 years (1590-1640)? The Essays were still on the 
bestseller lists at the beginning of the 1 i 11 century, and Descartes' work was the most 
prominent player on the philosophical field soon after the 1630's. Why did the quest for 
certainty arise specifically at this time? Why was Montaigne's practical contribution to 
philosophy discarded and forgotten? 
The Wars of Religion (1562-98) brought France almost to its knees. This epoch is 
crucially marked by the assassination of King Henry of Navarre (Henri IV) of France on May 
14, 1610. Montaigne worked as mediator in negotiations between the Protestant and Catholic 
leaders of his time, including for Henry of Navarre. Influenced by Montaigne, the King 
practiced a politics of relaxed tolerance based on modest scepticism rather than negative 
9 Montaigne finds a different kind of tru th, an unstable truth discovered in the give and 
take of conversation with the self or other: a sceptical movement versus a fixed Cartesian 
truth. Thus, the search for meaning must be constantly renewed. Merleau-Ponty (1964), in his 
outstanding reading of Montaigne, shows that scepticism opens us to the "idea of a totality of 
tru th in which contradiction is a necessary element in our experience of truth" (O'Neill, 1982, 
p. 16). Kauffmann (1989) describes Montaigne's modest humanistic scepticism as rooted in 
the paradox of the "conscious being" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 199). We are constantly 
participating in the world "through perception, politics or love, and yet always at a distance 
from it without which we would know nothing of it" (O'Neill, 2001, p.16). 
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dogmatism "which systematically refuses to accept whatever is not totally certain" (Toulmin, 
1992, p. 50) . Other European countries were picking sides in the religious wars, each 
monarch persecuting the opposition. But Henry wanted to build a France in which both 
Catholicism and Protestantism could thrive. The Edict of Nantes in 1598 gave the Calvinist 
Protestants, (also known as the Huguenots) rights within a nation dominated by the Catholic 
League. The Edict separated civil unity from religious unity. In sorne ways it was a civil 
rights document, and it was to end the civil wars of the late 1500s. 
After the King's assassination, the Edict was gradually revised, removing the rights of 
the Huguenots and opening the door to new religious wars, before it was revoked entirely in 
1685. The message read by Europe was that a policy ofreligious toleration bad been tried and 
bad failed. The bloody wars continued all over the continent with the exception of tolerant 
Holland . For those living among the bloodshed, it appeared that the humanistic embrace of 
uncertainty had not prevented the religious conflict from becoming so bloody. In fact, it 
seemed to worsen the mess. Uncertainty was unbearable and intellectual discussion was 
nonexistent; what mattered now was belief in belief. There was a craving for proof of 
certainty. But as fighting continued, it became Jess likely that each side would concede 
certainty of the other's religious doctrines. So they tumed to experience, which Montaigne 
bad already shown to be intersubjective, as a source of certainty that the humanists bad failed 
to notice. Toulmin 's thesis is that the assassination of the king brought this "desperation into 
sharper focus, and provided a natural context in which the Quest for Certainty could take 
shape" (p.56), to "escape the [bloody result of] doctrinal contradictions" (p. 62). 
The 17111 century philosophers' quest for certainty was an intelligible n~sponse to the 
historical challenge of their day: "the social, political, and theological chaos embodied by the 
Thirty Years ' War" (p . 70). The decontextualization of the problems of science and 
philosophy was a useful move to end the seemingly interminable concrete conflict. The New 
Philosophy did not arise in a vacuum; Descartes did not suddenly have access to a truth 
emanating from a pure spirit. His reflections gave people real hope for a way to reason their 
way out of this bloody mess, out of the hardening theological dogmatism. By basing theories 
on "clear" and "distinct" concepts, the Cartesian program fulfilled both instrumental and 
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intrinsic goals. It could solve problems empirically, and it provided certainty in a world torn 
apart by uncertainty, thus putting aside the Renaissance reasonable uncertainties. It created a 
"formally 'rational ' theory grounded on abstract, universal, timeless concepts" (p. 75). 
The concurrent timing of another event cemented the shift in the 16111 century balance 
between the Aristotelian practical concerns and Platonic theoreticalness: the upheaval of 
classical cosmology by Galileo and Copernicus. Simultaneously, people desperately looked 
for a "rational" way out of the dogmatic stalemate of warring sides in the religious wars and 
sought a new natural philosophy that could incorporate the astronomical discoveries. People 
strove to find a new foundational and celestial grounding. In this sense, they moved away 
from the everyday practical concerns to a greater overarching natural theory: "Granted, 
nothing in particular is at stake in our cosmology: what is at stake is everything in general" 
(p. 83). 
The dire situation called for a drastic restructuring of natural philosophy through the 
certainty of geometrical foundations. What a relief it was to build a "fresh cosmology from 
scratch" (p. 83). 
Th~ essay and the New Philosophy arose at the same time, each criticizing blind reliance 
on the authority of traditional texts , and each turning inward to experience. The Essays 
directly influenced Descartes to embark on his own, more fearful journey of self-inquiry in 
the Meditations. As a young student, Descartes attended the renowned Jesuit Collège La 
Flèche. He was captivated by Montaigne's celebrated Essays. Scholars believe that the 
annotations th at we see toda y in the Collège ' s copy of the Essays be long to Descartes. Given 
the historical context - Descartes' en tire !ife was engulfed by the Thirty Y ear war (1614 to 
1648) - we begin to see why Descartes responded so vehemently to Montaigne ' s jaunty 
scepticism. In Meditations, Descartes begins by essaying his experience of the chalet room 
warrned by the stove in the midst of a German winter. But, as Good (1988) wryly notes, these 
persona! reflections are only a "prelude to the moment of enlightenment" (p. 37). Once 
Descartes finds the one certain thing, a fixed centre: his cogito, his writing moves from the 
fluid essay forrn to the general perspective of a structured treatise, a precursor to today's 
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scientific article. Montaigne's inward turn finds movement and flux , the experience of which 
he cheerfully describes in the open-ended, intimate essay form. The ever-hospitable 
Montaigne visits himself when describing experience, whereas Descartes observes the self 
systematically. Instead of becoming the basis for a new discipline, the essay, like a 
conversation, remains an open, spontaneous description of and "a provisional [italics mine] 
ordering of the encounter" (p. 4). Interestingly, in "On experience", Montaigne also talks 
about German stoves, in sorne ways literally setting the stage for Descartes' project: "For in 
tru th, that stifling beat, and the smell of that material they are made of when it gets hot, give 
most of those who are not used to them a headache; not me" (III: 13, 1 008). Cogito ergo sum 
is Descartes' response to the Essays, the repercussions of which permeate our modern world. 
In Montaigne and Shakespeare, there is a confidence and a curiosity to explore human 
possibilities. For these thinkers , "experience puts the limits on Theory and Doctrine, not the 
other way about" (Toulmin, 1992, p. 130). In "On experience", published 50 years be fore 
Descartes' Meditations , Montaigne addressed philosophical questions about the nature of 
truth and knowledge, "and he drew reasons from his own experience to reject in advance the 
conclusions that Descmies argued for in general, abstract terms" (p. 37). The Essays 
anticipate and reject the "systematic ambitions of the new science" (Good, 1988, p. 3). 
Exploring the essay's history shows us that for a very brief period, the two visions of the 
world, that of classical scepticism and of modem rationalism JO , were in conversation! 
Montaigne anticipated modem rationality and put it into question. The Essays cultivate this 
fundamental conversation between the sciences and the humanities. 
Psychotherapy and the Humanist Vision 
The Essays constitute a vital touchstone for humanistic psychotherapy; they are an 
enduring reminder of two fundamental, ontologically distinct, yet complementary visions of 
JO In this vision, modem reason equates rationality with abstract theory alone and this 
scientific rationality is applied unreflectively everywhere, beyond its own reasonable limits. 
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the world. The modern vision of our Western culture is one forrned by the natural sciences, 
that of the solitary observer who sees fixed, immutable objects in front of him or ber as part 
of a continuous universe. This observer, alone in his or her unidirectional view, cannot help 
but have the impression that he or she sees an ultimate reality. In contemporary 
psychotherapy, we often obscure _the other vision that founds the humanities, the arts, and the 
human sciences. This human view is based not upon observation, but on the visit, the 
encounter with the other and the world. lt is a reciprocal vision; 1 am seen by the other and 
my vision is changed by this presence. Here, reality or truth is not in front of us, but it 
dynamically arises in dialogue. To explore this mutual reality, we must be invited to converse 
with the other, be it a neighbour, an ancestor, or a god (Jager, 2009). 
Psychotherapy is a dialogical métier in which the conversation between patient and 
therapist at once illuminates and creates the intersubjective world. The mutuality of our 
vision enables a rhythmic movement between question and answer, between invitation and 
acceptance, and forms the wellspring for the ever-expanding totality of understanding. The 
task of the psychotherapist is to lay the table for such a conversation. The arts, the humanities, 
and psychotherapy all share this vision of the human world and reciprocally nourish our 
understanding of humanity. There have been calls in this journal and elsewhere for a return to 
a liberal arts education in order for humanistic psychology to withstand the grasp of 
modernity's scientistic reach. Both Dillon (2008) and Graumann (1981) advocate a return to 
the earl y humanistic texts in order to reclaim sorne of the content and vision of the premodern 
humanistic tradition. These texts include Hebrew and Christian Scriptures, classical Greek 
and Roman philosophy, and the works of the humanist writers of the medieval Renaissance. 
The Essays fall into this range of poe ti cal works th at continue to speak with us throughout the 
centuries. They help us to better understand the psychotherapeutic dialogue in a wider 
context th an the natural sciences, bringing to the fore our often obscured humanist vision. Y et 
I contend that the Essays are an exceptionally important and relevant interlocutor for our 
discipline. 
As we have discussed, Michel de Montaigne was the first Western thinker to value 
ordinary experience as our most dependable source of an always imperfect truth, and the 
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Essays remain one of our most profound articulations of this theme. "He witnesses how his 
persan increases in substance, rather than decreases, the more he strives to understand and 
articulate his experience" (Hansen, 2002, p. 137). We saw that Descartes also took a radical 
tum inward to "essay" his ordinary experience. However, he found something quite different, 
an objective tru th , a cogito. Humanistic psychology contains these twin strands of modemity, 
the se two approaches to experience, (elabora ting it through conversation or observing it 
systematically), often awkwardly and as a source of confusion. The shared historical context 
reminds us of the original distinctiveness, complementarity, and later lost balance of two 
visions of the world. This fascinating history highlights the idea that science 's starting point 
was a conversation, not a fixed truth or an ultimately real thing. It reaffirms the legitimacy of 
"inquiry as conversation" (Spellmeyer, 1989, p. 264). We are reminded that scientific 
methods are not the only valid routes to knowledge, and that science is a perspective, a 
human lens through which we see a particular world. 
The Conversation 
We look to the Renaissance to reappropriate the word humanist, which is founded on the 
encounter between two civilizations: the renaissance of interest in Greek and Roman 
antiquity by Christian Europeans during the 14th and 15th centuries 11 • The Renaissance 
humanists, including Montaigne, picked up the unique trait of appropriating another culture, 
just as the advanced Romans chose the Greeks as their cultural ancestors. In this way the 
humanistic vision is one based on an idea of dialogue between two cultures, which finds its 
full expression in the essay, understood as an imperfect, open-ended attempt to bring together 
two worlds.12 
11 For an excellent account of this encounter, read Rémi Brague's Eccentric Culture: A 
The01y of Western Civilization (2002) . 
12 Mendelowitz's lively essay, Meditations on Oedipus (2006), is a fine example of 
bringing together Greek mythology and modem litera ture to shed new light on psychotherapy. 
87 
The humanist way of proceeding is to create a conversational mis-en-scene that 
facilitates the meeting between two cultures, between patient and therapist, between 
estranged aspects of the patient's being, or between patient and society. "[ ... ] the essay, of ail 
the genres in Western letters, acknowledges most openly the tentative, recursive, and 
conversational nature of discourse" (Spellmeyer, 1989, p. 257). Dialogue is the context of 
Montaigne's profound self-reflection. The Essays are one of the most enduring, dynamic and 
enjoyable conversations in Western history. Literaty critic Harold Bloom (2002) describes 
the conversational dimension of the Essays: "Montaigne writes for his own sake[ . .. ] and yet 
he needs us, his readers, if he is to reveal himself to himself' (p. 43). Blaise Pascal saw 
Montaigne's Essays as "totally composed of thoughts born out of the ordinary conversations 
of life" (Pascal, Pensées, Br. no. 18., cited in Hartle, 2003, p. 73) . Once retired from the 
business of public !ife, Montaigne was better able to embrace intimate conversation: 
There are private, retiring, and inward natures. My essential pattern is suited to 
communication and revelation. I am ail in the open and in full view, born for company 
and friendship. The solitude that I love and preach is primarily nothing but leading my 
feelings and thoughts back to myself, restraining and shortening not my steps, but my 
desires and my cares, abandoning solicitude for outside things, and mortally avoiding 
servitude and obligation, and not so mu ch the press of people as the press of business.xi 
Montaigne had the courage to come doser to and articulate his ordinary experiences, not 
from within a closed realm ofprivate subjectivity but in conversation with the world and with 
the canonical texts. Reading the Essays, Merleau-Ponty (1964) observed that: "It is in 
communicating with the world that we communicate with ourselves" (p. xv). Montaigne ' s 
native fluency in Latin afforded him a uniquely intimate engagement with the stories from 
Ovid, the histories of Caesar and Tacitus, and advice from Plutarch, Heraclites, Seneca and 
Socrates. The Essays are chock-full of quot-ations, creating a reflexive structure of many 
voices and levels. It is this open dialectic that keeps the Essays so fertile and alive. 
Montaigne, by turning inward, revealed "the self as openness towards the world and men" 
(O'Neill, 1982, p. 18). Like the therapeutic conversation, the essay is a dialogical expression 
of experience. Montaigne beautifully exemplifies how in sharing our experience, it enters the 
larger world, and in doing so, we may then see it in a different light. Essaying, an activity in 
which the voices of the conversation are put to paper (recorded), forms a literary parallel to 
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psychotherapy. If we think of recording as speaking and being heard by another persan, 
Good's (1988) description of essaying enriches our conception of therapy: "testing and 
tasting one's own !ife white experiencing it, thinking about it and recording the thoughts, 
reading and revising and adding to those thoughts, and comparing them to the recorded 
thoughts of others" (p. 32). 
The goal of a conversation, as opposed to an experiment, is not to explain and simplify, 
but to illuminate nuance and contradictions, to stimulate possibilities, and to enliven the 
intersubjective world. Many critics have attempted to organize Montaigne's work, to regroup 
levels of discourse and different voices, to impose order on his thought (Defaux, 1994, p. 50). 
In modem psychotherapeutic research, we also try reduce aspects of the conversation to 
measurable constructs. But a conversation is not a controllable, organized structure : 
I cannat keep my subject still. It goes along befuddled and staggering, with a natural 
drunketmess [ ... ] If my mind could gain a firm footing, 1 would not make essays, I would 
make decisions [emphasis mine]; but it is always in apprenticeship and on trial.xii 
In fact, Montaigne calls his approach "unscience" 13 , a position of ignorance, which 
stresses being rather than systematic leaming: 
I deliver my ignorance in pomp and state, and my leaming meagerly and poorly; this 
accidentally and accessorily, that principally and expressly; and write specifically of 
nothing but nothing, nor of any science but of that inscience. xi ii 
"Every Man Carries the En tire Form of Hu man Condition."xiv 
An additional vital task of psychotherapists is to tum toward the larger public, toward 
society past and present, to convey the basic human questions that invariably arise in our 
therapeutic conversations. Freud did this with his writing, following in Montaigne's path. The 
Essays are so relevant for our discipline because, with remarkable intimacy, Montaigne 
13 My translation ofMontaigne's word, inscience. 
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shows us how the more deeply he delves into his singularity, the closer he cornes to 
something profoundly human, to the fundamental questions of existence. The Essays are one 
of our richest examples of how conversation with a particular persan becomes part of the 
Jar ger human conversation, shedding light on the questions of humanity. Like psychotherapy, 
the Essays are a dialectic movement between private and public arenas. This movement 
allows us to renew the question of ourselves and thereby rethink humanity. For the patient 
and the therapist alike, the conversation is a humanizing process in which we leam to 
symbolize and thus tolerate our own humanity, becoming part of the wider human 
community. Questioning oneself is making place for another. Montaigne shows us the 
wisdom that we find in the movement from the particular to the general; his own experience 
brings him closer to the lived world, revealing insights into the human condition. In the same 
way, the therapeutic conversation can be the preamble to the broader conversation about the 
human condition, which is thoughtfully opened up by the essay. "The essay presents ' special' 
instances to the ' general' rea der, where the disciplines present 'general' conclusions to the 
'specialist"' (Good, 1988, p. 6). 
Like many of his Renaissance contemporaries, Montaigne was fascinated by the question 
"What do I know ?" 14 • To explore this question, Montaigne weighed or "essayed" his 
judgements, his experiences, and his knowledge. He presented his philosophical approach in 
the form of self-portrait (Tanguay, 1999). But his Socratic self-questioning does not arise 
solely from a private subjectivity. Instead, he is guided by basic human questions that help to 
place him within the human community. What do I know about happiness? What do I know 
about a good !ife? What do I know about friendship? Such self-understanding is Jess about 
what is unique about the individual and more about what he or she has in common with other 
human beings . 
14 Montaigne had his now famous motta Que scay-je? and a pair of scales engraved on a 
medal as a symbol of himself. 
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Montaigne revels in the particular, notably himself, but he also loves to give particular 
examples from history, poetry, and stories that he hears. Anne Hartle (2002) beautifully 
characterizes the significance of examples: 
And it is only through attention to examples that the unfamiliar can strike us, that we can 
be open to the possible, and then return to the familiar to find the strange in the familiar. 
Examples are the mirror in which we can see ourselves. (p. 68) 
However, Montaigne noted the difficulty in understanding the subject matter without 
reference to theory or universals: "Example is a hazy mirror, reflecting ali things in ali 
ways."xv How do we find truth through particular examples? This is a key issue for modern 
psychologists deeply immersed in scientific theories. Montaigne would respond by saying 
that examples lie in the realm of experience and the authority of experience lies in the chance 
encounter with wisdom. Our "accidentai philosopher"xvi is aware of the role of chance in the 
revelation of tru th. Digression, unpredictable elements, and parts of our everyday experience 
that do not appear to be relevant to our understanding may suddenly reveal an unexpected 
truth, an important discovery: "This also happens to me: that I do not find myself in the place 
where I look; and I find myself more by chance encounter than by searching my 
judgment. ,xvii 
Being a man of his time, with its many unexpected discoveries, primed Montaigne for 
his high estimation of the value of wisdom revealed by chance. When it cornes to self-
knowledge, our most dependable, though ephemeral, source of tru th, Montaigne finds that he 
cornes to it by accident. The more directly he searches, the more elusive it becomes. 
Montaigne describes his own "disciplined digression" (Kauffmann, 1989, p. 238) which 
allows for the sidelong glanee in "On vanity": 
This stuffing is a little out of my subject. I go out of my way, but rather by license than 
carelessness. My fantasies fo llow one another, but sometimes it is from a distance, and 
look at each other, but with a sidelong glance.xviii 
The essay, unlike the straightforward scientific article, is the literary form of the sidelong 
glanee, which allows for meaning to unexpectedly arise "from a word [ . .. ] in a corner"xix. 
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This particular word opens up a world, painting to an underlying unity: "It is the inattentive 
reader who !oses my subject, not I. Sorne word about it will always be found off in a corner, 
which will not fail to be sufficient, though it takes little room."xx 
Montaigne's accidentai mode of self-knowledge does not follow the systematic "arder of 
things and kinds" (Hartle, 2002, p. 76). The Essay's chapters are not in any specifie order, 
and they rarely flow from their title or tie in with neighbouring chapters. What Montaigne 
does follow, in his "unmethodical method" (Kauffmann, 1989), is the order of human 
testimony, that is to say, of conversation. 
Montaigne faced the tension underlying the precarious nature of tru th and identity with 
exuberant confidence. Anne Hartle (2002) reminds us of philosopher David Hume' s 
description of understanding as the expansion of hum an experience that cornes through books 
and conversation. For this fruitful dialogue to happen, there needs to be "a confidence in 
human testimony" (Hume, 1977, p. 71). Modem psychology appears to have !ost much of 
this confidence in human dialogue, as evidenced by its frenzied rush to advance theory and 
technique, as weil as by its anxiety about method. I would compare contemporary therapists 
to Kaufmann~s modem essayist, in Essaying as Unmethodical Method (1989) : 
Whereas Montaigne wrote with one eye on the world and the other on himself, the 
modem essayist, sub specie academia, works with one eye on the abject of study while 
the other nervously reviews the methods by which he is authorized to know or interpret. 
(p. 223) 
The Essays msp1re humanistic psychotherapists to regam this !ost confidence in 
particular human testimony, indeed in the testimony of our patients themselves. Engagement 
with the Essays helps us to reaffirm our participation in what philosopher Michael Oakeshott 
(1991) would cali "the conversation ofmankind" (p. 197): 
This conversation is not only the greatest but also the most hardly sustained of ali the 
accomplishments of mankind. Men have never been wanting who have had this 
understanding of human activity and intercourse, but few have embraced it without 
reserve and without misgiving, and on this account it is proper to mention the most 
notable of th ose who have do ne so: Michel de Montaigne. (Oakeshott, 1962, p. 491) 
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Mind the Gap 
My aim is to address fe llow novice therapists, who also fee! that there is an awkwardness 
between the scientific theories that we study in graduate school and our experiences in 
conversation with our patients. This uneasiness is highlighted in contemporary discussions 
about "bridging the gap" between research and practice, which often look at how best to 
implement evidence-based practices in therapy. Earlier, we looked at the original "bridging 
the gap" problem in modernity. Descartes wanted to eventually tie in the "clear" and "distinct" 
geometrical foundations of "abstract theories of nature" (Toulmin, 1992, p. 130) with the 
empirical facts of experienced phenomena. This led to our modern desire for a marriage 
between different types of truths : theoretical doctrines and persona! experience (p.130). 
Psychology continues to hold onto its dream of a new vision that unites these realms (lager, 
1991). The story of the co-birth of the natural sciences and the essay suggests another way of 
looking at the debate: the gap is between two rich visions of the world that are 
complementary but not translatable. Instead of desperately trying to justify humanistic ideals 
in the court of scientific rationality, we should deepen our engagement with the humanistic 
vision, that is, with the arts and humanities. The essay is a space in which we can revive the 
abandoned humanistic roots of modernity and strike a better balance between these two 
cultures. 
There are few academie opportunities for students to learn about psychotherapy outside 
of the natural scientific mode!. Almost al! Canadian psychology graduate schools use the 
scientist-practitioner mode! (Peluso, Carleton et Asmundson, 201 0). In this mode!, the 
humanities are seen as a nonserious diversion. In a sense, our debate about bridging the gap 
between theory and practice in psychology reflects an impoverished response to the larger 
crisis in philosophy, which could be described as the end of modernity. This brings us to a 
point where we begin to question tyranny of method and its collapse into scientism. As we 
discussed, Toulmin returns to the birth of the natural sciences and the essay to better 
understand what has been obscured and to rebalance the two complementary visions as a way 
of responding to this crisis in thought. Psychotherapy, as an increasingly hyper-specialized 
set of scientific disciplines, has little ability (or inclination) to reflect on itself and question its 
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position within a larger philosophical and historical context. Recently in this journal, 
Mozdzierz, Peluso, & Lisiecki (201 0) called for a new organizing princip le that frames the 
human encounter. Their approach would allow therapists to think non-linearly, while also, if 
imperfectly, remaining coherent with evidenced-based psychological practices. The authors 
present a highly complicated and rather strenuous articulation of the ir "new" way of thinking. 
We have forgotten the humanist vision, putting aside centuries of exploration and elaboration 
of the fundamental dimensions of the human encounter reflected in the arts and humanities. 
We necessarily reduce significant ideas by trying to validate them within the framework of a 
few decades of process therapy research : "For externat complexity bas produced an insane 
simplification of thought, preying upon persona! variety and spontaneous social expression" 
(McLuhan, 1999, p. 10). Psychotherapists should consider heeding Toulmin's cali for a 
humanized intellectual stance as we stand at a crossroads and look beyond the end of 
modernity. The Essays offer a uniquely fertile terrain on which this humanizing reconnection 
with our tradition can occur. 
Contemporary psychotherapeutic research often tries to address humanistic concerns 
because we have a sense that something is missing in our profusion of scientific theories, 
without acknowledging or understanding the vision from which they originate. This 
confusion is exacerbated by language. For example, the word experience in the humanist 
vision, as is so eloquently developed by Montaigne, cornes alive in a description of 
movement, flux and human limits. This description inevitably refers back to the art of 
conversation. Ordinary experience can never be pinned down or fully grasped. It is not 
predicated on disengaged reason like experience in the sense of scientific empiricism. There 
is no path between the two; they are two ontologically distinct, yet complementary, realms of 
modern individuality. We need to reclaim and clarify our concepts and experiences of 
dialogue and conversation. Marshall McLuhan aptly describes our age as one in which we 
propagate " information and knowledge without literacy." (McLuhan, 1999, p. 60) The Essays 
help us to become more literate. 
I have introduced Montaigne 's Essays as an essential compamon for humanistic 
psychotherapists, and presented three interrelated reasons, chosen (among many) for their 
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pertinence as well as for their merit m introducing the Essays to new readers. First, 
Montaigne is the first thinker to value ordinary experience as our best, though fallible, source 
of knowledge. The Essays are a wonderful articulation of the reorientation of value from 
abstract truths to concrete bodily experience: 
I know a man who, when I ask him what he knows, asks me for a book in order to point 
it out to me, and wouldn't dare tell me that he has an itchy backside unless he goes 
immediately and studies in his lexicon what is itchy and what is backside. xxi 
In therapy today, we take for granted that individual reflection or exploration of 
everyday experience through conversation is a valuable route to understanding, but we owe 
this idea to Montaigne. We see echoes of this older humanism in the writings of Rollo May 
and other more familiar names in humanistic psychology. However, the Enlightenment 
humanism, from which 1960s humanistic psychotherapy more directly flows, is a current that 
underlies modernity and individualism and embodies a break from tradition: We become 
human by detaching from our past and becoming an independent individual. Renaissance 
humanism values the return to tradition in order to refine our own experiences and discover 
new possibilities. In this light, I encourage our profession to not only explore our existential 
and phenomenological traditions, but to venture further back along the roots of our thought, 
to the humanist voices of the Renaissance. 
The second reason why the Essays are a valuable resource for psychotherapists, is that 
the story of the birth of the essay and the natural sciences illuminates two fundamental yet 
complementary visions of the world, that of the natural sciences and that of the arts and 
humanities, founded on the individual observer and on the encounter, respectively, which are 
often confused or conflated in contemporary psychotherapeutic discourse. 
Finally, the Essays are a wonderful illustration of how conversation with a particular 
person cim become pat1 of the larger conversation of humankind. The convivial atmosphere 
invites us to engage in a festive conversation, which over the centuries "bas turned from a 
private dinner party to a great lively banquet" (Bakewell, 2010a, p. 9). Montaigne's Essays 
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reaffirm our faith in human testimony, which is often devalued in this era of neuroscientific 
and genetic research. 
The Montaignian essay forms a fertile parallel to the psychotherapeutic conversation. 
Each is a hermeneutic encounter that brings together an intimate, persona!, and a public 
world . Montaigne invented the essay as a new form of conversation to express a way of being 
together that reveals the self, the other, and the world. 1 see the essay as the corresponding 
literary form par excellence to the therapeutic ·conversation. Exploring and practicing this 
friendly form of prose and discourse serves to contextualize humanistic psychotherapy, to 
illuminate and articulate the values, experiences and history that shape our perspective. 
The "irrepressible vivacity" (Woolf, 2003) of Montaigne's writing reveals the human 
world in new ways (Jauregui, 2001) and inspires us to tum to essaying as a different yet 
fruitful mode of inquiry into psychotherapy. Wh ile the scientific article reflects the 
systematizing view of an outside observer seeking predictive control of his or her subject, the 
essay dares us to draw even closer to our lived world in therapy. Through essaying, 
psychologists can share their therapeutic experiences in all of their particular richness, col our 
and variety. Conversation with the Essays enlivens our profession, in the hospitable presence 
of Michel de Montaigne, who put "consciousness astonished at itself at the core of human 
existence" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 203). 
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Notes 
i (F, III:l3, 1044) 
« Si, avons nous beau monter sur des eschasses, car sur des eschasses encores faut-il 
marcher de nos jambes. Et au plus eslevé throne du monde, si ne sommes assis que 
sus nostre cul.» (T-R, III:l3, 1096) 
ii (F, III:l3, 1000-1001) 
Je m'estudie plus qu'autre subject. C'est ma metaphisique, c'est ma phisique. [ ... ] De 
l'experience que j'ay de moy, je trouve assez dequoy me faire sage, si j'estoy bon 
escholier. (T-R, III:l3 , 1050-1051) 
iii (F, III:l, 732) 
« Je suy le langage commun» (T-R, III:l, 774) 
iv (F, III:2, 740-741) 
Je propose une vie basse et sans lustre [ ... ] Les autheurs se communiquent au peuple 
par quelque marque particuliere et estrangere; moy, le premier, par mon estre 
universel, comme Michel de Montaigne, non comme grammairien ou poëte ou 
jurisconsulte. (T-R, III:2, 782) 
v (F, III:2, 742) 
«Je n'enseigne poinct,je raconte.» (T-R, III:2, 784) 
vi (F, II: 17, 606) 
« Les autres vont tousjours ailleurs, s'ils y pensent bien; ils vont tousjours avant, moy 
je me roulle en moy mesme.» (T-R, II:17, 641) 
vii (F, 11:12, 454) 
« de regenter, d'ordonner, d'establir la vérité » (T -R, II: 12, 485-486) 
viii (F, III:2, 741) 
[ .. . ] que jamais homme ne traicta subject qu'il entendit ne cogneust mieux que je fay 
celuy que j'ay entrepris, et qu'en celuy-là je suis le plus sçavant homme qui vive; 
secondement, que jamais aucun ne penetra en sa matiere plus avant, ny en esplucha 
plus particulierement les membres et suites; et n'arriva plus exactement et plainement 
à la fin qu'il s'estait proposé à sa besoingne. (T-R, III:2, 783) 
102 
ix (F, III:l1, 958) 
Je n'ay veu monstre et miracle au monde plus exprès que moy-mesme. On 
s'apprivoise à toute estrangeté par l'usage et le temps; mais plus je me hante et me 
connois, plus ma difformité m'estonne, moins je m'entens en moy. (T-R, III: 11, 1006) 
x (F, II:12, 517) 
Je ne fay qu'aller et venir: mon jugement ne tire pas tous jours avant; il flotte, il 
vague,[ .. ] Chacun à peu pres en diroit autant de soy, s'il se regardoit comme moy. 
(T-R, II:12, 549) 
xi (F, III:3 , 758) 
Il y a des naturels particuliers, retirez et internes. Ma forme essentielle est propre à la 
communication et à la production; je suis tout au dehors et en evidence, nay à la 
societé et à l'amitié. La solitude que j'ayme et que je presche, ce n'est principallement 
que ramener à moy mes affections et mes pensées, restreindre et resserrer non mes 
pas, ains mes desirs et mon soucy, resignant la solicitude estrangere et fuyant 
mortellement la servitude et l'obligation, et non tant la foule des hommes que la foule 
des affaires. (T-R, III:3 , 801) 
xii (F, III:2, 740) 
Je ne puis asseurer mon object. Il va trouble et chancelant, d'une yvresse naturelle. [ ... ] 
Si mon ame pou voit prendre pied, je ne m'essaierois pas, je me resoudrois; elle est 
tousjours en apprentissage et en espreuve. (T-R, III:2, 782) 
xiii (C, III: 12) 
Je dis pompeusement et opulemment l'ignorance, et dys la science megrement et 
piteusement; accessoirement cette-cy et accidentalement, celle là expressément et 
principalement. Et ne traicte à point nommé de rien que du rien, ny d'aucune science 
que de celle de l'inscience. (T-R, III:12, 1034) 
xiv (C, III:2) 
«chaque homme porte la forme entiere de l'humaine condition.» (T-R, III:2, 782) 
xv (F, III:l3, 1017) 
« L'exemple est un miroüer vague, universel et à tout sens. » (T-R, III: 13, 1 067) 
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xvi (F, II: 12, 497) 
«Nouvelle figure : un philosophe impremedité et fortuite! » (T -R, II: 12, 528) 
xvii (F, I:lO, 31) 
« Ceci m'advient aussi : que je ne me trouve pas où je me cherche; et me trouve plus 
par rencontre que par l'inquisition de mon jugement.» (T-R, I:lO, 41-42) 
xviii (F, III:9, 925) 
Cette farcisseure est un peu hors de mon theme. Je m'esgare, mais plustost par licence 
que par mesgarde. Mes fantasies se suyvent, mais par fois c'est de loing, et se 
regardent, mais d'une veuë oblique. (T-R, Ill:9, 973) 
xix (F, III:9, 925) 
«il s'en trouvera [le sujet] tousjours) en un coing quelque mot » (T-R, Ill:9, 973) 
xx (F, Ill:9, 925) 
« C'est l'indiligent lecteur qui pert mon subject, non pas moy; il s'en trouvera 
tousjours en un coing quelque mot qui ne laisse pas d'estre bastant, quoy qu'il soit 
serré.» (T-R, III:9, 973) 
xxi (F, 1:25, 122) 
J'en cognoy à qui, quand je demande ce qu'il sçait, il me demande un livre pour me le 
montrer; et n'oseroit me dire qu'il a le derriere galeux, s'il ne va sur le champ estudier 
en son lexicon, que c'est que galeux, et que c'est que derriere. (T-R, 1:25, 136) 
CHAPTERIII 
A SIDELONG GLANCE AT PSYCHOTHERAPY 
Rachel S tarr 
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ABSTRACT 
The unruly and fleeting lived experience of Renaissance writer Michel de Montaigne, as 
wonderfully described and evoked in his Essays, strikes a surprisingly resonant chord with 
my own experience of the therapeutic conversation. Rather than explaining or defining his 
experience, Montaigne cultiva tes it, like fine wine. He draws us into the richness of his world, 
abuzz with conversations and cheer. Ever the personable and attentive host, he makes room 
for each of his lively guests: his readers, his classical ancestors, his contemporaries, and 
himself. While chatting with one person, he acknowledges others through playful sidelong 
glanees, creating a festive order. 
I use Montaigne's metaphor of the sidelong glanee as a starting point of inquiry into what 
actually goes on in therapy, as a way of relooking at what is close to us already. Our 
essayistic frame is unabashedly first-person, limited, dialogical, embodied, and wobbly. We 
see how this metaphor points to the shared horizon of essaying and therapy: that of the 
humanities. And we leam that therapy itself is an invitation to rediscover the resources of the 
humanities, to rediscover how to be together in a human world - an understanding that is 
increasingly obscured in our modem age. 
Keywords: Psychotherapy, Montaigne, humanism, Renaissance, humanistic, 
embodiment, lived experience, accompaniment, conversation 
RÉSUMÉ 
L'expérience de vte indisciplinée et fugace de l'écrivain de la Renaissance Michel de 
Montaigne, telle que merveilleusement décrite et évoquée dans ses Essais , trouve une 
résonnance étonnante avec ma propre expérience de conversation thérapeutique. Plutôt que 
de chercher à expliquer ou à définir son expérience, Montaigne la cultive, comme du bon vin. 
Il nous entraîne dans la richesse de son monde, effervescent de conversations et de gaieté. 
Sans cesse l'hôte courtois et attentif, il fait place à chacun de ses invités : ses lecteurs, ses 
ancêtres classiques, ses contemporains, et lui-même. Tout en discutant avec une personne, il 
reconnaît la présence des autres à travers de ludiques regards obliques, créant une ambiance 
festive. 
J'utilise la métaphore du regard oblique de Montaigne comme point de départ pour explorer 
ce qui se déroule concrètement en thérapie, comme une manière de réexaminer ce qui est déjà 
près de nous. Notre cadre d'essayiste est résolument à la première personne, limité, 
dialogique, incarné, et instable. Nous voyons comment cette métaphore pointe vers l 'horizon 
partagé de l'essai et de la thérapie : celui des humanités. Et nous apprenons que la thérapie 
elle-même est une invitation à redécouvrir les ressources des humanités, à redécouvrir 
---------------------------------
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comment être ensemble dans un monde humain, une compréhension qui est de plus en plus 
obscure dans notre ère moderne. 
Mots-clés : psychothérapie, Montaigne, Renaissance, humaniste, incarnation, 
expérience vécue, accompagnement, conversation 
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During our therapeutic conversation, 1 often try awkwardly to follow my patient - not 
quite keeping up to her, or else lumbering on by. Either way, we miss little windows of 
understanding that wink in the dark as we retrace well-wom tracks. But once in a while, we 
fall into step, side by side, with a new rhythm. The fresh jaunt in our gait inspires the 
confidence to venture down the oblique paths that arise in our conversation, suddenly aware 
that we are drawing closer to something vital. We may witness a flickering memory as it 
cornes into view, or begin to discern the dark contours .of shame. We may encounter the 
spontaneous pleasure of recognition, or fee) a momentary spark of connectedness. These 
experiences share a sensation of groundlessness and yet we are drawn to them. 
If such revelatory glimpses are too unsettling, we retreat from our neighbourly stance to 
the separate and safer perches of expert and patient. From our anchored positions, we can get 
a clear, global view of the matter at hand, or have the stabi lity to lean in for a detailed 
analysis. These direct perspectives allow us to impose our own systematic order or technique, 
and to come up with explanations, circumscribing the unknown. It's comforting for both of 
us. 
Our most fruitful moments in therapy occur when, together, we have the courage to be 
obliquely attentive to the lively order of the subject at hand, to look at it from many 
perspectives without subduing it. We draw closer, but not too close; we step back, but not too 
far; we move at a speaking distance. lnstead of trying to pin down or de fine our exchange, we 
let it unfold, keeping the conversational bail in the air, alert to the opening of unexpected 
possibilities. 
1 am profoundly struck by one particular evocation of such a moment, one that cornes not 
from the scientific literature, nor even from the phenomenological-existential writings of the 
last couple of hundred years - works that typically inform our practice of psychotherapy. 
Let' s take a look: 
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Lately when I retired to my home, determined so far as possible to bother about nothing 
except spending the little !ife I have left in rest and seclusion, it seemed to me I could do 
my mind no greater favor than to let it entertain itself in full idleness and stay and settle 
in itself, which I hoped it might do more easily now, having become weightier and riper 
with time. But I find [ ... ] that, on the contrary, like a runaway horse, it gives itself a 
hundred times more trouble than it took for others, and gives birth to so many chimeras 
and fantastic monsters, one after another, without order or pUI-pose, that in order to 
contemplate their ineptitude and strangeness at my pleasure, I have begun to commit 
them to writing, hoping intime to make it ashamed of itself. li 
This passage was written by the French nobleman, winemaker, and renowned humanist, 
Michel de Montaigne, during the waning years of the Renaissance. In 1571, at the ripe old 
age of 38, " long weary of the servitude of the court and of public employments," (Brush, 
1994, p. 55i this reluctant magistrate and sometime diplomat for the Catholic King Henri III 
and later for the Protestant King Henry de Navarre, withdrew from public !ife to the tower on 
his private estate to write. Montaigne was likely motivated in part by the reclaimed Stoic 
ideals of achieving apatheia, or tranquillity of the mind through solitude and contemplation 
of the mind (Kim-Reuter, 2008, p. 40) . Once ensconced in his library, free from "press of 
business";;' Montaigne hoped to uncover his immutable core. Instead, he discovered the 
fluctua ting, ungraspable nature of his inn er world in which his thoughts and feelings followed 
no logical order, but tumbled along oblique and ephemeral paths. On what was a pioneering 
inward voyage, he discovered that he was no less infinitely variable and diverse than the 
1 For ease of reading, I have placed ali of the citations from the Essays in the end notes 
using this format: (TRANSLATOR INITIAL, BOOK:chapter, page). I refer to Donald Frame 
(Montaigne, 2003), M.A. Screech (Montaigne, 1991), and Charles Cotton's (Montaigne, 
1877) translations of the EssaJ.S. I also provide the original French text as found in the 
Thibaudet-Rat edition (Montaigne, 1962). 
2 This is from Frame ' s (1965) translation of a Latin inscription painted on the wall of a 
room connected to Montaigne's library: "In the year of Christ 1571, at the age ofthirty-eight, 
on the last day of F ebruary, his birthday, Michael de Montaigne, long weary of the servitude 
of the court and of public employments, while still en tire, retired to the bosom of the learned 
Virgins, where in calm and freedom from ali cares he will spend what little remains of his !ife, 
now more than half run out. If the fates permit, he will complete this abode, this sweet 
ancestral retreat; and he has consecrated it to his freedom, tranquillity, and leisure." (p. 115) 
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outside world3. The self-unity and self-mastery that he had hoped to find by allowing his 
mind to "stay and settle in itself' were illusory. In a sense, he was searching for a 
fundamental "I", but concluded that there is no solid "I", only an elusive shadow of the self. 
Montaigne cheerfully relinquished his hope of finding a solid foundation of the sou!, a 
true and uni versai human nature: "Others form Man; I give an account of Man and sketch a 
pic ture of a particular one of them [ . . .]' 'i ii Despite feeling disconcerted and perhaps a little 
disappointed by this raucous and mysterious vision of reality, he set to writing essais, which 
we might translate as "attempts", or "tries", to conversationally describe the strange 
"chimeras and fantastic monsters" of his world. 
Montaigne coined the term Essays to denote his new iiterary invention. Essaying was a 
means of bath following, shaping and expressing his own particular experiences, 
"tumultuously"iv and "without any system"v:"If my mind could gain a firm footing, I would 
not make essays, I would make decisions; but it is always in apprenticeship and on trial. "vi 
The Essays both describe and evoke a vision of reality that speaks to my experience of 
therapy. In the psychotherapeutic moments described above, my patient and I also explore a 
reality that is ephemeral, unwieldy and in constant flux . Thus, like the Essays, our 
conversation is an amalgam of oblique attempts to draw closer to experience as it is lived, to 
reveal aspects of a world that will al ways remain partial! y hidden. 
Like many academie psychologists, Montaigne was unsure about the value of his own 
ordinary experience; he was a little "ashamed" of its insubstantiality in comparison with the 
weighty abstract truths found in more commendable sources. For Montaigne, these sources 
would have included Latin and Greek thinkers as well as the Bible. He was acutely aware that 
this "new and extraordinary amusement"vii of essaying the self might be perceived as self-
flattery. In his introduction to what would become an instant best-seller, he assures the reader 
3 The Renaissance was an era of great discovery and rediscovery of the New World of 
the Americas and the ancient classical world respectively. 
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that his goal is to reveal himself, watts and ali. On the other hand, with an insouciant modesty 
typical of the Renaissance ordo neglectus style, his prefatory remarks "To The Reader" 
constitute an apologia for "this fricasee that I am scribbling here"vi ii : 
If I had written to seek the world's favor, I should have bedecked myself better, and 
should present myself in a studied posture. I want to be seen here in my simple, natural , 
ordinary fashion, without straining or artifice; for it is myself that I portray. My defects 
will be read to the life, and also my natural form, as far as respect for the public has 
allowed. Had I been placed among those nations which are said to live still in the sweet 
freedom of nature's first laws, I assure you I should very gladly have portrayed myself 
here entire and wholly naked. Thus, reader, I am myself the matter of my book; you 
would be unreasonable to spend your leisure on so frivolous and vain a ~ubject.ix 
Nevertheless, over the twenty-year course of his writing and adding to the 107 chapters 
in 3 books, (from 1572 until the day he died in 1592), the Essays reflected his growing 
enjoyment and confidence in his own self-reference. Through essaying, Montaigne developed 
the profound idea that ordinary experience, rather than abstract theory or religious doctrine, 
was his best, though fallible, source of tru th. 
I study myself more than any other subject. That is my metaphysics, that is my physics 
[ ... ] In the experience I have of myselfl find enough to make me wise, if I were a good 
scholar. ' 
Beginning with relatively straightforward remarks about his favourite aphorisms from 
Antiquity, (including Ovid, Plutarch, Heraclites, Seneca and Socrates), the Essays bloomed 
into an unabashed inquiry into the manifold dimensions of his self and worlds in flux . He 
acquired "faith in dwelling with the variety and richness of expressions as they appear" 
(Todres, 1991 , p. 1 00), and renounced the Scholastic pretension of "regimenting, arranging, 
and fixing truth"xi. Instead of searching for truth about a specifie topic by accumulating 
adages from authoritative writers, he began to use the citations as voices in conversation. The 
Essays' inaugural shift away from the Scholastic approach, towards observation and 
experience as sources of truth, was taken up by the New Philosophy of the 1 i 11 century. 
However, the Essays anticipated and rejected the later systematic and progressive empiricism 
of the natural sciences in favour of spontaneous or accidentai routes to more temporary, 
particular, and local truths. 
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Montaigne's "unmethodical method" (Kauffman.(l, 1989) was to write down or dictate 
everything that came into his head, following his "disciplined digression[s] " (p. 238) with "a 
studied naivety" (McGowan, 1974, p. 24). He juxtaposed his questions about the recently 
discovered New World with musings about the rediscovered classical world. In this "happy 
combination of seriousness and free play" (O'Neill, 1982, p. 74), he tells wide-ranging stories 
about ali sorts of topics, including cannibals, Socrates, fatiing, war-horses, thumbs, the 
subjective experience of his cat, and death. The Essays are "countless examples, anecdotes, 
differing opinions, other voices of the citations - [ .. . ] exchanges of views a round a posed 
question." (Rudent, 2001, p. 106, my translation) . 
Montaigne's Essays gleefully flout any externally imposed structure, such as the 
dominant treatise genre of his time, a forerunner of scientific article with which most 
psychotherapists communicate today. While freewheeling and open-ended, the Essays are not 
random or chaotic. They follow experience on its own terms. According to Montaigne, the 
"able"xii and attentive reader will see that his Essays follow the provisional order of sidelong 
glanees: 
This stuffing is a little out of my subject. I go out of my way, but rather by license than 
carelessness. My fantasies follow one another, but sometimes it is from a distance, and 
look at each other, but with a sidelong glanee. [ ... ] I love the poetic gait, by leaps and 
gambols. [ ... ] It is the inattentive reader who !oses my subject, not I. [ ... ] My style and 
my mind alike go roaming.xiii 
This passage, from the chapter "On vanity", is the touchstone of our CUITent reflection. 
Montaigne acknowledges that the Essays ' multifarious themes are oblique; they don ' t 
necessarily flow smoothly from the titles. He deliberately allows the disobedient subject, like 
stuffing bursting at the seams, to exuberantly reveal itself : 
I want the matter to make its own divisions. It shows weil enough where it changes, 
where it concludes, where it begins, where it resumes, without my interlacing it with 
words, with links and seams introduced for the benefit ofweak or heedless ears [ ... ] xiv 
True to the way they appear, the Essays place his opinions, feelings, stories, and 
experiences in a position to encounter each other. They look at each other obliquely, "from a 
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distance" at which they can be seen in light of the other.4 The order of the sidelong glanee is 
that of conversation. The Essays are an unruly form of writing, a reflective "conversation 
with the reader" (Hansen, 2002, p. 142): 
No pleasure has any savor for me without communication. Not even a merry thought 
cornes to my mind without my being vexed at having produced it atone without anyone 
to offer it to .'v 
Ralph Waldo Emerson (1996), an avid reader of the Essays, agreed : "I know not 
anywhere the book that seems less written. It is the language of conversation transferred to a 
book" (p. 95). 
W e have briefly sketched out the idea that psychotherapy and the Essays share a vision 
of reality or experience as unstable and ephemeral, which is best accessed by oblique 
attempts to draw near rather than by pinning down. Montaigne describes the nature of this 
reality as being on the order of the sidelong glanee. The second idea that I want to elucidate is 
that Montaigne's metaphor of the sidelong glanee guides us to another, perhaps more 
essential notion: this vision of reality is fundamentally dialogical. 
Here, our exploration of the sidelong glanee runs up against a paradox which affronts our 
modem sensibilities. If Montaigne tumed inward to essay his experience, how can we say 
that it is dialogical? This paradox is the beating heart of the Essays, the reason why they 
continue to speak to so many readers throughout the centuries. The Essays show us how in 
drawing closer to his own experience, Montaigne is revealed and open for friendship. The 
Essays' sidelong glanees invite a response. The last line of the first edition of the Essays 
became the first line of the third edition: "I speak to my paper, as I speak to the first man I 
meet."xvi The experience of experience, or what we might calllived experience, is continually 
born in conversation . It was not enough for Montaigne to explore his experience alone. He 
was searching not only for information, but for company: "There are private, retiring, and 
4 Frame translates "mise en regard" as "from a distance" . I prefer "to be seen in light of 
the other". 
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inward natures. My essential pattern is suited to communication and revelation. 1 am ali in the 
open and in full view, born for company and friendship ."xvii His discoveries connected him to 
the world around him. This is what humanizes him and makes him come alive, to the delight 
of countless readers throughout the centuries . 
Let 's go back to the famous image of Montaigne writing alone in his tower. lt seems a 
rather isolated and " lofty" pursuit, and brings to mind the lonely ivory tower of academia. 
But if we look a little more closely, we see that he is hardly alone. Colourful frescoes of 
classical scenes adorn the walls around him. Above, on the wooden beams of his curved 
ceiling are carved 57 of his favourite aphorisms from antiquity (Marchi, 1994, p. 304). 
Among them, we find "The plague of man is the opinion ofknowledge", "1 establish nothing. 
1 do not understand. 1 hait. 1 examine", and this maxim from Sextus Empiricus: "To any 
reason an equal reason can be opposed". Through the windows, the voices of his es tate trickle 
in from ali sides: the labourers, perhaps those of his wife and only surviving daughter, Leonor. 
(Five other daughters died as infants). As he listened to the daily chape! services, he may 
have wondered about future readers of his book - what would these friends be like? 
Montaigne spent cosy win ter da ys with the 1500 books of his tower library. In the 16111 
century, barely one hundred years after the invention of the printing press, this was an 
impressive number of books. His study actually housed more books than the Oxford library. 
Many had been bequeathed to him by his great friend, the poet, Étienne de La Boétie. The 
tower firmly rooted Montaigne in his everyday world white affording him an intimate 
engagement with other worlds. Whether he was listening, writing, reading, walking or 
dictating, his sidelong glanees acknowledged that something else was going on as weil. 
Montaigne's celebrated tower is one way of illustrating the dialogical nature of the 
Essays . We can also think about a painting. The 1611 and 1617 editions of the Essays 
featured an engraved portrait by Flemish painter, Thomas de Leu (1608): 
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Figure 3-1 Montaigne had severa! portraits painted of himself, but interestingly did not include one in 
the frontispiece of his Essays. Thomas de Leu's engraving is based on an earlier anonymous portrait of 
Montaigne as mayor of Bordeaux. This engraving appeared in posthumous editions of the Essays. 
The Essays are a self-portrait and like many Renaissance portraits, the subject gazes out 
at the viewer with a sidelong glanee. From this painting, Montaigne's oblique gaze draws you 
into the scene. His expectant look makes space for us; he is aware of us as co-creator of the 
meaning or experience of the painting. It is not enough for Montaigne to see what he sees, the 
viewer has to see it in a different way. The sidelong glanee is a way of looking that underlies 
our relationallife. In contrast, a probing stare does not invite conversation; it dominates. 
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The shared goal of psychotherapy and the Essays is to crea te a canvas or a mis-en-scene 
for a conversation, an encounter that illuminates a world . When the patient and therapist 
address each other, it is not to establish a law. Each is asking the other to judge, to change 
their words, to add new meanings to their words. The light of understanding cornes from this 
exchange, not from theory, or from either individual subjectivity. This li ght allows us to see 
our world as it is and also inspires us to deviate from what we set out to do and discover other 
worlds. 
The sidelong glanee that emerges from the Essays is playful and seductive, not 
authoritarian. lt seeks encounter and not facts. The questions it raises have to do with 
presence rather than information. Together, writer and reader, (Montaigne was also a close 
reader of his own text, endlessly reflecting on the writing and language of the Essays), draw 
close to lived experience and show it to be on the order of the sidelong glanee. This 
conversational order of reality differs from the purely subjective or objective realms of 
autobiography or philosophical treatises respectively. The Essays' profound sense of 
humanity is that you don 't see it alone; that it doesn't suffice for one person to see the thing. 
In the Renaissance humanist view, a person becomes human by encounteri ng another, and a 
civilization becomes a civilization by actively looking for and engaging with another. There 
is no lived world without a neighbour (Jager, persona! communication, September, 2010). 
Montaigne caught a glimpse "into the truth, lost afterwards to much of the Western 
philosophical tradition, that the being of the subject is not reducible to the being of 
consciousness" (Kim-Reuter, 2008, p. 42) Psychotherapy is one of the few remaining public 
spaces in our modem world where we can cultivate this understanding. We have an intuition 
that psychotherapy can serve as a counterweight to the alienation of modemity. 
Tentative Beginnings 
We are beginning to hear a harmonious chord struck between the experiences of a 500 
year-old winemaker from Bordeaux, and my contemporary experience of the therapeutic 
conversation. Both essaying and therapy lead us to express, shape and cultivate "a more 
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vividly experienced human world" (Jager, persona! communication, September, 2012). The 
sidelong glanee is uniquely adapted to orient ourselves within a "recalcitrant and unwieldy 
human reality" (Jager, 2001, p. 104) which "staggers confusedly along with a natural 
drunkenness."xviii Essaying and therapy share a dialogical and limited vision of reality th at, in 
our modern world "offends the dignity of the individual and the authority of reason" 
respectively (Kim-Reuter, 2008, p. 42). Intrigued by this initial resonance, I propose that we 
further investigate how Montaigne's metaphor illuminates what actually happens in therapy. 
Cl earl y, the sidelong glanee is a different starting point of in quiry than th at of abstract theory 
or the search for medical causes. 
A Change in Aspect 
In the larger picture, we are taking a sidelong glanee at the discipline of psychotherapy 
itself, wandering off of the Royal Road of scientific progress. It certainly felt a little out of 
left field wh en I be gan this work, given that almost ail of psychotherapy education in Canada 
is firmly entrenched in the medical model and the natural scientific tradition. The sidelong 
glanee in the natural sciences is one in which we check to see how we are progressing, 
looking for indications that we are on the right path towards an ultimate, objective reality. 
Here the sidelong glanee is instrumental, in the service of progress, eventually to be cast off 
as we acquire more information or technology. The underlying belief is that eventually you 
won't need any more sidelong glanees once you arrive at the truth. In fact, what you see off 
to the side might not only be trivial, but downright dangerous. Similarly, when you drive 
down a highway, it may be risky to go off the road and enter the unfamiliar countryside. The 
ultimate goal of the sciences is to predict reality; you certainly don't need to look around you 
any more when you can predict. 
In therapy and essaying, we don't only follow the predictive road of theory, but look for 
other paths: "one doesn't direct the future but open possibilities towards it" (Leeming, 
Madden et Marian, 2009, p. 741). If, like Montaigne, we dare to renounce our grand 
ambitions, and risk following the oblique and crooked paths spotted in our dusty side view 
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mirror, we glimpse a different and wider order of reality. As we bourree along a country road, 
what we see in the mirror is limited and transitory - the blur of an old gas station quickly 
receding, the smudged sunset disappearing into the horizon, ever-shrinking crows on an 
endless telephone wire. W e understand that mu ch will al ways re main unseen. 
Despite the professional pressures to progress along the mam highway paved by 
empirical evidence, taking a sidelong glanee at psychotherapy is highly pertinent because the 
goal of psychotherapy itself is a change in aspect. Psychotherapy is a reframing of particular 
experience through conversation with another person, in the service of reducing suffering. 
Therapy and essaying are putting an old description into a new context, to see it anew and to 
judge it, to open it up and enlarge our vision. 
Human understanding is marvellously enlightened by daily conversation with men, for 
we are, otherwise, compressed and heaped up in ourselves, and have our sight limited to 
the length of our own noses.xix 
The sidelong glanee offers a re-looking at what is close to us already. Rather than 
leaming new explanations or concepts, we recognize what we know, what is familiar, but in a 
different way, i.e. obliquely. 
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their 
simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something - because it is always 
before one's eyes). And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most 
striking and most powerful. (Heaton, 2010, p. 134)5 
The talking cure involves "reminders of what we have overlooked" (p. ix). Montaigne 
encourages his reader to be attentive: "For while we are looking for powerful and weighty 
causes and ends, worth y of such great renown, we Jose the true orres; they escape our view by 
their littleness."xx The sidelong glanee reveals connections that we may not have noticed 
before. Shifts in perspective lead to shifts in understanding or meaning. 
5 For an excellent illumination of the value of particular reflection over abstract theory in 
talk therapy, I highly recommend Heaton's book, The Ta/king Cure Wittgenste in's 
Therapeutic Method for Psychotherapy (2010). 
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"lt is the inattentive reader who !oses my subject, not I. Sorne word about it will always 
be found off in a corner, which will not fail to be sufficient, thought it takes little room."xxi 
The "word [ .. . ] in a corner" has a "poetic gait"; it opens a new conversation. lt puts things 
into relation, into a metaphorical whole, by revealing new connections iri the familiar. On the 
other hand, a definition or concept closes the conversation: ''[. . . ] an essay, in the sequence of 
its paragraphs, explores a thing from many sides without wholly encompassing it - for a 
thing wholly encompassed suddenly !oses its scope and melts down to a concept" (Musil, 
1995, p. 270). 
W e are forever relooking at the familiar in essaying and therapy because the nature of 
what we are looking at is not graspable - it is too diverse and changing and mysterious. We, 
the lookers, are also in constant flux. 
This is a register of varied and changing occurrences, of ideas which are unresolved and, 
when needs be, contradictory, either because 1 myself have become different or because 1 
grasp hold of different attributes or aspects of my subjects. So 1 may happen to contradict 
myselfbut, as Demades said, 1 never contradict truth.xxii 
Montaigne constantly essayed his reason and his senses, running up against the limits of 
his own uncertain knowledge and fallible perception: "For 1 do not see the who le of anything; 
nor do tho se who promise to show it to us"xxiii. He found the se limits to be a source of wonder 
and exhilaration rather than a weakness to be overcome. By acknowledging that he was 
dependent on the perception of another in order to better understand himself and the world, 
Montaigne transformed his limits into thresholds, or areas of exchange. The Essays are a 
continually renewed invitation to pull up a seat at the banquet. Montaigne, ever the convivial 
host, notices you standing shyly in the corner and with a merry wave, beckons you over to the 
table. 
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"Language most shewes a man, speake that 1 may see thee."6 
Montaigne explicitly chose to write the Essays in Fr~nch rather than Latin because he 
felt that French was closer to the fleeting nature of experience that he was describing. 
Characteristics of the French language that were seen as limitations by most of his 
contemporaries were transformed into sources of new possibilities for Montaigne. In the 16111 
century, bef ore grammaticians 7 stepped in to "codify the language" (Friedrich, 1991, p. 3 63 ), 
the French vocabulary was still semantically imprecise. Montaigne revelled in the 
changeability and ephemerality of the language which "slips out of our hands every day, and 
has halfway changed since I have been alive."xxiv He saw French as an "airy medium of 
words"xxv which would likely not even be understood in 50 years, unlike Latin, which was 
universal and sure to last forever. In fact, Montaigne was the first renowned writer to write in 
French rather than Latin or in sorne combination of the two. The Essays are the first 
"significant and original body of thought [ written] exclusively in the language spoken by 
ordinary people" (Friedrich, 1991, p. 23) in France, Spain or Ital y - a fact of which 
Montaigne was well aware as he wrote "the only book in the world of its kind" xxvi_ His 
decision was even more remarkable when you consider that his native language was Latin, 
and that he did not leam French until the age of six. 
The speech I love is simple, natural speech, the same on paper as in the mouth; a speech 
succulent and sinewy, brief and compressed, not so much dainty and well-combed as 
vehement and brusque.xxvii 
French (and its various dialects) was the language in which people actually conversed. 
The kind of truth accessed through everyday conversation is different than that leamed 
6 The poet Ben Jonson, ( another admirer of Montaigne), echo es Seneca in the collection 
Timber; or, Discoveries Made upon Men or Matter, line 1661 , published in 1640. 
7 In 1634, the Académie française was founded with the aim standardizing and 
preserving the French language. To this day, the esteemed Académie continues to protect the 
purity of the official French language, in part by preventing words from other languages from 
being incorporated. 
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through more acade!llic pursuits. Montaigne retums agam and agam to the distinction 
between understanding and explanation, between "well-formed" and "well-filled"xxviii brains: 
Do we witness more of a jumble in the chatter of fishwives than in the public 
disputations of the professional logicians? I would rather have my son learn to speak in 
the ta v ems than in the schools of talk. xxix 
Therapy in the humanist paradigm is not about sophisticated language. It too is about 
language that is close to the heart, "succulent and sinewy", which draws us closer to the 
experience of understanding. We attempt to miiculate that which is, to listen for the "murmur 
of the indiscernible" (Heaton, 2010, p. 60). Instead of making irrefutable connections 
between sturdy pronouncements of the ancient sages or the Stoic prescriptions, Montaigne 
gleefully clambered over the shifting sands of the French language. By "follow[ing] common 
usage in language"xxx, he opens himself to further conversation. In academie psychotherapy, 
we would often rather tum to exp lana tory models or to the categorizing language of the DSM, 
than admit that what we do is ordinary and best expressed plainly. I think that Montaigne 
might have compared us to architects: 
I don't know whether it happens with others as with me; but when I hear our architects 
puffing themselves out with those big words like pilasters, architraves, comices, 
Corinthian and Doric work, and suchlike jargon, I cannot keep my imagination from 
immediately seizing on the palace of Apollidon; and in reality I find these are the paltry 
parts of my ki tchen door.xxxi 
But plainspoken does not mean easy. Montaigne 's exuberance for plain and homely 
speech belies just how difficult this is . To see and tell things as they are, "to hold pleasant and 
reasonable conversation with oneself and one's family, [ ... ] this is rarer and more difficult to 
achieve."xxxii Imagine sitting down and writing thoughts as they come into your head. Would 
they be interesting or even make sense? Writing plainly about the Essays brings this 
difficulty into stark relief. Plain speech reveals my ordinary thinking and the limits of my 
understanding. Given that l'rn writing about the greatest essayist in literature, my awkward 
striving for the right words is even more painfully exposed. With my need to fee! competent 
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under threat, it would be less daunting to revert to a very literary or philosophical stance. 8 I 
can at !east take sorne comfort in knowing that Montaigne too felt like this ~ometimes: 
When I write, I prefer to do without the company and remembrance of books, for fear 
they may interfere with my style. Also because, in truth, the good authors humble and 
dishearten me too much.xxxiii 
As therapist and patient, our task of finding the words to express what goes on in therapy . 
is also infinite and at times overwhelming. The unsayable points to the fact that there is 
something we would like to say, but fail to find the word, the motjuste, "the word [ .. . ]offin 
the corner" that can reach the other. Montaigne faced the unsayable with equanimity and 
charm and inspires us to do the same. In therapy, as in essaying, we find the right words 
spontaneously, when we draw closer to experience and let ourselves be surprised . 
Conversational speech, rather than jargon or concepts, allows this to happen. 
To tell it like it is in conversation means to incorporate playfulness, charm, seduction, 
humour and tact. (Interestingly, these expressions are ali evoked by the sidelong glanee) . The 
"essays in flesh and bone"xxxiv use an intimate language which is close at band, words that 
gesture at the world from the page. The 1 i 11 century essayist, Francis Bacon, suggested that 
"[a]s the tangue speaketh to the ear, so the gesture speaketh to the eye" (Bacon, 1605, as cited 
in Frampton, 20 11a). Plain speech is persona! but also common, evoking what Saul Frampton 
(20 11 b) ca Ils "a sense that what we are is somehow between us" (p. 273). 
I am not proposing that therapists dismiss formai language. Theorizing helps us to stay 
composed and get through the initial strangeness and confusion of the therapeutic encounter. 
In the beginning, we may see the patient as belonging to a pathological or sociological group . 
Theory and its language provide the vital road markers that we need to get started, to get 
moving down the road, especially as a novice therapist. In another a sense, theory is how to 
8 For this reason, I admire Sarah Bakewell 's (2010a) biography of Montaigne, the first in 
50 years . Her plainspoken book rises to the challenge of staying true to the Essays' vision, 
thus serving as an excellent introduction to new readers. 
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meet the stt·anger. It g1ves you a little bit of familiarity so that you aren't completely 
overwhelmed by the unknown. But as you go along, both you and your patient loosen your 
grip on theories and embark on a different journey. We begin to stray from our itinerary, to 
tum towards the conversational realm of the humanities. "One of the major !ife tasks of a 
therapist is to learn to tolerate this confusion and uncertainty, even embrace the mysterious 
nature of human experience." (Kottler, 2012, p. 41) A good conversation, like a good essay, 
is on the edge of not being sa fe, but not off-putting. Once we are on our way, with the help of 
theories, we become agreeable to taking a risk, to stepping off the path. I like therapist Susie 
Orbach 's conception of therapy as being "continually engaged with being wrong-footed" 
(Longplayer, 2009, 29:54). She says that you fee! "wobbly" ( 30:06) when you are in a new 
potential space, but it is this very wobbliness that allows you to think about something you 
know but have never thought about. 
"This Bundle of so Many Disparate Pieces"xxxv 
Montaigne chose a vernacular language as one way of drawing doser to everyday 
experience in arder to marvel at how strange it seems when you look at it from different 
angles. Let's take another look at how the Essays' sidelong glanees lead to new 
understanding. Mary B. McKinley (1981) sees Montaigne 's use of more than 1300 Latin 
quotations as fragments that invite "the reader to make a detour temporarily from the Essays 
and to sojoum in the text of its origin before moving on" (p. 103). She views the words as 
doors "opening off the winding corridors of Montaigne's discourse" (p. 1 03). The Latin 
quotations are pauses, moments where the reader can catch glimpses of another world. 
Montaigne's use of the national language served to create a distance between him and the 
authoritative voices of tradition - a speaking distance at which each can engage with and 
judge the words of the other. In the original books, the chapters (or wh at we now re fer to as 
individual essays), were single paragraphs. The quotations stood on their own - they were 
rarely introduced or cited, and never translated. Their linguistic strangeness and 
typographical separateness gave them presence. Like any good host, Montaigne let his guests 
speak naturally . He did not try to organize or classify the ir words. Y ou can see su ch a page 
123 
for yourself: a colour reproduction of the last edition of the Essays published while 
Montaigne was alive, known as the Bordeaux copy, was published in 2002. This document is 
part book and part written manuscript, complete with ali ofMontaigne's marginalia.9 
The very crookedness of the Essays' pa th primes the reader for such pauses and breaks, 
which seem Jess like intrusions and more like invitations to discover something unexpected. 
There is a sense of discontinuous time as we are transported to different centuries sometimes 
holding on to a thread of common thought, sometimes taking the risk to Jose our footing 
altogether. The Latin quotations offer wobbly jumping off points from the fami liar French 
into the unfamiliar, after which the reader and author return to the text transformed. 
Montaigne's unique and profound intimacy with the Latin texts allowed him to develop the 
confidence to juxtapose these worlds so conversationally, without resorting to Scholastic 
classification. Similarly, a therapist gradually cornes to know his patients in a fluent way 
rather than systematically. 
1 happened the other day to come upon such a passage. 1 had dragged along languidly 
after French words so bloodless, fleshless, and empty of matter and sense that they real! y 
were nothing but French words. At the end of a long and tedious road I came upon a bit 
that was sublime, rich, and lofty as the clouds. [ ... ] after the first six words 1 realized that 
1 was flying off into another world.'xxvi 
Therapy and essaying are a negotiation between familiarity and strangeness, between 
academie spheres and social worlds. This oblique movement is !ost in an objective view. In 
scientific articles, or in scholarly essays, every voice is cited and introduced cl earl y. For 
example, the APA formatting of citations calls for the same line height and font size as the 
body text. A small indent provides the only faint distinction between the quote and the body 
of the text. Using the first persan "l" or "we" is discouraged. The voices are muted, laying 
bare the facts, or underlining the authority with which we justify ourselve.s. There are no I's 
or "eyes", no expectant gazes or sidelong glanees emerging from the text. Montaigne 's 
metaphor highlights the difference between two fondamental human impulses: to synthesize 
9 http: //humanities . uchicago.edu/orgs/montaigne/h/bordeaux _ copy/ 
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fragments into a whole or to place them together in a fruitful relationship - into a 
metaphorical or symbolic unity. The essay, like conversation, juxtaposes fragments in 
endlessly different ways - constantly testing and retesting and waiting for the "chance 
encounter" with wisdom, or for the chance to fly "off into another world". This is a first-
person endeavour, an infinite cultural task in which Montaigne makes himself at home 
amongst his newly introduced guests. In the natural sciences we labour in an indifferent uni-
verse, where man is superfluous to reality. 
The Essasy' oblique movement between prose and quotations allows the reader to 
respond, to fill in the gaps and create their own conversational order. Montaigne is searching 
for an attentive and able reader who can bring the text to life. The attentive reader is "alert to 
twists and tums ofMontaigne's text and to the words in a corner that mark them" (McKinley, 
1981 , p. 112). This attentiveness may come about through si de long glanees, which are 
particularly apt for picking up on such peripheral words. Such moments of encounter 
between the reader and the text point to an underlying unity or coherence. The able reader is 
able to make new connections, to create new paths of understanding. "An able reader often 
discovers in other men's writings perfections beyond those that the author put in or perceived, 
and lends them richer meanings and aspects."xxxvii 
In his instructions to the printer, Montaigne acknowledged his un]lsually frequent use of 
capitals and full stops over commas, and advised the printer to not correct his punctuation. 
The full stops place divided worlds in relation to each other, creating a separation or 
difference. To encounter the other, you have to come to a stop, and tolerate the ambiguity of 
living at a distance. Recall one of the aphorisms engraved on Montaigne's ceiling: "I 
establish nothing. I do not understand. I hait. I examine." Like the discontinuous Latin 
quotations, the full stops create and elaborate thresholds; they humbly open the text up for the 
reader to respond. The reader can form her own links between meanings and perspectives, 
and create new relationships. Analogously, in the spontaneous rhythms of therapy, the 
therapist and patient have to be able and attentive readers of the patient ' s testimony or 
expenence. 
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The constant task of the therapist is to override concepts and labels in order to be 
attentive to alterity. A patient may be saying one thing, but you remain alert to the possibility 
of bringing tangential concerns into conversation. The sidelong glanee is not fully integrated 
into main subject. Like Montaigne's marginalia in the Bordeaux palimpset, the peripheral 
things spice it up, and keep the conversation alive for past and future readers. On the other 
hand, the sidelong glanee may lead to an entirely different concern altogether, as so often 
happens in therapy. 
Neither these stories nor my quotations serve always simply for example, authority, or 
ornament. I do not esteem them solely for the use I derive from them. They often bear, 
outside of my subject, the seeds of a richer and bolder material, and sound obliquely a 
subtler note, both for myself, who do not wish · to express anything more and for tho se 
who get my drift. ""xviii 
Montaigne called himself an "accidentai philosopher" xxxix because his greatest 
discoveries occurred indirectly: "I am displeased with my sou! for ordinarily producing its 
most profound and maddest fancies , and those I like the best, unexpectedly and when I am 
!east looking for them"x1• In fact, the more directly Montaigne searched for truth, the more 
elusive such knowledge became. Thoreau (1856, as cited in Matthiessen, 1968) described the 
accidentai approach as seeing "with the unworn sides ofyour eye" (p. 90). Freud's practice of 
free association also cornes to mind. Keats too relished the "sidelong glance" 10 • He found that 
his most fruitful intuitions flourished when he adopted an indolent attitude (Matthiessen, 
1968, p. 90). The humanities, in which I include the arts, myth, philosophy and religion, have 
no abstract put-pose or goal - in this way they are indolent. They do not strive to bolster 
theory, predict outcomes, or attempt to grasp an ultimate reality. Instead, they serve to inspire 
reflection, to cultivate intuitions, indirect! y drawing us cl oser to the liveliness of the common 
world. In the chapter, "On the education of children", Montaigne asserts that 
[ . .. ] the teacher best helps children learn by drawing them further into the !ife of things, 
so that, indirectly, they come to understand themselves and the larger human condition 
which they embody and inhabit (Hansen, 2002, p. 150) 
1° From the poem, To G. A. W., published in 1817. 
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Sometimes, the sidelong glanee can be an evasion, a way of always looking out the 
window disinterestedly. The essayist and therapist must think about how to deal with 
diversions. To what extent do you allow things to come in and colour the theme? Will you 
see them purely as a disturbance or as a spice? Or as a possible route to a surprising new 
subject altogether? 
xli 
"Every movement reveals us." 
Donald Frame translates "la veuë oblique" as the "sidelong glanee". 1 prefer his 
translation .to the more literai "oblique look". The sidelong glanee evokes the ambiguous and 
lively motion ofMontaigne's writing and his understanding ofthe spirited nature ofreality. 
And we, and our judgement, and all morta! things go on flowing and rolling unceasingly . 
Thus nothing certain can be established about one thing by another, both the judging and 
the judged being in continuai change and motion. xlii 
So far 1 have described the Essays' sidelong glanees as digressive, relaxed, indolent, 
limited, nonchalant, and festive. 1 would also characterize them as amused, doubtful, judging, 
sceptical, erotic, or slippery. Perhaps you take a darker view: furtive, disdainful, suspicious, 
devious, even envious. One thing we can probably agree on is that the sidelong glanee is 
ambiguous. Bach ti me we try to de fine it, it wriggles out of rea ch. 
By the way, as graphie designer Milton Glaser (2004) reminds us , "ambiguity IS a 
military term that means to be attacked from two sides simultaneously" (p. 3). The 
Montaigne estate, thirty miles to the west of Bordeaux, lies on the border between wh at were, 
during the 16111 and 17111 century, Catholic and Protestant strongholds. While the religious wars 
raged on in pursuit of absolute truth on either side of him, Montaigne kept an open door 
policy. In "On physiognomy", he recounts the story of a gang of robbers who came to his 
chateau with the intent of deceiving their way in and looting. Despite his suspicions given the 
frequency of such schemes during this tempestuous time, Montaigne "gave orders for them to 
come in."xliii The leader and his 25 or 30 henchmen were met with frank hospitality. 
127 
Completely disarmed by Montaigne's pleasant and open attitude, the rogues ended up leaving 
without stealing anything. This approach paid off, although Montaigne, ever the sceptic, is 
quick to recount other anecdotes where such "ambiguity" bad the opposite result. 
Montaigne was deeply intrigued by the way that his own thoughts, opm10ns, and 
emotions changed from moment to moment: 
My footing is so unsteady and so insecure, I find it so vacillating and ready to slip, and 
my sight is so unreliable, that on an empty stomach I feel myself another man than after 
a meal. If my health smiles upon me, and the brightness of a beautiful day, I am a fine 
fellow; ifl have a corn bothering my toe, I am surly, unpleasant, and unapproachable.'1iv 
For this reason, Montaigne considers his Essays to portray becoming not being: "I do not 
portray being: I portray passing."xlv The realm of the essay is the realm of change and flux -
the movement of !ife itself. Montaigne, whom Starobinski (1985) christened the "Man in 
Motion", was unafraid to see life as "a material and corporeal movement, an action which by 
its very essence is imperfect and irregular", nor to strive "to [serve] it in its own way."xlvi We 
cannot completely grasp our consciousness nor pin down the world around us. Instead we 
gesture back and forth from one to the other, caught up in the rhythms of dia logue. 
For Montaigne [ . . . ] we are interested in a world we do not have the key to. We are 
equally incapable of dwelling in ourselves and in things, and are referred from them to 
ourselves and from ourselves to them. (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 199) 
Montaigne was not interested in removing himself from the motion of !ife in order to 
grasp universal truths. He refused to sit still and pose for his portrait. Nor did he pose in the 
sense of presenting himself inauthentically. (Hansen, 2002, p. 137) But describing the 
constant variability within himself did not dilute his self-portrait: "The brush-strokes of my 
portrait do not go awry even though they do change and vary."xlvii Instead, the infinite motion 
of his textual brush reveals what is unique about him while tracing our common ground: "ail 
waver with a common motion and their own."xlviii Montaigne invites the reader to take his 
band and follow his roaming mind and style. Through "the leaps and gambols" of his text, we 
become aware of the motion of our own thoughts and experiences. For this reason, readers 
throughout the centuries have wondered "how did he know ail that about me?" (Bakewell, 
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201 Oa, p. 6) Even Pascal marvelled, "lt is not in Montaigne but m my self th at I fi nd 
everything I see there" (Pascal, 1670, as cited in Bakewell, p. 6). 
Montaigne tells us that he likes to scratch his ears, that he can't have sex standing up, 
that he prefers his wine mixed with water, and what it's like to pass a kidney stone. He used 
to like radishes, then disliked them, and now likes them again. These are not trifling details : 
I am not excessively fond of either salads or fruits , except melons. My father hated all 
kinds of sauces; I love them all. Eating too rouch bothers me; but I have as yet no really 
certain knowledge that any kind of food intrinsically disagrees with me; even as I do not 
notice whether the moon is full or waning, or whether it is spring or autumn. There are 
changes that take place in us, irregular and unknown. Radishes, for example, I first found 
to agree with me, then to disagree now to agree again. In severa! respects I fee! my 
stomach and appetite vary that way: 1 have changed back from white wine to claret, and 
then from claret to white ."1ix 
Many readers, including Virginia Woolfs (2003) "Common Reader", find that such 
infinite and variable brush-strokes have "the force of a revelation about both the fragility and 
the strength of the human fabric" (Hansen, 2002, p. 137). 
Montaigne took great "delight [ . . . ] in the sudden movements of li fe and of language, in 
the aggravated sensation ofbeing alive" (Hampshire, 2003, p. xxvi). In contrast to continuous 
staring, sidelong glanees, or what Thoreau (1852) might cali the "sauntering of the eye" (as 
cited in Matthiessen, 1968, p. 90), reveal the textures of our world: 
My sight is confounded and dissipated with poring; I must withdraw it, and refer my 
discovery to new attempts; just as, to judge rightly of the lustre of scarlet, we are taught 
to pass the eye lightly over it, and again to run it over at severa! sudden and reiterated 
glances. 1 
The above passage brings to mind Merleau-Ponty who said that in order to fee! a table 
beneath your band, you have to move your band. Otherwise, the contact stops . Movement 
evokes the other. In his celebrated essay, Reading Montaigne, Merleau-Ponty (1964) 
attributes the Essays' impression of movement to Montaigne ' s scepticism. Montaigne was a 
major contributor to the rebirth of scepticism during the XVI1h century. The Renaissance 
sceptic would say that we can never be certain that something is true, nor can we be sure that 
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something is false. Buoyed by a "sceptic ease" 11 , "a [ . . . ] languid rocking to and fro"1i, 
Montaigne cheerfully sets out to explore that most human of questions : What do I know? He 
sifts his own words for possibilities: 
[Essaying] is a new pastime, outside the common order; it withdraws us from the usual 
occupations of people - yes, even from the most commendable ones. [ .. . ]No description 
is more difficult than the describing of oneself; and none, certainly, is more useful.1i i 
In the above passage, Montaigne plays with the contradiction that essaying is both a 
"pastime", something one does without effort for light amusement, and one of the most 
valuable and difficult endeavours than one can engage in. Contradictions are the wellspring 
ofMontaigne's sceptical rhythm. He throws out the idea on the page in front ofhim, to see it, 
to essay it, to weigh his judgement. He takes his question about the worth of his project and 
sets it out to sea in a precarious boat. The rocky waves bring it close and move it far, but 
doubt keeps it afloat and in motion. He writes to find out what he thinks and what doesn't 
think. There is no final resolution to the sceptical movement, only presence: 
In these extraordinary volumes of short and broken, long and learned, logical and 
contradictory statements, we have beard the very pulse and rhythm of the soul, beating 
day after day, year after year, through a veil which, as time goes on, fines itself almost to 
transparency. (Woolf, 2003) 
The Essays renounce the stillness of a cogito and any "mooring beyond ourselves" 
(Frampton, 2011 b, p. 270), and playfully embrace the self and world in motion . By being 
deeply attentive, listening, waiting and describing rather than pinning down experience and 
things, Montaigne draws cl oser to li fe, to presence, and makes room for the revelation of the 
other. 
11 Hail sceptic ease! When error 's waves are past, 
How sweet to reach thy tranquil port at last, 
And, gently rock 'd in undulating doubt, 
Smile at the sturdy winds, which war without! 
(Moore, 1823, as cited in Bakewell, 2010a, p. 126) 
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"You cannot point out a star to someone without putting your other band on his 
shoulder." 12 
The metaphor of the sidelong glanee evokes the image of accompaniment or walking 
side by side . Montaigne dedicated his essay, "On friendship" to the memory of his friend, the 
poet Etienne de La Boétie. His greatest friend knew the "best side" (Hansen, 2002, p. 134) of 
him, and now, through essaying, Montaigne keeps glancing to his side, keeping a 
conversation going with his long !ost friend. He certainly made many new friends, including 
Nietszche who effusively wrote: 
Montaigne. The jo y of living on this earth has truly been increased by the fact that such a 
persan wrote. At any rate, since my first encounter with this freest, most energetic of 
spirits, I have found it necessary to say of him what he said of Plutarch: "As soon as I 
cast a glanee at him, I sprouted another leg or a wing." I would take my example from 
him ifl were set the task ofmaking myselffeel at home on this earth. (Nietzsche, 1995, 
as cited in Hansen, 2002, p. 127) 
Together, alongside of each other, the patient and therapist can bravely face the world, 
just as Montaigne, alongside his reader, faced the precarious nature of truth with cheerful 
affection, confident in an ultimately benevolent human world. For us Modems, this is 
difficult because the natural universe is not a particularly hospitable place. Psychotherapy is 
always about giving up the dream of being sufficierit to yourself. Our starting point is Joss. 
Rather than seeking truth as an ultimate haven so that you don't lack anything, you let 
someone in on your thought. Y ou give up on y our own tru th in favour of presence. 
The etymology of the word cura underscores the distinctive attitudes toward therapy in 
the medical and humanist paradigms. If we go back to the foundations of the term cura, as in 
cura animarum, it meant "care of the souls" rather than "cure". Contemporary therapies 
follow a medical model of "cure", which entails symptom reduction and problem solving, 
decision-making, a "doing to". The original therapeutic attitude was one of accompaniment, a 
"walking with ', or a "companionship through the existential transitions of !ife" (Lee ming, 
12 (Yizhar, 1959, as cited in Grossman, 2010, p. 165) 
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Madden et Marian, 2009, p. 740). We walk beside our patient in solidarity as he presents his 
case to the wider world. Together, we contemplate the patient's experience and look for 
meaning by placing it in a broader hÙman context, in the wider space of conversation. 
The essay, like the humanist vision in contemporary psychology, is marginalized in our 
modem world. W e no longer have the time to meander with the essayist through an 
"investigation of the self in its manifold relations" (Butrym, 1989, p.4), never mind embark 
on a long-term psychotherapy. We have forgotten the great p!easure to be found in 
meandering with a friend along new paths, unhurried by pressure to get to an end point. As 
the wonderful Australian essayist, Robert Dessaix (20 1 0) notes, y ou have to be "adept at 
idleness" (p. 39) ifyou want to be able to describe and remark upon: 
We [ essayists] circle, look over our shoulder, pause to gre et passers-by, sniff the air and 
lurch a lot. For us the underlying air of incoherence that characterises our thought is 
something to be joyfully acknowledged - it's what makes us who we are. (p. 39) 
An expert does not meander beside you, shoulder to shoulder, but observes you from a 
superior fixed position of diagnostical knowledge and the01y. Since Freud, we have delegated 
the responsibility of understanding ourselves to experis. The lay persan may be able to 
understand sorne of their conscious experience, but the realm of the uncQnscious is best 
tackled by the expert analyst who has a privileged perspective and a finn theoretical grasp. 
Earl y on, Freud knew that he had to get out of the medical mode! to understand the persan in 
his office. His starting point of the talking cure was the fortuitousness of speaking in 
conversation. He began with practice, rather than theory or psychiatry. However, in arder to 
validate his new practice, Freud then did his best to build his own system or theory of forces , 
to exp lain rather than describe. Thus, he created a new type of expert: the analyst. 
Heaton (2010), a student of Wittgenstein, says that we tum to both philosophy and 
psychotherapy when we have !ost our way (p. viii). When we have !ost our way, we need 
c!arity and meaning rather than expert explanations: 
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Mystifications play no part such as the therapist claiming to have special knowledge to 
impart. When we are disorientated we do not need to leam truths, but we need to make 
sense. This involves seeing connections which we are blind to and learning to express 
ourselves in a meaningful way. (p. 213) 
The expert psychologist who applies theories and techniques to the patient is uncovering 
externat paths between the theory and the patient. This is fundamentally different from and 
incommensurable with the spontaneous making of connections within the patient's particular 
experience. "For what is specifie to the subject is precisely its ability to elude its own grasp, 
which is wh y reflection is called for rather th an theory" (p. 21 0). 
To tum to the humanities as a psychotherapist is to give up the comforts of expertise- be 
it in neuro-imaging, Stoic philosophy, literature, theology or history. In our current academie 
climate, this is quite destabilizing. We are embaiTassed by what we do because it appears so 
simple. We would rather show off our knowledge, uphold the fantasy that we have incredible 
mastery over theories. Yet, as Montaigne discovered, when we are in a wondering and 
agreeable state, like a child, we are open to a different kind of access to the world. "Wonder 
is the foundation of all philosophy, inquiry its progress, ignorance its end."1;;; When we are at 
ease with incompetence, when we consent that we cannot master our subject matter, then we 
are open to understanding. 
1 love terms which soften and tone down the rashness of what we put forward, terms 
such as 'perhaps,' 'somewhat,' 'sorne,' ' they say,' 'I think,' and so on. And ifl had bad 
sons to bring up I would have trained their lips to answer with inquiring and undecided 
expressions such as, 'What does this mean!' ' I do not understand that,' 'lt might be so,' 
'Is that true?' so that they would have been more likely to retain the manners of an 
apprentice at sixty than, as boys do, to act like leamed doctors at ten.1iv 
This is not to say that therapists should not be well-educated, or have advanced degrees. 
But we should have the ability to reflect upon our own knowledge and the place of that 
knowledge, and have the humility to restrain ourselves, like Montaigne, to abstain from 
holding fast to this knowledge. 
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It is because therapy is oblique that we are obliged to enter into it, rather than use it to 
solve problems or be seized by it [ ... ] At no point must it be the realisation of pre-
existing knowledge, even though knowledge has been painfully acquired by therapist. 
This restrained intensity on the part of the therapist allows the disclosure of thought. 
(Heaton, 2010, p. 60) 
Like essaying, therapeutic reflection requires a Jess ambitious attitude than theory; we 
seek a relation between the self and the other that is not purely intellectual. We can fall into 
the trap of thinking that our intellectual expertise can cure, of taking ourselves very seriously, 
whether in the dominant scientific vision, or in other intellectual approaches. Walking 
shoulder to shoulder with our patient is a position underpinned by the fundamental notion of 
hospitality, not aspiration and progress. 
Return now to the portrait of Montaigne on p. 114. Perhaps he seems detached or 
haughty to you. This look is authoritarian; its language is in the imperative. He covertly sizes 
you up from a distance, or intrusively peers at you from close up. He certainly doesn ' t trust 
you, as you no doubt have something to hide. Both objective distances are conducive to 
gathering information, but not to dialogue. This look is just as seductive, in its own way, as 
the playful Montaignian sidelong glanee. In our modern era, as it was during the scholastic 
Renaissance, authority is tempting. We are living more and more in a world that we don 't 
understand, or don't trust that we can understand - it is almost as though we are driven out of 
the world and into the natural scientific universe. Marilynne Robinson (2010) observes that 
"(t)he self is no longer assumed to be a thing to be approached with optimism, or to be trusted 
to see anything truly" (p. xviii). No Jess so in the therapeutic relationship. The seduction of a 
patient who pushes you to be an expert is difficult to resist. Access to secret knowledge is 
power and power promises a much simpler world. Power is what is at stake in the fierce 
renunciation of a human vision of psychology. For many contemporary therapists, engaging 
with a vision wider than that of the natural sciences carries risks, su ch as 
"[ ... ] failing the test, not getting the degree, position or job, intemship or residency, 
postdoctoral position, promotion, bursary, stipend, grant, referral, honor or award; losing 
your license, approval, accreditation; not having your article, book, proposai accepted; 
being accused ofunethical or unprofessional conduct [ ... ]" (Mahrer, 2005, p. 233) 
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"Essays in Flesh and Bone" 
As Robinson points out, m the natural scientific v1ew, "the physical world that is 
manifest to us describes reality exhaustively" (Fay, 2008). Academie psychologists believe 
that science gives us a special perspective of "the world as it really is, if we climb on the 
shoulders of those we believe know more than we do" (Heaton, 2010, p. 210). Montaigne 
brings us right back down to Earth with a resounding thump: "And on the loftiest tluone in 
the world we are still sitting only on our own rump." 1v According to the Essays, it is the body 
that grounds us. This is the best vantage point from which to think about the human condition, 
to live more intensely, and to enter into conversation. Essaying, like therapy, is an embodied 
practice, it is not in the realm of the theoretical: "Y et there is no use our mo un ting on stilts, 
for on stilts we must still walk on our own legs."1vi 
The Essays chart Montaigne's reorientation of value from abstract truths to concrete 
bodily experience. Put simply, Montaigne values the body as our best source of 
understanding because we are cl oser to our bodies than to anything el se (Frampton, 2011 b, p. 
255): 
Now it is likely that if the sou! knew anything, it would first of ali know itself; and if it 
knew anything outside of itself, th at would be its body and shell bef ore anything el se [ ... ] 
We are nearer to ourselves than the whiteness of snow or the weight of stone are tous. If 
man does not know himself, how does he know his functions and powers?1vii 
Corporeality infuses the Essays. Montaigne explores such topics as death, illness, food, 
sex, war, suicide and nature. Not only do many of the themes have to do with the body, but 
the Essays themselves are remarkably physical body of work. Montaigne's speech is rooted 
in the body. Emerson (1996) says of the Essays' visceral style: "Cut these words, and they 
would bleed; they are vascular and alive" (p. 95). 
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The physicality of the Essays makes the portrait radically intimate. With a candour that 
was soon !ost to the Cartesian prudery 13 of the New Philosophy, Montaigne reveals ali sorts 
of details about sexual habits , his dining preferences, his kidney stones, and his toiletry 
routines. "In this way the Essais became the most persona! book that had appeared to date in 
world literature, despite ali its precursors in the various categories of autobiography, 
confessions, memoirs, and letters" (Friedrich, 1991, p. 208) . Montaigne makes fun of tho se 
who want to den y bodil y experience, who "want to get out of them selves and escape from the 
man"
1
viii: "Both kings and philosophers defecate, and ladies too."lix Unlike the typical painted 
portrait, Montaigne's portrait candidly reveals the entire body, not just the face. 
I expose myself entire: my portrait is a cadaver on which the veins, the muscles , and the 
tendons appear at a glanee, each part in its place. One part of wh at I am was produced by 
a cough, another by a pallor or a palpitation of the heart - in any case dubiously. It is not 
my deeds that I write down; it is myself, it is my essence.1' 
The body becomes a limiting point, or a vantage point in the diversity of ideas and 
values that Montaigne explores . His sidelong glanees come from an inhabited body. He is 
physically implicated in this first-person view. This is not the scientific "disembodied, 
spectatorial Cartesian cogito" (Jay, 2006, p. 35), an objective "view from nowhere" (Nagel, 
1986 as cited in Jay, p. 35), which has become the human view in our modern world. 
Montaigne radically privileged the "particular, nongeneralizable body" (Freidrich, 1991 , p. 
xxiv). His revolutionary appreciation of the embodied self or lived body led Merleau-Ponty 
to view Montaigne as a proponent of phenomenology "avant la lettre" (Marchi, 1994, p. 88) . 
The embodied sidelong glanee brings to mind the premodem notion of the eye. Before 
the biological or mechanistic mode! of Melanchthon and Vives, the eye emitted a sort of light, 
or "cast glanees", rather than simply passively receiving light as per our modern 
understanding (Jager, 1991 , pp . 66-67). The eye ' s activity was as corporeal as a social 
13 Recall Descartes ' famous announcement that he enters the philosophical arena with his 
face hidden: "I come forward, masked" (lm-valus prodeo ). 
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gesture. The eye reached out and could be seen within the same conversational realm as a 
shake of the band: 
A glanee, like a band raised in greeting, can signal the opening of a social space within 
which it becomes possible to exchange greetings, to bring each other news, or to ask and 
answer questions. (p. 67) 
The modern conception of vision which arose concurrently with scientific empiricism, 
put vision as a passive observation within a material universe as opposed to an embodied 
activity that took place within an inhabited space shaped by conversation. Clearly, the 
ordered reality of the material universe is better passively observed by highly sensitive 
instruments, rather than by the hurnan eye. This mute reality can be probed, but not 
conversed with. Jager (1991) says that the anatomical human eye can be studied by 
experimental science, but not the human glanee, which is in this sense unseen and unheard : 
"In a world where the sun no longer rose or feil [asper the Ptolemic vision of the heavens], 
there was also no longer a place for an eye that could light a path or cast a glanee" (pp. 66-
67). 
Thus, can we prove that a certain expression is genuine? It often bas to be felt. Subtleties 
of glanee, gesture, tone of voice and familiarity with the pers on ali play a part. It may be 
very difficult to put into words the difference between, for example, a genuine loving 
look and a pretend one. (Heaton, 2010, p. 73) 'Ask yourself: How does a man learn to 
get an "eye" for something?' (Wittgenstein, 2009, as cited in Heaton, 2010, p. 73) 
Philosopher and therapist Donna Orange (2009, November 10) says that it is the body 
that creates perspective. We can't escape the place where we are situated and we can't escape 
our limited embodied perspective without engaging with the other. The inhabited body, 
moves beyond the Cartesian dichotomy between the thinking subject and the object of 
thought. Montaigne's reflections on the inseparability of the mind and body constitute a 
significant thread that runs through the Essays: 
We are not bringing up a sou!; we are not bringing up a body: we are bringing up a man. 
We must not split him in two. We must not bring up one without the other1xi 
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The scientific view is also embodied, but thinly; science is a work of disembodiment, a 
casting off and then forgetting that we are disembodied. The tragedy of our modern world is 
that we believe that the only way to truth is by making ourselves absent. We become 
scientific no-bodies, consisting only of fragments. Embodiment bas to do with 
particularization and presence. In the humanities, as in psychotherapy, you have to present 
yourself. This is difficult; it requires work, as poet Ariana Reines (2008, April 30) puts it, to 
"heave yourselfup" ( 1:01:23) and say specifically who you are. 
Montaigne brings together disparate worlds, those of the reader and writer, the ancients 
and the modern. That is to say that he embodies them. The Essays , "limb of my life"1xii ' allow 
him to come out of the woodwork of the intellectual world, tell stories, set the table, and set 
the page abuzz. Instead of just presenting an idea, he makes it part of his existence. Ever the 
host, he creates order, bringing harmony to multiple worlds, "without violating their 
distinction" (Jager, 1997, p. 212). 
"Let my eyes also taste, according to their capacity."1xiii 
The French word "essay" can also mean "to taste" . Montaigne, the winemaker from 
Bordeaux, tastes life's delicious eloquence. He delights in the Roman poet Lucan 's epitaph, 
"The speech that strikes the mind will have the most taste"1xiv. His book is a savouring of life, 
a "bodily joy" (O'Neill, 1982, p. 93) rather than an explanation or a detachment from it as per 
the Stoical and later Cartesian traditions: 
Everyone looks in front of him; as for me, I look inside of me; I have no business but 
with myself; I continually observe myself, I take stock of myself, I taste myself. [ ... ] I 
roll about in myself.1xv 
Tastes, like glanees, acknowledge the transience and proximity of embodied experience. 
In "On conversation", Montaigne first wrote that through conversation "we seek the truth", 
but la ter crossed this out and replaced it with "we seek what is" (Frampton, 2011, p. 258) . 
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Essaying and therapy relinquish the quest for certainty and strive to deepen our engagement 
with "what is" . We cultivate our experience, like wine: 
I try to increase it in weight; I try to arrest the speed of its flight by the speed with which 
I grasp it, and to compensate for the haste of its ebb by my vigor in using it. The shorter 
my possession of life, the deeper and fuller I must make it.1xvi 
Tasting is a form of intimate access, a way of paying attention to what is close to us. 
Coming closer to that which is makes experience "deeper and fuller" , which leads to an 
opening of possibilities, rather than simplification. In a way, despite the risks we may run, 
tas ting is a loving act th at is possible in the context of trust. 
Therapy is teaching the client to become "more "faithful to her experience", to be open 
to sud den upsurges of the spirit (Todres, 1991, p. 1 02). Coming close to th at which is, within 
"a larger rhythm of distance and closeness to our lived situation" (p. 100), indirectly and 
spontaneously lights the spark of insight. If the therapist tries to encourage a particular insight, 
he "might obscure the experiential process that could empower the insight in a personally 
relevant way" (p. 101 ). If the client doesn't "experience" or taste an insight, even if it is true, 
then she won't have confidence in it. The therapist, like her trusted cupbearer 14 , also tastes 
the patient's experience. In this way, therapy extends the patient's palate, making life 's 
flaveurs more vivid and distinctive. 
Tasting !ife means staying m motion, not staying with a particular interpretation. 
Gadamer reminds us that to understand is to understand differently each time (Gadamer, 
Weinsheimer et Marshall, 2004, p. 296). This happens when therapist and patient adopt a 
position of not knowing. Renouncing our grasp on things or selves means being present to the 
motion and gestures of our conversation, to the !ife of our subject matter. It means moving 
towards increased complexity over particular insights or solutions because these are always 
14 A cupbearer in Montaigne's era held a highly privileged posttlon as the King's 
intimate confident. He would serve drinks to the King and often taste the wine before serving 
it. His tasks of creating hospitable and secure conditions are interestingly analogous to those 
of a therapist. 
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context-dependent and variable. "[W]hat is involved here is not correction but continuous 
reaffirmation of the accumulation of living, thinking and feeling" (O'Neill, 1982, p. 83). 
Philosophy Brought Down to Earth 
By drawing closer to his unruly expenence rather than uncovenng hidden facts, 
validating his method, or making sorne "permanent contribution to knowledge" (O'Neill, 
1982, p. 82), Montaigne is able to continually let his self unfold through conversation. 
I speak my mind freely on ali things, even on those which perhaps exceed my capacity 
and which I by no means hold to be within my jurisdiction. And so the opinion I give of 
them is to declare the measure of my sight, not the measure of things .lxvii 
The nature of reality or experience that we explore in essaying and psychotherapy is 
lively, embodied, and continually rebom in the light of the other. Together, reader and writer, 
or therapist and patient, taste experience from many angles, gradually !etting go of abstract 
theories and the false security of private subjectivity as we go. We do this by trying to tell it 
like it is, with words that seek a willing ear. Through word of mouth, plain speech brings us 
to the body, to salads and radishes, and to the motion of daily life. In moments of resonance, 
when we are revealed to ourselves and to our interlocutor, we gain a bit of vitality. Irvin D. 
Yalom (2008) says that he enjoys watching his patients "open up to !ife" (p. 290). Frampton 
(2011b) refers to this experience in his book's subtitle: "Montaigne and Being in Touch with 
Life". Through essaying the self, Montaigne discovered that the most fertile starting points of 
conversation are not abstract, but close to the bone: a persona! observation, an opinion, a 
poem, the Essays themselves. 
Therapists have techniques for symptom reduction, and in certain contexts use medical 
knowledge. But theory and technique are not our frame. Our frame is the sidelong glanee, as 
described by Montaigne. Ours is an essayistic view, at once a wider and more persona! frame 
of reference, which acknowledges other view-points, including the medical view. This frame 
roots our looking, our theories and our techniques within a first-person perspective while 
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reminding us that that our shared human condition is incarnate. The sidelong glanee humbly 
invites us to engage at the limits of our frame. Limits at which you can pause, look back, see 
the other person, and see what else is going on. In the scientific frame of mind, we try to be 
an onlooker, rather than a glancer, because the entire natural universe lies before us. What we 
can't see only indicates ignorance that can ultimately be corrected. 
The Essays show us that there are multiple starting points to think about psychotherapy 
other than the natural universe: works of art, myth, philosophy, religion, and our own 
observations in everyday !ife - in essence, the humanities. Each is a hospitable site where we 
can meet each other. Each inspires a continually renewed conversation. The essential human 
question is how to be together, given that we are separate, given that we have different 
worlds - man ~md god, parent and child, man and woman, man and animal, living and dead . 
Psychotherapy is about the same question: how can I live with my neighbour, with my 
mother, etc.? How can we transform this separation into a source of inspiration? 1t opens 
possibilities of living together rather than solving problems in a single universe. We learn 
about the se questions by opening ourse1ves to other things and people. Essentially, 
psychotherapy is an invitation to enter into .the humanities, to discover this grand resource 
that helps us to live in more than one world (lager, persona! communication, September, 
2010). 
I think that most experienced therapists would agree that they view their practice within 
a wider horizon than that defined by any systematic method. But it is very difficult to express 
the values, ideas and understandings that arise in our work when we lack any liberal arts 
education. Robinson (2010) says that we have "a conception of humanity that itself is very 
limited, excluding as it must virtually all observation and speculation on this subject that have 
been offered through the ages by those outside the closed circle that is called modern thought" 
(p. x) . We exclude classical and humanist traditions as well as religious. Thus as she puts it, 
our modem conversation is truncated, often to the point of banality. We have created a 
schism that has "alienated science and humane learning" (p. xvi). Montaigne puts these 
traditions back into conversation through the essayistic frame. 
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If there is overlap in the two approaches : the natural sciences and humane learning - for 
example, when science is interested in themes like embodiment or conversation - the 
difference is the value or priority assigned to the theme, the starting point and shape of the 
investigation, the attitude, the types of truth sought, the goals (synthesis or juxtaposition of 
worlds), the consideration of ontological questions and epistemological questions, the 
language, and the level of tolerance of uncertainty. In the humanist vision, the essential value 
of essaying and psychotherapy is that we are together. In the scientific perspective, we 
describe lawful relationships in order to control and predict behaviour. 
My work is part of a larger endeavour in psychotherapy to restore the humanities as a 
complementary source of understanding alongside the natural sciences. The wonderful 
fertility of our particular field arises from the fact that we espouse both the scientific and 
humanist perspectives. Unfortunately, in academie psychology we have a serious imbalance -
the scientific reality completely obscures any other way of seeing the world . We have 
become !ost in an explosion of psychological theories as we unsatisfactorily attempt to 
explore human reality only one set of tools . The Essays help us to redress this imbalance: 
Montaigne's aversion to abstraction, [ ... ] lets the eye that is blinded by the universe 
recover by viewing what is individual and close at hand, his feeling for the uniqueness of 
an event[ .. . ] his comfortable dwelling in milieu and everyday situations [ ... ] (Friedrich, 
1991, p. 369) 
This imbalance is nothing new. Throughout Western history, we have witnessed an 
oscillation between the two human paradigms. In Antiquity, for example, Plato sought the 
truth in the ideal world, over the common world, and during Montaigne's time, scholasticism, 
also Platonic, reigned. The scholastics wanted to know everything in its eternal configuration; 
they revered categories and external definitions. Montaigne 's Essays, with his novel 
idiosyncratic twist, briefly swung the pendulum back the other way, towards the valuation of 
ordinary lived experience; that highly particular and embodied type of experience. Montaigne 
considered himself an "accidentai philosopher", because he was not a philosopher in the 
sense of espousing grand theories on human nature. The Essays and, I would say, 
psychotherapy, are philosophy brought down to earth: 
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Lay a bearn between these two towers of such width as we need to walk on: there is no 
philosophical wisdom of such great firmness that it can give us courage to walk on it as 
we should if it were on the ground.1xvii i 
Academie psychology is scholastic in its quest for classification and models. It strikes 
me that we are living in a para lie! moment to the end of the Renaissance. We are beginning to 
see the pendulum swing back to a humanist vision in psychotherapy and in other disciplines 
such as philosophy, history, economies, and political thought. Inspired by the Essays, Saul 
Frampton (2011b), says: 
The task of philosophy [and I would say therapy], therefore, is not to dig down to firmer, 
more resolute foundations, or to rise up into the beyond, but to show us where we 
already stand not to shake off the body, but to shake its hand. (p. 255) 
Montaigne spurs us to use conversation as a mode of inquiry, not just as lip service to the 
talking cure. 
To see keeping a conversation going as a sufficient aim ofphilosophy, [and I would say 
therapy ], to see wisdom as consisting in the ability to sustain a conversation, is to see 
human beings as generators of new descriptions rather than beings one hopes to be able 
to describe accurately. (Rorty, 2009, p. 378) 
What is important is that the pendulum keeps swinging, that therapists are able to move 
between the two distinct realms, to cultivate each without conflating them. It seems 
particularly relevant to reflect on what happens in psychotherapy through the lens of someone 
who lived so weil with one foot in the scholastic and one foot in the humanist worlds. 15 
The Essays encourage psychologists to overcome the pathology of staring, oblivious to 
what is going on around us in other disciplines. (We can view pathology as an inability to 
escape our monolithic view of experience.) In school we are taught to focus on the teacher, 
the blackboard, and on a single tapie at a time with the goal of grades, bursaries, acceptance 
15 For a detailed exploration of this pivota! historical moment, see my paper "Should We 
Be Writing Essays Instead of Articles? A Psychotherapist' s Reflection on Montaigne's 
Marvelous Invention" (Starr, 2012) . 
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to university, etc. It is frowned upon to talk to the person beside you, orto look indolently out 
the window. This brings to mind Francis Bacon's rejection of ordinary embodied experience 
in favour of "experience ordered and arranged, not irregular and erratic" (Bacon, 1994, as 
cited in Jay, 2006, p. 31). He called this new type of experience, experientia literata: 
"experiences that have been taught how to read and write" (Jay, p. 31) like obedient students 
sitting quietly in neat rows of desks. The desks would have the same configuration with or 
without the students. Science seeks an order that already exists, and that will ultimately be 
unveiled. But Montaigne discovered that order of the human mind is an interpersonal order 
that is achieved, brought about through conversation. Without others, everything remains 
chaotic. 
I am surprised at how overlooked the Essays are in humanistic psychology. Montaigne is 
a wonderful friend for therapists isolated in our lonely profession. He is a mentor with whom 
we can face questions with no answers. Just "as the se essays rea ch not the ir end, but the ir 
suspension in full career" (Woolf, 2003), you don't finish the Essays, they become a lifelong 
companion. It feels good to be united with old texts, to preserve vital aspects of our humanity. 
We are in a delirium of novelty, but it is important to find our place in the story, just as we 
ask our patients to do. Engaging with our history through essaying or conversation is not the 
same as espousing a progressive view ofpsychology. 
If we understand the goal of psychotherapy as entering the humanities, of learning to 
avait ourselves of the understanding and resources offered by the humanities, th en the Essays 
offer a uniquely fertile entry point for therapists stuck in the scientific frame. Montaigne is a 
warrn and generous teacher who makes us, his pupils, fee! at home in new worlds. 
Engagement with the Essays helps to raise questions about how we can better position 
our discipline of psychotherapy within a human perspective. We are reminded of a different 
vision of the world on which the humanities are based, and are intrigued by the possibility 
that we may be needlessly restraining ourselves within the scientific worldview. The aim of 
this essay is not to denigrate the scientific paradigm which bas given us so much, but to put it 
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in perspective, to take stock of its limits and glanee outside of this vision to see what else is 
the re. 
This great world of ours (which for sorne is only one species within a generic group) is 
the looking-glass in which we must gaze to come to know ourselves from the right slant. 
To sum up then, I want it to be the book which our pupil studies. Such a variety of 
humours, schools of thought, opinions, laws, and customs teach us to j udge sanely of our 
own and teach our judgment to acknowledge its shortcomings and natural weakness. 
And that is no light apprenticeship .1xix 
This essay is about drawing close in therapy, about how to rn ove between worlds, not 
about finding an answer to a problem. Montaigne takes us by the hand as we follow "the 
crooked path" (Kauffmann, 1989, p. 224) of ordinary experience, casting sidelong glanees at 
our metier of psychotherapy. What might we catch a glimpse of when we avoid the full-on 
glare of scientific observation? What understanding might we stumble upon when we follow 
our bolting mind1xx rather than guiding it? 
"How many things did Montaigne discover that we have painfully rediscovered in our 
own times!" (Romans, 1984, p. 9) 
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Notes 
i (F, 1: 8, 25) 
Dernierement que je me retiray chez moy, deliberé autant que j e pounoy, ne me 
mesler d'autre chose que de passer en repos et à part ce peu qui me reste de vie, il me 
semblait ne pouvoir faire plus grande faveur à mon esprit, que de le laisser en pleine 
oysiveté, s'entretenir soy mesmes, et s'arrester et rasseoir en soy : ce que j'esperais 
qu'il peut meshuy faire plus aisément, devenu avec le temps plus poisant, et plus 
meur. Mais je trouve, [ ... ] que au rebours, faisant le cheval eschappé, il se donne cent 
fois plus d'affaire à soy mesmes, qu'il n'en prenoit pour autruy; et m'enfante tant de 
chimeres et monstres fantasques les uns sur les autres, sans ordre, et sans propos, que 
pour en contempler à mon aise l'ineptie et l'estrangeté, j'ay commancé de les mettre 
en rolle, esperant avec le temps luy en faire honte à luy mesmes. (T-R, 1:8, 34) 
ii (F, III:3, 758) 
« la foule des affaires » (T-R, Ill:3 , 801) 
iii (S, III: 2, 907) 
« Les autres forment l'homme; je le recite et en represente un particulier [ .. . ] » 
(T-R, III:2, 782) 
iv (F, III:9, 925) 
« tumultuairement » (T-R, III:9, 973) 
v (F, III:13 , 1004) 
«sans regle» (T-R, III:13, 1054) 
vi (F, III:2, 740) 
« Si mon ame pouvoit prendre pied, je ne m'essaierais pas, je me resoudrais ; elle est 
tousjours en apprentissage et en espreuve. » (T-R, III:2, 782) 
vii (F, II:6, 331) 
«un amusement nouveau et extraordinaire» (T-R, Il:6, 358) 
viii (F, III:13, 1007) 
« cette fricassée que je barbouille icy » (T -R, III: 13, 1 056) 
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ix (F , preface, p.2) 
Si c'eust esté pour rechercher la faveur du monde, je me fusse mieux paré et me 
presenterais en une marche estudiée. Je veus qu'on m'y voie en ma façon simple, 
naturelle et ordinaire, sans contantion et artifice : car c'est moy que je peins. Mes 
defauts s'y liront au vif, et ma forme naïfve, autant que la reverence publique me l'a 
permis. Que si j'eusse esté entre ces nations qu'on dict vivre encore sous la douce 
liberté des premieres loix de nature, je t'asseure que je m'y fusse tres-volontiers peint 
tout entier, et tout nud. » (T-R, Au lecteur, 9) 
x (F, III:13, 1000-1001) 
Je m'estudie plus qu'autre subject. C'est ma metaphisique, c'est ma phisique. [ ... ] De 
l'experience que j'ay de moy, je trouve assez dequoy me faire sage, si j'estoy bon 
escholier. (T-R, III:13, 1050-1051) 
xi (F, II:12, 454) 
« de regenter, d'ordonner, d'establir la vérité » (T -R, II: 12, 485-486) 
xii(F, I:24, 112) 
« un suffisant lecteur » (T -R, 1:24, 126) 
xiii (F, III: 9, 925) 
Cette farcisseure est un peu hors de mon theme. Je m'esgare, mais plustost par licence 
que par mesgarde. Mes fantasies se suyvent, mais par fois c'est de loing, et se 
regardent, mais d'une veuë oblique. [ ... ] J'ayme l'alleure poetique, à sauts et à 
gambades. [ .. . ] C'est l'indiligent lecteur qui pert mon subject, non pas moy; [ ... ] Mon 
stile et mon esprit vont vagabondant de mesmes. (T-R, III:9, 973) 
xiv (F, Ill:9 , 926) 
J'entends que la matiere se distingue soy-mesmes. Elle montre assez où elle se 
change, où elle conclud, où elle commence, où elle se reprend, sans l'entrelasser de 
parolles de cousture introduictes pour le service des oreilles foibles ou nonchallantes 
[ ... ] (T-R, III:9, 974) 
xv (F, III:9, 917) 
Nul plaisir n'a goust pour moy sans communication. Il ne me vient pas seulement une 
gaillarde pensée en l'ame qu'il ne me fache de l'avoir produite seul, et n'ayant à qui 
l'offrir. (T-R, III:9, 965) 
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xvi (F, III:l, 726) 
«Je parle au papier comme je parle au premier que je rencontre.» (T-R, III:l, 767) 
xvii (F, III:3 , 7 58) 
« Il y a des naturels particuliers, retirez et internes. Ma forme essentielle est propre à 
la communication et à la production; je suis tout au dehors et en evidence, nay à la 
societé et à l'amitié. » (T-R, III:3, 801) 
xviii (F, III:2, 740) 
«Il va trouble et chancelant, d'une yvresse naturelle.» (T-R, III:2, 782) 
xix (C, !:25) 
Il se tire une merveilleuse clarté, pour le jugement humain, de la frequentation du 
monde. Nous sommes tous contraints et amonceliez en nous, et avons la veuë 
racourcie à la longueur de nostre nez. (T-R, !:26, 156) 
xx (F, III: 11, 958) 
« Car, poisantes et dignes d'un si grand nom, on pert les vrayes; elles eschapent de 
nostre veuë par leur petitesse.» (T-R, III:11, 1006) 
xx i (F, III:9, 925) 
« C'est l'indiligent lecteur qui pert mon subject, non pas moy; il s'en trouvera 
tousjours en un coing quelque mot qui ne laisse pas d'estre bastant, quoy qu'il soit 
serré.» (T-R, III:9, 973) 
xx ii (S, III:2, 908) 
C'est un contrerolle de divers et muables accidens et d'imaginations irresoluës et, 
quand il y eschet, contraires; soit que je sois autre moymesme, soit que je saisisse les 
subjects par autres circonstances et considerations. Tant y a que je me contredits bien 
à l'adventure, mais la vérité, comme disoit Demades, je ne la contredy point. 
(T-R, III :2, 782) 
xxi ii (F, 1:50, 266) 
« Car je ne voy le tout de rien. Ne font pas, ceux qui promettent de nous le faire 
veoir. » (T-R, 1:50, 289) 
xxiv (F, III:9, 913) 
«Il escoule tous les jours de nos mains et depuis que je vis s'est alteré de moitié. » 
(T-R, III:9, 961) 
xxv (F, II:6, 332) 
«en ce corps aërée de la voix» (T-R, II:6, 359) 
xxvi (F, 1!:8, 338) 
«le seul livre au monde de son espece » (T-R, II:8, 364) 
xxvii (F, 1:26, !54) 
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Le parler que j'ayme, c'est un parler simple et naïf, tel sur le papier qu'à la bouche; un 
parler succulent et nerveux, court et serré, non tant delicat et peigné comme 
vehement et brusque (T-R, !:26, 171) 
xxviii (S, 1:26, 168) 
«bien faict »et« bien pleine» (T-R, 1:25, 149) 
xxix (F, III:8, 859) 
«Voit-on plus de barbouillage au caquet des harengeres qu'aux disputes publiques 
des hommes de cette profession? J'aymeroy mieux que mon fils apprint aux tavernes 
à parler, qu'aux escholes de la parlerie. » (T-R, III:8, 905) 
xxx (F, III:!, 732) 
«Je suy le langage commun» (T-R, III:1,774) 
xxx i (F, 1:51 , 271) 
Je ne sçay s'il en advient aux autres comme à moy; mais je ne me puis garder, quand 
j'oy nos architectes s'enfler de ces gros mots de pilastres, architraves, corniches, 
d'ouvrage Corinthien et Dorique, et semblables de leur jargon, que mon imagination 
ne se saisisse, incontinent du palais d'Apolidon; et, par effect, je trouve que ce sont 
les chetives pieces de la porte de ma cuisine. (T-R, 1:51 , 294) 
xxxii (passage from III:2 as translated by and cited in Frampton, 2011 b, p. 268) 
« converser avec les siens et avec soymesme doucement et justement, [ .. . ] c'est chose 
plus rare, plus difficile et moins remerquable. » (T-R, III:2, 787) 
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xxxiii (F, III:5, 808) 
Quand j'escris, je me passe bien de la compaignie et souvenance des livres, de peur 
qu'ils n'interrompent ma forme. Aussi que, à la verité, les bons autheurs m'abattent 
par trop et rompent le courage . (T-R, III:S, 852) 
xxxiv (F, III:5 , 777) 
«des essays en cher et en os» (T-R, III:5, 821) 
xxxv (F, II:37, 696) 
«Ce fagotage de tant de diverses pieces » (T-R, II :37, 736) 
xxxvi (F, 1:26, 131) 
Il m'advint l'autre jour de tomber sur un tel passage. J'avais trainé languissant après 
des parolles Françaises, si exangues, si descharnées et si vuides de matiere et de sens, 
que ce n'estaient voirement que paroles Françaises; au bout d'un long et ennuyeux 
chemin, je vins à rencontrer une piece haute, riche et eslevée jusques aux nuës. [ ... ] 
des six premieres paroles, je conneuz que je m'envolais en l'autre monde. 
(T-R, 1:26, 145-146) 
xxxvii (F, 1:24, 112) 
Un suffisant lecteur descouvre sauvant és escrits d'autruy des perfections autres que 
celles que l'autheur y a mises et apperceües, et y preste des sens et des visages plus 
riches. (T-R, 1:24, 126) 
xxxviii (F, 1:40: 224) 
Ny elles [ces histoires], ny mes allegations ne servent pas toujours simplement 
d'exemple, d'authorité ou d'ornement. Je ne les regarde pas seulement par l'usage que 
j'en tire. Elles portent souvent, hors de mon propos, la semence d'une matiere plus 
riche et plus hardie, et sonnent à gauche un ton plus delicat, et pour moy qui n'en 
veux exprimer d'avantage, et pour ceux qui rencontreront mon air. (T-R, 1:40, 245) 
xxx ix (F, Il:12, 497) 
« Nouvelle figure : un philosophe impremedité et fortuite! » (T-R, II:12, 528) 
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xl (F, III:5, 811) 
« Mais mon ame me desplait de ce qu'elle produict ordinairement ses plus profondes 
resveries, plus folles et qui me plaisent le mieux, à l'improuveu et lors que je les 
cerche moins » (T-R, III:5, 854) 
xli (1:50, 266) 
«Tout mouvement nous descouvre. » (T -R, 1:50, 290) 
xlii (F, Il: 12, 553) 
Et nous, et nostre jugement, et toutes choses m011elles, vont coulant et roulant sans 
cesse. Ainsin il ne se peut establir rien de certain de l'un à l'autre, et le jugeant et le 
jugé estans en continuelle mutation et branle. (T-R, II:12, 586) 
xliii (F, III:12, 989) 
« commendant qu'ils entrassent. » (T-R, III: l2, 1038) 
xliv (F, Il:12, 516-517) 
J'ay le pied si instable et si mal assis, je le trouve si aysé à croler et si prest au branle, 
et ma veuë si desreglée, que à jun je me sens autre qu'après le repas; si ma santé me 
rid et la clarté d'un beau jour, me voy là honneste homme; si j'ay un cor qui me presse 
l'orteil, me voy là renfroigné, mal plaisant et inaccessible. (T-R, II: 12, 548-549) 
xlv (F, III:2, 740) 
«Je ne peints pas l'estre. Je peints le passage» (T-R, III:2, 782) 
xlvi (F, III:9, 919) 
« La vie est un mouvement materiel et corporel, action imparfaicte de sa propre 
essence, et desreglée; je m'emploie à la servir selon elle. » (T -R, III:9 , 967) 
xlvii (S III:2, 907) 
« Or les traits de ma peinture ne forvoyent point, quoy qu'ils se changent et 
diversifient. » (T-R, III:2, 782) 
xlviii (S , III:2, 907) 
«Toutes choses y branlent sans cesse [ ... ] et du branle public et du leur. » 
(T-R, III:2, 782) 
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xlix (F, III:13, 1031) 
Je ne suis excessivement desireux ny de salades ny de fruits, sauf les melons. Mon 
pere haïssoit toute sorte de sauces; je les aime toutes. Le trop manger m'empeche; 
mais, par sa qualité, je n'a y encore cognoissance bien certaine qu'aucune viande me 
nuise; comme aussi je ne remarque ny lune plaine ny basse, ny l'automne du 
printemps. Il y a des mouvemens en nous, inconstans et incogneus; car des refors, 
pour exemple, je les a y trouvez premierement commodes, depuis facheux, present de 
rechef commodes. En plusieurs choses je sens mon estomac et mon appetit aller ainsi 
diversifiant: j'ay rechangé du blanc au clairet, et puis du clairet au blanc. 
(T-R, III:l3, 1082) 
1 (C, 11:10) 
Ma veuë s'y confond et s'y dissipe. Il faut que je le retire et que je l'y remette à 
secousses : tout ainsi que, pour juger du lustre de l'escarlatte, on nous ordonne de 
passer les yeux pardessus, en la parcourant à diverses veuës, soudaines, reprinses , et 
reiterées. (T-R, 11:10, 389) 
li (S, III:2, 907 -8) 
«un branle plus languissant» (T-R, III:2, 782) 
Iii (S, 11:6, 424) 
Et est un amusement nouveau et extraordinaire, qui nous retire des occupations 
communes du monde, ouy, et des plus recommandées. [ ... ]Il n'est description pareille 
en difficulté à la description de soy-mesmes, ny certes en utilité. (T-R, 11:6, 358) 
Iiii (F, 111:11, 959) 
« L'admiration est fondement de toute philosophie, l'inquisition le progrez, 
l'ignorance le bout. » (T -R, III: 11, 1 008) 
Iiv (S,III:l1, 1165) 
J'ayme ces mots, qui amollissent et moderent la temerité de nos propositions : A 
l'avanture, Aucunement, Quelque, On di ct, Je pense, et semblables. Et si j'eusse eu à 
dresser des enfans, je leur eusse tant mis en la bouche cette façon de respondre, 
enquesteuse, non resolutive : « Qu'est-ce à dire? Je ne l'entends pas. Il pourroit estre. 
Est-il vray? » qu'ils eussent plustost gardé la forme d'apprentis à soixante ans que de 
representer les docteurs à dix ans, comme ils font. (T-R, 111:11, 1 007) 
lv (F, III:13, 1044) 
« Et au plus eslevé throne du monde, si ne sommes assis que sus nostre cul. » 
(T-R, III:13, 1096) 
lvi (F, lll:l3 , 1044) 
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« Si, avons nous beau monter sur des eschasses, car sur des eschasses encores faut-il 
marcher de nos jambes. » (T-R, III: 13 , 1096) 
lvii (F, II:12, 512) 
Or il est vray-semblable que, si l'ame sçavoit quelque chose, elle se sçauroit 
premierement elle mesme; et, si elle sçavoit quelque chose hors d'elle, ce seroit son 
corps et son estuy, avant toute autre chose. [ .. . ]Nous nous sommes plus voisins que 
ne nous est la blancheur de la nege ou la pesanteur de la pierre. Si l'homme ne se 
connoit, comment connoit il ses fonctions et ses forces? (T-R, II:12, 543-544) 
lvi ii (F, III: l3 , 1044) 
«veulent se mettre hors d'eux et eschapper à l'homme. » (T-R, III:l3 , 1096) 
lix (F, III:l3 , 1013) 
«Et les Roys et les philosophes fientent, et les dames aussi.» (T-R, III:13, 1063) 
1
' (F, II:6, 332-333) 
Je m'estalle entier : c'est un skeletos où, d'une veuë, les veines, les muscles, les 
tendons paraissent, chaque piece en son siege. L'effect de la toux en produisait une 
partie; l'effect de la palleur ou battement de coeur, un'autre, et doubteusement. Ce ne 
sont mes gestes que j'escris, c'est moy, c'est mon essence. (T-R, II:6, 359) 
lxi (S, 1:26, 185) 
Ce n'est pas une ame, ce n'est pas un corps qu'on dresse: c'est un homme; il n'en faut 
pas faire à deux. (T-R, 1:26, 164) 
lxii (S, 11:1 8, 755) 
«membre de ma vie» (T-R, 11:18, 648) 
lxiii (F III·13 1012) 
' ' ' 
«Que mes yeux y tastent aussi, selon leur capacité.» (T-R, III:13, 1062) 
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lxiv (F, 1:26, 154) 
Hœc demum sapiet dictio, quaeferiet (T-R, I:26, 171) 
lxv (F, II:l7, 606) 
Chacun regarde devant soy; moy, je regarde dedans moy :je n'ay affaire qu'à moy, je 
me considere sans cesse, je me contrerolle, je me gouste. [ ... ]moy je me roulle en 
moy mesme. (T-R, II:17, 641) 
lxvi (F, III :l3, 1040) 
je la veux estendre en pois; je veux arrester la promptitude de sa fuite par la 
promptitude de ma sesie, et par la vigueur de l'usage compenser la hastiveté de son 
escoulement; à mesure que la possession du vivre est plus courte, il me la faut rendre 
plus profonde et plus pleine. (T-R, III:l3 , 1092) 
lxvii (F, II:lO, 361) 
Je dy librement mon advis de toutes choses, voire et de celles qui surpassent à 
l'adventure ma suffisance, et que je ne tiens aucunement estre de ma jurisdiction. Ce 
que j'en opine, c'est aussi pour declarer la mesure de ma veuë, non la mesure des 
choses. (T-R, II:lO, 389) 
lxvii i (F, II: 12, 546) 
Qu'on jette une poutre entre ces deux tours, d'une grosseur telle qu'il nous la faut à 
nous promener dessus : il n'y a sagesse philosophique de si grande fermeté qui puisse 
nous donner courage d'y marcher comme nous ferions, si elle estoit à terre. 
(T-R, II:l2, 579) 
lxix (S, I:26, 177) 
Ce grand monde, que les uns multiplient encore comme especes soubs un genre, c'est 
le miroüer où il nous faut regarder pour nous connoistre de bon biais. Somme, je 
veux que ce soit le livre de mon escholier. Tant d'humeurs, de sectes, de jugemens, 
d'opinions, de loix et de coustumes nous apprennent à juger sainement des nostres, et 
apprennent nostre jugement à reconnoistre son imperfection et sa naturelle foiblesse : 
qui n'est pas un legier apprentissage. (T-R, 1:26, 157) 
lxx (S, 1:8, 31) 
Mais je trouve, [ ... ] que au rebours , faisant le cheval eschappé, [mon esprit] [ ... ] 
(T-R, III:8 , 34) 
CONCLUSION 
The notions which I am propounding have no form and reach no conclusion. [ .. . ] I am 
seeking the truth, not laying it down. i 
Throughout my doctoral work, I have never ceased to be surprised at how vividly 
Montaigne 's Essays speak to humanistic psychotherapists, and at how little we have engaged 
with them. In this thesis, I have discovered and rediscovered ways in which the Essays should 
be a touchstone text for our discipline. My exploration of the Essays brings the experience of 
reading and writing in the humanities together with the experience of speaking and listening 
in therapy. I developed a closeness with this book from another time and place in ways that 
fee! akin to the mysterious experience of mutual revelation in the consultation room. The 
more I read and write, the closer I fee! to Montaigne's world, and the more I come to terms 
with how little I know. Reading and listening in the humanities is about making a place for 
difference in our world, rather than conquering it with theory. Things that are very alien to 
me about Montaigne's experience- for example, the time during which he lived, his intimate 
relationship with kings, or the fact that he bad his very own tower - have brought him closer 
tome; they have become points of contact and places of exchange. 
Through essaying, Montaigne came up against the limits of his reason and experience. 
Instead of reaching beyond these limits for a truth that he could possess, he came to know the 
pleasure of infinitely seeking truth in the presence of another: "[ .. . ] and I find myself more 
by encounter than by inquisition of my own judgement." ii As reader and writer, he 
continually revived ancient human questions by inscribing his persona! questions within the 
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larger community of common human experience, always leaving room for other readers, like 
myself, to bring their own experiences to the table. What strikes me about essaying is that 
questions and answers form an infinitely renewable couple, and that this is a very different 
paradigm than that of the natural sciences. In science, questions are exhaustible. Once a 
question is answered, the couple dissipates, revealing a latent ultimate truth. 
"Halfancient, halfmodern" (Levine, 2001, p. 21), Montaigne's peculiar book sheds light 
on profound differences between the complementary cultures of humane learning and the 
natural sciences. The Essays help me to better distinguish between these separate yet 
intertwined strands of thought that underlie our discipline. I have come to understand that by 
sidelining the humanities in our education and daily lives, we have lost our bearing towards a 
human world. We are losing sight of a world that welcomes and guides us. The Essays' 
hospitable gaze reminds me of the look that parents give their children. It is not a prying look, 
but a gleam of goodwill and contentment just to be in the ir presence. In this sense, the Essays 
serve as a critical counterweight to the alienating forward momentum of modem life that 
academie psychology both bows to and propagates. 
My thesis is an invitation to therapists to come home to a conversation. I want to pique 
the interest of those students, including myself, who fee! like something is missing in our 
increasingly depersonalized education. By picking up on Montaigne's wide-ranging 
conversational beat and embodying the expectancy of his sidelong glanees, I try to entice my 
"definite correspondent"iii along oblique paths into a new conversation about our discipline. 
My essays draw attention to and describe what is lost in academie psychology's pinched view 
of life and learning: a recognizable human world. I hope to inspire therapy students to turn to 
the Essays, and also to other conversations - works of art, music, literature, religion, 
philosophy, history, and mythology- to better understand who we are and where we belong. 
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"And theo, for whom do you write?"iv 
After many years of fulfilling scientific educationa1 requirements, I encountered 
humanistic concerns during my psychotherapy practicum. For the first time, I was required to 
value and cultivate (in myself and in my patient) tolerance of uncertainty, self-reflection, and 
humility. It struck me as odd that most psychotherapy students only begin to really talk about 
these values at the outset of our internships, and often with no broader context than the 
consultation room. It seemed to me that we bad to embody these ideas in practice with little 
relevant framework of thought or richness of meaning. When I searched for answers as to 
why I spent years receiving an apparently unbalanced education fOF a therapist, I found two 
general responses. The most common one was that as a scientist-practitioner, I now have the 
tools and skills to understand the scientific literature on any issue in psychotherapy and 
integrate it into my practice. For example, I can glean from the literature that psychotherapy 
research cl earl y supports humanistic values (Wampold, 2001) and, that more effective 
psychotherapists are better able to tolerate ambiguity (Lecomte et al., 2004). I can measure 
and de fine "intolerance of uncertainty" (lU) (Birrell et al., 2011 ). 
However, when sitting face to face with a real person, expected to have a conversation, 
understanding tolerance of uncertainty as a measurable factor, and not also as a hu man value 
embedded in a long tradition, felt inadequate. Moreover, when sitting face to face with the 
"lU variable" glaring at me from my computer screen, daunting in its statistical significance, 
I felt demoralized. The variable certainly didn ' t ask anything of me, nor could I of it. 
Powerless in the face of anonymous data, I wondered what technique or method could 
possibly help me to master it. 
The second response that I received was that the idea of returning to the humanities in 
psychology is indeed gaining ground. 1 Although this good news is encouraging, it doesn' t 
1 For example, the recent special section of The Humanistic Psychologist (2012) is a cri 
de coeur to revive our ti es to the humanities in response to the AP A ' s recommended plan to 
position psychology as a STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics) discipline. 
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change the reality that most psychology students are living. Our academie and social worlds 
are "inhospitable" to a humanist psychology. The efficient and productive paths that we must 
follow to get into graduate school, receive funding, and complete our degrees, leave little 
room for the liberal arts? In fact, during my first psychology degree, Freud was only 
mentioned once in a passing remark. 
My academie path began in human genetics and moved into experimental psychology. 
But my encounter with the Essays compelled me to take an oblique tum into the humanities. 
Discovering the Essays was a revelation and a homecoming. Finally, here was a world that 
spoke to me, and perhaps would speak to other students equally entrenched in the scientist-
practitioner model. 1 was very fortunate to have stumbled upon the humanistic department at 
l'UQÀM, one of the few in North America that brings the humanities into psychotheiapy 
education. 1 was even more fortunate to have found my director, Bernd Jager, who has a 
special interest in Renaissance humanism and whose profoundly humanist conception of 
psychotherapy is the wellspring of ali of my work. My essays are aimed at students who are 
not so lucky. 1 have particular students in mind: friends who are intrigued by the humanities, 
who love literature and art, but who are caught up in the rat race of psychology doctoral 
programs. Most of us are drawn to psychology and psychotherapy by a desire to contempla te 
the human condition, or to plumb the mysteries of human relationships. Y et we have little 
choice but to enter scientist-practioner programs ifwe want professional accreditation. 
1 sense a malaise in the ever-widening purview of scientific psychology to include such 
subjects as tolerance of uncertainty, presence or alliance. Looking at these questions within a 
scientific framework often seems to be a way to "legitimately", albeit strenuously, pull us 
towards what we have !ost, to an older conception of humanity, to older priorities. This 
movement speaks to a palpable thirst for something beyond operationalizable constructs, for 
something that "is obliterated by calculative frameworks unable to recognize the incalculable 
2 Of course, this problem is not only in psychology, but is part of a broader crisis in 
education and society in which the humanities have been cast aside in favour of the more 
"economically viable" disciplines. 
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character of our humanity" (Sipiora, 2012, p. 260) . My intended reader's ear is already 
pricked, alert to something different from mainstream psychotherapy research. 
Writing as Invitation 
What I have come to better understand through reading, writing and talking about the 
Essays, what bas sustained me, and what I have tried to convey, is that at its heart the 
humanities are about not doing it alone. I think that this notion is itself an inspiration and a 
very tempting invitation, especially to those whose profession is to accompany others. 
In the realm of the humanities, "you trust a conversation to guide your !ife" (Jager, 
persona! communication, October, 2012). Long ago, Montaigne discovered that he wasn't 
guided by ultimate truths but by intimate conversations. Psychotherapy is a contemporary 
space in which to recover this ancient way of seeing, understanding and being. Therapy is by 
and large convincing people that conversations are how we leam to manoeuvre in life. And 
student therapists need convincing too. In our academie world of techniques and outcome 
measures, it's easy for students to fee! like we aren't doing enough in therapy . To move 
towards the humanities is leam to trust conversations, to tolerate the openness of 
conversation by having faith in human testimony rather than on! y in theories (even theories 
about conversation). The Essays help us to see that by articulating our fallibility and 
acknowledging the contestability of our views, we mandate plurality. For "he must first be 
friend and citizen before he can belong to himself in ali his variety [ ... ]" (Starobinski, 1985, 
p. 307). As friend and citizen, we invite the question, "and what do you think?" 
Unlike a conversation, science hems you in. Y our outlook is necessarily pre-determined; 
it cornes fully formed. Science tells you what is worthwhile noticing. There is no need for the 
perspectives of friends or citizens because method demarcates the scope of the investigation. 
A psychology that is situated only within the natural sciences gtves nse to an ill-
conceived notion of psychotherapy. Patients often come to therapy in search of knowledge 
that can fix ali of their problems. They want to be in charge of their own !ife by acquiring 
information or technology that will make them immune to missteps (or taking oblique paths) . 
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A student trained exclusively in the natural sciences risks perpetuating the patient ' s distress 
in a folie à deux : by collaborating in the modern illusion that knowledge can heal. Montaigne 
was not fooled by this illusion. He chided men of letters for being more concerned with 
justifying their knowledge as rational than questioning the worth or foundations of that 
knowledge: 
while these men, through wanting to exalt themselves and swagger around with this 
learning th at is floating on the surface of the ir brain, are perpetually getting confused and 
tangled up in their own feet. [ .. . ] They know Gal en well , but the patient not at ali. v 
In our modern world, as it was during the W ars of Religion, we dream of a theory th at 
can repair the bonds between people. W e want a good theory to understand the misery of the 
world. We seek an ineluctable logic, an established truth so that it will no longer be necessary 
to make sense. But theory and truth cannat substitute loving and relationships. Understanding 
involves suffering, tolerating the abyss between our selves, others and the world. Therapy 
helps us to tolerate the pain of this symbolic separation, once we give up the fantasy that we 
can be together without work. 
Psychotherapy is really about coming to the understanding that our life is not governed 
by our consciousness, but by our friends and loves. It is about creating a relationship in which 
we can come to understand the world and how to live well within it. Together can we be 
confident that it is not necessary to know everything. A relationship where we stand together 
to face li fe has become very precious in modernity, and for this reas on the humanities are 
critical to a therapist ' s education. 
"Now we must not attach learning to the mind, we must incorporate it; we must not 
sprinkle, but dye."vi 
This thesis touches on a very different notion of education for therapists, one in which 
we see ourselves as inheritors of an ancient tradition, rather than part of the vanguard of the 
neurosciences. The original Greek form of humanist learning, paideia, had to do with the 
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raising and education of children. The humanist educator guided his charge through the 
difficult rite of passage from childhood to young adulthood, from the home to the polis . 
Cicero later translated the Greek paideia into the Latin humanitas to describe the education 
of a cultured man. Cicero's humanitas was revived by the Renaissance humanists, and lives 
on in the humanities of toda y. The common thread between paideia, humanitas, and the 
humanities is the understanding that learning involves a difficult and humanizing passage 
between incommensurate worlds, between adolescence and adulthood, between the .home and 
the city, between the ancient world and Christendom. Humanist learning is about becoming 
more human, or as Montaigne would say, "well-formed" rather than "well-filled"vii. 
Following in the footsteps of our forebears, notably Prometheus, Socrates, Cicero and 
Montaigne, the therapist takes on the humanist role of accompanying his patient in a dialogue 
that guides the metaphorical coming together of two inhabited worlds, often the lonely 
experience of suffering and the richness of the common world. We become better guides by 
through meeting and engaging with the works of great writers, artists, poets, and philosophers. 
Our subject is encounter and conversation. Our work is an elucidation of the experience of 
being together, rather than only a refinement of intellect or technique. 
"Open and in Full View, Born for Company and Friendship"viii 
Montaigne stepped out of his workaday !ife to a void "not so much the press of people as 
the press of business". Y et from what was "formerly [ . . . ]the most useless part of the house"ix 
- his infamous tower - he was able to open up to a festive world of dialogue by essaying his 
experience with remarkable candour. Pen in band, he beckons the reader to come along with 
him, to approach the Essays with the same authenticity and openness (Spears, 1988, p. 317). 
Montaigne challenges therapists to step out of the consultation room and to break out of the 
mold of scientific writing and speaking, into a world of real dialogue. In North America, the 
therapists that we see in the public arena are largely expert solution providers . They tell us 
how to live, spout statistics, and dispatch dire warnings about the latest mental illness. 
Montaigne encourages us to take a stand in a different type of discourse: broader, open-ended 
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conversations about societal issues, politics, science, and art. Our unique access to so much 
diverse human experience enables us to make important contributions to cultural dialogue. I 
admire the English therapists Theodore Dalrymple and Susie Orbach, who bring their vast 
clinical experience and conversational ability into mainstream debates on ail sorts of issues. 
Recall that it was in England that the essay first made its mark. Montaigne's radically 
persona! voice was embraced by the 18th century coffeehouse culture of conversation. It can 
be argued that the British are the true heirs of the Montaignian essay form. There has always 
been more room for the distinctive voices of essayists and therapists in British culture than in 
our own. On this side of the pond, with few exceptions, psychologists have !ost touch with 
the idea of being a cheeky alternative. Freud was forced into this position and ever sin ce we 
have been trying to claw our way back to legitimacy, back into the tower. 
In this thesis, I have tried to take up the Essays' challenge to participa te in real dialogue, 
to step into the public square, "in full view", so to speak. Essaying the Essays was a chance 
to practice what I preached and to avoid an impersonal dissertation that risked collecting dust 
on the shelf. By publishing in academie journals, and presenting at conferences, I think that I 
have made sorne inroads into the public sphere. However, l'rn not sure that I have stepped far 
enough out of my own humanistic tower to reach students in scientific psychology. I wonder 
whether publishing in humanistic psychology journals is largely preaching to the choir: 
And unison is an altogether boring quality in discussion. x 
On the other hand, if I were to succeed in publishing in a scientific journal, would my 
intended readers actually have the time or inclination to meander with me through the 
circular dialectic of a 40-page essay, as opposed to quickly gleaning information from the 
abstract and results sections of articles? Psychology graduate students commonly write in 
teams to co-publish 5 or 6 scientific articles during their degree. They need to create and 
acquire massive amounts of information. This is a very different paradigm of writing and 
reading than that of the humanities. An academie journal may not be the most hospitable 
place to meet my reader. 
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To better take up Montaigne on his challenge, and to better reach my intended reader, 
but above ali to pursue my endless enj oyment of the Essays, I propose to write a book. I want 
to revisit and renew the conversation that has emerged in this thesis in a form that better 
speaks to student therapists . ln Good Company: Psychotherapists and the Wine-Maker ji-om 
Bordeaux, will be a companion book of very short and plainspoken musings on diverse 
student therapist experiences and questions, observed in the light of Montaigne's "gay and 
sociable wisdo!TI"xi_ I see it as a friend in book form, outside of the context of journals and 
textbooks. 
In Good Company will aim to entice readers, to ease them into the Montaignian world of 
essaying and the humanities. I want the reader to leisurely sample the essays, to perhaps 
encounter unexpected moments of connection and reflection. Montaigne himself eased into 
essaying, both as a reader and as a writer. His early essays are quite spare and sometimes no 
more than a page long, which is fitting because he preferred leafing through books to 
studying them. In fact, he boasts that it has been twenty years since he spent more than an 
hour with a book. Later, as his own Essays start to come to life, he irreverently concedes that 
two hours might be more appropriate. 
I take my inspiration from Irvin D. Yalom's (2002) exceptional book, The Gift of 
Therapy: An Open Letter to a New Generation ofTherapists and Their Patients. This book is 
a miscellany of advice and personal reflections, gathered into 85 brief chapters, or mini-
essays. Y alom compiled wh at he considers his most important and useful pieces of wisdom 
gleaned from 45 years as a clinician. His book doesn ' t follow "any particular system or 
order", but rather his "passion" and "enthusiasm" (p. xix). He describes his text as having "an 
episodic, lurching quality." (p. xx) We are clearly in Montaignian territory, although he 
makes no explicit reference to the Essays. 
I keep The Gift ofTherapy on band at my office because I find it remarkably calming to 
leaf through it before going into a session. The chapters speak lucidly about simple yet 
profound issues such as shaking your patient's band, how to be supportive, or the importance 
of taking notes after a session. Reading a chapter or two of this book gives me a bit of 
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practical knowledge to hold onto during the initial uncertain moments with my patient. 
However, the true gift of The Gift of Therapy, is the palpable presence of the au thor. Yalom 
credits the presence of Rilke loo king over his shoulder as he wrote the book, spurring him on 
to achieve the "honesty, inclusiveness and generosity of spirit" (p. xix) of Letters to a Young 
Poet. He succeeds; I fee! the experienced Yalom at my side. When I read The Gift ofTherapy, 
I fee! more connected to myself and open to others because presence is a feeling that I am 
most myself wh en I am not al one. This is a therapeutic frame of mind, which helps to prepare 
me for the give and take of the upcoming session. 
Although Yalom wrote the canonical textbook on existential psychotherapy and has had 
an extensive scientific career, his ideas about psychotherapy have come to be most vividly 
expressed through his novels. The Gift ofTherapy is yet another departure for his writing, one 
which brings to mind essayist Robert Dessaix ' s (2010) quip: "Novels have sweep. Essays are 
so small. As each of us is small, of course, wh en ali is said and doue" (p. 36). 
In Good Company will be an invitation for students to judge their own clinical 
experiences against the lived experience of our friend from Bordeaux. I want to bring out 
Montaigne's distinctive voice and encourage therapists to find their own. Just as the therapist 
is a privileged witness of his patient's relationships, I will be a sort of privileged reader of the 
Essays, someone who is already in mid-conversation with the Essays and invites another 
reader to join in. 
In order to prepare this book, I would like to teach a seminar on the Essays to student 
therapists . I hope to enliven the conversation by bringing in their experiences, questions, 
comments and suggestions as students, therapists, readers and writers. I will also draw on 
questions and themes that have arisen or even surprised me during this thesis: What is 
psychotherapy? How do you learn to practice psychotherapy? How is plain speech important 
in therapy? What is the place of theory in a particular encounter with a patient? How do love 
and friendship come into play in therapy? Why is writing so difficult and what does this 
mean for therapists? 
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In Good Company will bring out the natural kinship between essaying and therapy, and 
give a sense of the profound relevance of Montaigne's writings for our practice. 1 hope to help 
readers situate and reflect on our therapeutic thinking. But most importantly, I would Iike 
readers to fee! as I do, that the arnica ble presence of Montaigne stands with me, shoulder to 
shoulder. 
The "presences" that guide our !ife are mostly of this symbolic variety. [ ... ] the parting 
words of a good friend, the reactions of an old teacher to what we said on a particular 
occasion, ali stay with us in a durable way so we see and hear them again at the right 
time when we have to make a particular decision or find ourselves at the crossroads for 
sorne other reason. (Jager, persona! communication, January, 2013) 
I have always considered The Gift ofTherapy to be a Renaissance book. It combines the 
orderliness of a commonplace book with the free-wheeling nature of the Essays, pivoting 
between teaching and relating. Interestingly, while writing this conclusion, I reread Yalom 's 
introduction and found that he got the idea for his book when he chanced upon an exhibit of 
books from Renaissance England. He was surprised that three of the top-ten were how-to 
books: lists of tips or advice. He was equally surprised by his sudden desire to write one 
himself. The Gift ofTherapy fits into a humanist literary tradition which includes the Essays, 
and also many of the velum-bound volumes that Montaigne kept on his bookshelf. Among 
the most dog-eared were Plutarch's Moralia, Seneca's Moral Letters, and Erasmus's Adagia. 
These works embody the humanist idea "that books, Iike conversation be guided by and 
contribute to the liveliness and pleasure of sociallife." (O'Neill, 1982, p. 190) I would like In 
Good Company to offer therapy students a glimpse into their humanist Iiterary lineage and 
inspire them to mingle with people outside of psychology. 
Our curricula is fi lied with busyness and progress. W e run experiments, administra te 
labs, teach classes, participate in conferences, conduct assessments, see patients, attend 
supervision, and apply for grants. I want my book to be an oasis - a place of meeting, not of 
problem solving - an opportunity to reconnect with ourselves, and with others, in a 
conversation about things we have always talked about, with questions that have resonated 
170 
throughout the centuries, and always will. 
Do not read, as children do, to amuse yourself, or like the ambitious, for the purpose of 
instruction. No, read in order to live. (Flaubert, 1857i 
3 (Letter to Mlle Chantepie, June 6 1857, as cited in Frame, 1940, p. 61) 
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Notes 
i (S, 1:56, 355) 
Je propose des fantasies informes et irresolues, [ .. . ]non pour establir la verité, mais 
pour la chercher. (T-R, !:56, 355) 
ii (I: 10, my own translation) 
et [je] me trouve plus par rencontre que par l'inquisition de mon jugement. 
(T-R, 1:10, 41-42) 
iii (S, 1:40; 283) 
«un certain commerce » (T-R, 1:40, 246) 
iv (F, II:17, 605) 
«Et puis, pour qui escrivez vous?» (T-R, 11:17, 640) 
v (F, 1:25, 123) 
ceux cy, pour se vouloir eslever et gendarmer de ce sçavoir qui nage en la superficie 
de leur cervelle, vont s'ambarrassant et enpestrant sans cesse. [ ... ] Ils cognoissent bien 
Galien, mais nullement le malade. (T-R, !:25, 138) 
vi (F, !:25, 125) 
« Or il ne faut pas attacher le sçavoir à l'ame, il l'y faut incorporer; il ne l'en faut pas 
arrouser, il l'en faut teindre;» (T-R, 1:25, 139) 
vii (S, !:26, 168) 
« bien faict »,« bien pleine» (T -R, !:25, 149) 
viii (F, III:3, 758) 
« tout au dehors et en evidence, nay à la societé et à l'amitié » (T-R, III:3, 801) 
ix (C, III:3) 
« C'estoit au temps passé le lieu plus inutile de ma maison.» (T-R:III:3 , 806) 
x (F, III:8 , 855) 
Et l'unisson est qualité de tout ennuyeuse en la conference. (T-R, III:8, 900) 
xi (F, III:5 , 778) 
« J'ayme une sagesse gaye et civile » (T-R, III:5, 822), ou 
«sagesse [ .. . ] gaye et sociale» (T-R, III:13 , 1097) 
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